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Liying Ren, PhD 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
 
 
This study investigates the usefulness of public opinion survey in China for political research.  
Using data from the World Values Survey and from several Chinese public opinion surveys, my 
central inquiry consists of three separate but interrelated issues: are public opinion survey data 
from China truthful, meaningful, and comparable?  I frame these questions in a comparative 
perspective and in the transitional contexts of China.  By examining the issues of item-
nonresponse, norm-seeking response, and cross-national comparability, I show that the validity 
of survey responses in Chinese opinion surveys is mainly influenced by the respondents’ 
cognitive ability, political interest, media exposure, and cultural difference.  Political control is 
present in the form of response effect and information control, but it should not be a serious 
concern about the use of Chinese survey data.   
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1. INTRODUCTION: CHARTING THE VOYAGE OF INQUIRY 
A few months before the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, a Chinese communist party journal, 
Outlook Weekly (Liaowang), published the results from a social survey that was conducted in 
August, 1988, by the Sociological Institute of the Chinese Social Science Association (Zhongguo 
shehui kexue yuan) in collaboration with the State Statistical Bureau.  The study surveyed 12,000 
workers in 16 large cities about their political and social lives.  The results revealed the rising 
intensity of the social conflicts at that time.  For example, when asked what the most urgent 
problems to be resolved were, about two thirds of the respondents chose corruption in the 
communist party and over half of the respondents chose degenerating social morals.  Moreover, 
about 28% of the respondents thought elections were meaningless and should be reformed.  
When asked about the most serious problems in the legal system, the respondents again set fire 
on the corruption of government officials and the poor quality of law enforcement.  In answering 
what were the possible sources of the new social conflicts, 64.1% of the respondents chose rising 
price and 35.3% chose income gap.   These findings indicated with confidence that public 
discontent aroused by corruption and inflation had prevailed and it would possibly cause social 
instability (Zhu 1989). 
While news reports and individual letters to government offices provided many anecdotal 
details of the public discontent, the survey reflected the overall intensity of public reaction to 
corruption and inflation and drew attention from high level government officials, including Deng 
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Xiaoping.  When Deng met with the President of Uganda in late March, 1989, and talked about 
the achievements and difficulties of China’s ten years of reform, he conceived that the biggest 
failure of the reform was political education.  He stated that, “after sober consideration, we think 
the failure (in political education) is even more serious than inflation.  Most importantly, we 
failed to tell the people, including the members of the Communist Party, that we should keep our 
good tradition of thrifty even though we had great economic development and improvement in 
people’s living standard.  Only by following that tradition could we curb corruption” (Deng 1993: 
290).   
In the meantime, another survey report on social reaction under the reform was sent to 
Zhao Ziyang, the then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), through the 
channel of internal publication.  The report was based on a series of surveys that had been 
conducted since 1987 by the China Social Survey System (CSSS) under the direction of Zhao’s 
think tank, the Economic System Reform Institute of China (ESRIC).  It indicated a sharp rise in 
public dissatisfaction and in the belief that the pace of reform was too fast.  Dissatisfaction with 
the CCP, social morals, and prices were particularly higher in late 1988 than they were in early 
1987.  While only 20 percent said reform was too fast in early 1987, over one third said it was 
too fast by 1988.  Meanwhile, the people’s desire for more consumer goods continued to rise.  
When their desire could not be satisfied or secured by the reform, more discontent arose.  Based 
on the evidence, Yang Guansan, the director of the CSSS, predicted that social disturbance might 
happen in spring 1989.1 
The two survey reports to a great degree accurately reflected the social situation of China 
in late 1980’s and successfully provided the information to policy-makers. However, history 
                                                 
1 Personal interview with Yang Guansan, 12/20/2005.  Yang was accused of plotting the turmoil and was put into 
jail because of the report.   
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demonstrates that the Chinese government did not take effective action to ease the people’s 
discontent and eventually led to the June 4th tragedy.  One may expect that the opinion surveys 
should have been muffled after 1989 since they disclose public disapproval of government 
policies, which violates the conformity of socialist ideology and reflects the failure of socialist 
education.  Surprisingly, not only have most of the old survey institutions survived, new survey 
organizations have mushroomed together with China's further economic growth and market 
transition. Government offices, marketing firms, international organizations, and academic 
researchers are all busy at conducting opinion surveys.  They, though with different purposes, 
have collected abundant survey data for studying a variety of topics in transitional China. 
However, the quality of survey data from China is often questioned by researchers.  
Survey quality can vary greatly depending on the availability of resources, the advancement of 
technology, the training and background of survey practitioners, and the cooperation of 
respondents.  While most methodological concerns are general for surveys everywhere, the 
problems related to the validity of survey responses draw particular attention in China’s political, 
social, and cultural contexts.  First, some researchers claimed that “legitimate public opinion 
polling is practically impossible to conduct under authoritarian and totalitarian governments” 
(Warren 2001: 258).  China is not a democracy.  People still have limited, though much more 
than before, freedom of speech; they may have concerns when expressing their opinions in 
public opinion surveys.  Moreover, China is a propaganda state.  Individual opinions are 
confined by government information control and inculcation of official doctrine.  It is 
questionable whether the survey responses are meaningful in public opinion research.  Third, 
China is a developing country.  A great number of Chinese people are poorly educated.  They are 
likely to be limited by cognitive ability and have difficulty to form substantive opinions when 
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confronting complex survey questions.  Fourth, China has a unique history and culture.  It is 
possible that the Chinese have a different understanding from people in other countries even 
though the same questions are asked.  Comparative studies thus may be misled by the superficial 
meaning of survey responses.  For example, statistically significant differences found in studies 
among different populations may not mean that they have different opinions but are possibly 
caused by the different understanding of the concept due to cultural differences.   
It should also be noted that China is in a great transition due to the effect of liberalization, 
modernization, and internationalization.  The state has gradually loosened its control over 
society, media commercialization has greatly weakened the power of propaganda, education has 
been improved significantly, and China has become more open to the world.  Then to what 
extent have the problems of the validity of survey responses been alleviated?  This dissertation is 
an attempt to shed light on this question.  It first investigates the impact of China’s transition in 
the development of public opinion surveys.  Subsequently it examines three separate but 
interrelated issues: is public opinion survey data from China truthful, meaningful, and 
comparable?  The implications of public opinion surveys in China are discussed in the 
conclusion part.     
The introduction to the present dissertation delineates how the scope of the study can be 
narrowed down to the validity of survey responses.  In the remaining pages of this chapter, I first 
give a brief account on the relationship between survey research and public opinion, and point 
out that public opinion surveys pave a way for studying public opinion in non-democratic states.  
Then, based on a review of relevant literature, I describe the state of public opinion surveys in 
China and the contribution of opinion surveys to studies of Chinese politics.  Next, I raise the 
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research question as a result of the problems of public opinion surveys in China.  At the end of 
this chapter, I introduce the data sources for this study and outline the remaining chapters. 
1.1 PUBLIC OPINION AND SURVEY RESEARCH 
“Survey research is systematic data collection in a natural setting for the purpose of answering 
questions about a specified population” (Manion 1994: 743).  Some surveys are done to describe 
the preferences of a population, which we usually call opinion polls; others are more concerned 
with explaining how such preferences are formed and how they relate to other factors.  In this 
study, I refer to both types as public opinion surveys.   
Public opinion surveys originated from America in the 1930s.  It came into public 
attention in 1936 when a young man named George Gallup successfully predicted the winner of 
the presidential election based on his survey findings.  Contrasted with straw polls, which are 
conducted among self-selected population, Gallup’s opinion polls were called “scientific” in that 
he used a statistical approach called random sampling to select respondents with controls.  This 
application allowed the survey findings of small samples to be generalized to the entire 
population from which the samples are drawn.  In those early years, opinion surveys were very 
costly and time-consuming because face-to-face interview was required to get a representative 
sample of a population.   With the rapid development of telecommunication, especially increased 
telephone ownership and the advance of the computer, opinion surveys have become far more 
efficient and cost-effective.  Moreover, some academic survey research centers, such as the 
Institute of Social Science (ISR) at the University of Michigan and the National Opinion 
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Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, were established to greatly improve the 
validity of this method. 
The application of survey research into public opinion study to a great degree changed 
the meaning of public opinion.  Public opinion used to be regarded as a clash of group interests 
(Herbst 1998), a process (Price and Roberts 1987; Crespi 1997), or a consensus through 
continual and institutional communication (Splichal 1999). Now public opinion is commonly 
accepted as an aggregation of individual opinions.  Proponents of opinion survey research 
fervently embrace this definition and argue that this definition can ensure the representativeness 
of public opinion and make it methodologically manageable.  Today, public opinion and the 
results of public opinion polls are often treated as identical (Asher 2001).  However, by reducing 
public opinion to a series of numbers, critics of opinion survey research argue that it deprives the 
holistic feature of public opinion as a process in which horizontal communication plays an 
important part.  It also ignores the reality of group politics that actually works in today’s 
democracies by treating each individual equally (Glynn 1999; Splichal 1999). Nevertheless, 
public opinion surveys have become one of the dominant tools of studying public opinion and 
they have quickly expanded to other parts of the world, not only in virtually every Western-style 
democracies, but also in many communist states and numerous Third World countries 
(Worcester 1987; Warren 2001).    
In most democratic systems, opinion polling is commonly used in three areas: political 
elections, political campaigns, and public policy research. 
Opinion polling shares many features with political elections.  First, both treat all votes 
(individual opinions) as equally important and give them the same weight.  Second, both 
accomplish the results by aggregating all votes (individual opinions) in a straightforward way.  
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The interpretation of the results is seemingly more objective.  Third, both aim to reflect general 
opinion representatively, which serves as the basis for the democratic process.  Therefore, 
opinion polling is often used to find out people’s preferences over candidates in advance of 
election days or even predict election outcomes.  The media is a major sponsor of such polls.  
Many newspapers and TV stations at both national and local levels conduct polls on an ad hoc 
basis covering presidential and local elections as well as other social and political issues.  Media 
polling is widely publicized.  Both voters and candidates can easily learn polling results through 
the media (Atkin and Gaudino 1984; Ismach 1984). 
The power of opinion polling also attracts attention from political parties or other 
political groups.  They recognize that opinion polling is a valuable tool to promote political 
campaigns or group interests.  They conduct private opinion polls, which use essentially the 
same methodology as media polls, but often deal with different issues and are used in a different 
way from media polls.  First, through polling, they want to know what people are most 
concerned about and what kind of issues will motivate them.  Candidates and partisan groups 
thus identify pivotal issues and calibrate their strategies accordingly.  Second, private polls are 
used to develop image profiles of candidates and opponents, which usually include questions 
such as the knowledge of a candidate, voters’ perception of a candidate’s personality, capability, 
experience, knowledge of issues, and inclination to favor one group over another.  Private polls 
can also pinpoint a candidate’s relative strengths and weaknesses among various voter groups, 
such as members of a certain religion, gender, income, ethnic background, union affiliation, or 
other relevant demographic or political characteristics.  Third, private polling is also used to 
measure the effect of campaign activities.  Campaign organizations of some major races usually 
set up voter monitoring systems to track voters’ preferences and reactions continuously through a 
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campaign.  By doing so, they can evaluate the effect of a candidate’s television appearance, 
participation in a debate, the quality of campaign literature, speeches, tours, and other campaign 
activities.  Therefore, private polling can provide voters’ information to political parties or 
groups so that they may consciously choose campaign strategies (Cantrell 1992; Declercq 1978; 
Levy 1984; West 1991).   
Political pollsters found that opinion polls greatly attracted public attention during the 
height of election campaigns; however, during other periods people were also interested in public 
policy issues.   Effective governance requires sufficient social information as an input as well as 
a feedback in the process of policy-making (Deutsch 1963).  As a result, government agencies 
and other institutions found it desirable to sponsor opinion polling for policy research purpose 
(Jacobs and Shapiro 1995).   Opinion polls for policy research can cover a variety of policy 
issues, such as racial equality, health care, educational reform, energy program, environmental 
legislation, foreign relations, and other issues concerning social security.  Like polls used in 
market research, which help corporations stay informed about their customers, opinion polls for 
policy research aim to keep government agencies and other institutions sensitive to public needs 
and preferences.   
In non-democratic countries, without genuine political elections, opinion polling is not so 
commonly used by the media to find out the people’s preferences over candidates or by political 
parties to adjust their strategies of political campaigns as it is in democratic systems.  Instead, 
opinion polls serve both as a control mechanism and a device to assure adequate performance 
within the system in communist states. For example, scholars found that in the Soviet Union “the 
distinctive characteristics of public opinion in the Stalinist system, were, aside from its careful 
control and manipulation, its almost exclusively supportive function and its instrumental use as 
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simultaneously a safety valve and a device for uncovering malfunctions within the system” 
(Gitelman 1977: 2).  Polls were conducted in the Soviet Union in the 1980’s to monitor the 
quality of state services and the officials whose departments got bad reports and were thus fired 
(Smith 1990).  In East Germany, opinion research was also justified as a “policy tool employed 
to ensure the efficient control of society by the party elite …, used in decision-making, in the 
evaluation of already implemented policies or in the manipulation and mobilization of the 
citizens” (Sieger 1990: 324-325).   
Moreover, in some non-democratic systems, especially those under liberalization, opinion 
polling has been gradually used for political consultation in order to improve effective 
governance.  These polls usually deal with demographic characteristics and behavior and avoid 
attitude questions and controversial topics.  As Crespi comments, “political authorities in 
nondemocratic states do not plan to expect opinion research to be used to make them responsive 
to their subjects.  Their use of polls is not a sign that they have accepted the political legitimacy 
of public opinion.  At most, in both authoritarian and totalitarian states polls might be used for 
administrative purposes, analogous to the use of marketing research to enhance a company’s 
business planning” (Crespi 1997:144-145).   
No matter for what purposes, public opinion surveys have not been unique in democratic 
societies.  They have become a universal tool for public opinion research in all countries. 
1.2 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY IN CHINA 
It was not a coincidence that public opinion surveys emerged and have developed quickly in 
post-Mao China.  As a means to study political change in reformed China, public opinion 
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surveys are also under the influence of changing political situations.  Dong Li (1994), in his 
doctoral dissertation, described three phases in the development of Chinese public opinion 
surveys.  The first phase was from 1979 to mid-1982, when China was in its initial stage of 
economic reform.  In this period, public opinion surveys emerged as a response to the imperative 
needs of studying youth problems, which reflected young people’s confusions caused by the 
interacting effects of the unfolding reforms and the residual influences of the Cultural 
Revolution.  These surveys were mostly conducted by official research institutions, like the 
Youth Research Institutes of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the Youth Section of the 
Institute of Sociology, and the Psychology Institute of the Chinese Social Science Academy.  
The second phase was from mid-1983 to 1989, which was China’s most liberalized period.  It 
witnessed that Chinese public opinion surveys have experienced a quick growth in terms of 
numbers, scales and a scope of topics. In this period, youth studies were still dominant, but the 
public’s attitudes toward the reforms were also called into attention.  Survey institutions have 
also expanded drastically.  Official and semi-official survey institutions had developed wide 
survey networks, such as the survey groups under the State Statistical Bureau and under the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions.  China Social Survey System (CSSS), which was under the 
Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (ESRIC), conducted a series of public 
opinion surveys and played an active role in uncovering the public’s feelings toward market 
reform.  Some private survey institutions, though few, also entered this field, such as the Opinion 
Research Center of China (ORCC).  The third phase was from 1989 to 1994 (when his 
dissertation was finished).  Public opinion surveys confronted a tight restriction on topic 
selection and publication of polling results.  Many survey institutions discontinued polling 
activities immediately after the Tiananmen tragedy.  ESRIC was dissolved and so was CSSS.  
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Fortunately, ESRIC remerged in July 1991 under a new name: the Chinese Economic 
Management and System Research Institute (CEMSRI) and resumed conducting opinion surveys 
in September 1991 (Li 1994).  Since the mid-1990’s, China has witnessed a rapid revival of 
public opinion survey research.  The public’s attitudes are widely studied, though certain 
sensitive topics, like those about the Communist Party, are still restricted (Smith 2004).  
Numerous survey organizations emerged, including those attached to government and quasi-
government, academic institutions, and commercial companies (Tang 2005).  
Even though public opinion survey research was still at its infant stage, it had shown a 
great effectiveness to detect the public pulse accurately.  For example, ESRIC had conducted 14 
longitudinal social surveys by the end of 1986.  Results from these surveys revealed three stages 
in the evolution of mass attitudes.  The first stage lasted from October 1984 to early 1995.  It was 
marked by nationwide enthusiasm as a response to the initiation of the urban reforms.  The 
second stage witnessed an increasing dissatisfaction in 1985.  At the third stage, after 1985, 
“pluralism” in both discontent and desire arose (Rosen 1989).  These surveys results provide a 
good source for understanding the changing society under reforms (Tang and Parish 2000). 
The impact of public opinion surveys on the government-public relationship in China has 
attracted a few scholars’ attention in the late 1980’s (Reynolds 1987; Crespi 1989; Rosen 1989).  
Since China is not a democratic state, political responsiveness is excluded from scholars’ 
interest.  They admit that opinion polling in China has a practical function of providing guidance 
in the formulation of government policy.  However, their studies mainly focus on the ideological 
functions of opinion polls in political and normative education and socialization. Crespi states 
that, “the purpose of polling in China is to enable the still totalitarian government to pursue its 
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goals more effectively.  We should not conclude that the use of polls presages a conversion of 
the People’s Republic China into a Western-style democracy” (Crespi 1989: 44-45).   
In contrast to these Western scholars, who are suspicious of the usefulness of Chinese 
public opinion polls, most domestic researchers have the confidence that opinion polls could play 
an important role in China’s political process.  Public opinion polling is regarded as “a tide of 
expressing public opinion” (Zhao et al 2005), and some suggested that it should be incorporated 
into the system of the National Congress (Shi 2004). It was also observed that opinion polls are 
influencing policy making (Liu 2005). The functions of opinion polls include (1) reflecting social 
evaluation, (2) assisting decision-making in public management, (3) alarming social problems, 
and (4) communicating mass opinions (Yuan and Zhou 2005).    
Scholars had different prospects for the future of public opinion surveys in China.  Rosen 
(1989) expected that a stage of “polling mania” would appear following the legitimization of 
public opinion surveys.  However, this “polling mania” would cheapen the value of surveys and 
gradually lead to declining interest in opinion surveys.  Warren (2001), based on his interview 
with Du Yan, a former director of the Institute of China Social Survey (ICSS) that was purged in 
1987, concluded that the polling industry in China was on the decline.  He gave evidence of a 
governmental regulation which was published in 1999.  This regulation orders all overseas-
funded survey institutions or domestic survey agencies employed by foreigners to receive 
approval from national or provincial statistical bureaus.  It obviously limits foreign activities in 
collecting survey data in China.  However, Tang (2005) argues that the purpose of this regulation 
may be beyond political consideration.  As he states, “this measure has proven to be a double-
edged sword.  It strengthened the position of the State Statistical Bureau by giving it further 
administrative authority.  On the other hand, by limiting the number of licensed survey firms, it 
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also provided further reassurance for the State Statistical Bureau’s domination and profitability 
in a growing market of survey research” (p.40).   
1.3 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS AND CHINESE POLITICAL STUDIES 
Studies of Chinese politics have long been dominated by qualitative research or case studies 
before the 1990’s.  Though China’s political change since the reforms attracted many western 
scholars’ interest, large scale survey research had been rarely conducted because of their inability 
to directly conduct research in China.  Some scholars have designed and administered semi-
structured questionnaires to émigré Chinese in Hong Kong to collect first-hand information 
about life in Chinese villages, cities, and factories (Parish and Whyte 1978; Whyte and Parish 
1984; Walder 1986).  However, this method is obviously subject to selection bias and inference 
problems.  The situation has changed since 1990.  In one case, in coordination with domestic 
research institutes, some western scholars have successfully conducted a series of scientific 
public opinion surveys in China, which provided rich data for many works on Chinese politics 
(e.g., Manion 1996; Jennings 1997, 1998; Shi 1997, 1999; Chen and Zhong 2002; Chen 2004; 
Tang 2001, 2005).  In another case, certain survey data collected by domestic survey 
organizations, such as the Economic System Reform Institute of China (ESRIC), the State 
Statistical Bureau (SSB), and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, have become available 
to researchers.  Some western scholars are able to get access to these data through personal 
connections.  These data are precious in studying China’s societal and political changes since 
some of them are even longitudinal (Tang 1993; Tang and Parish 2000).   
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Since an institutionalized linkage between public opinion and political policy is absent in 
non-democratic systems, most China studies based on survey data focus on political 
development and social changes.  In 1993, the American Journal of Political Science published a 
pioneering study that mainly relies on survey data from China (Tang 1993).  Drawing data from 
the 1986-1987 World Bank—Chinese Academy of Social Science joint survey, this study 
examines employee participation in management decision making in Chinese local industrial 
firms.  This survey was “the single largest and the most comprehensive data set on Chinese local 
industries” at that time.  In the early 1990’s, two large scale social surveys were conducted in 
China as an effort of successful coordination between western and domestic scholars.  The first 
one was a joint research between the departments of political science at the University of 
Michigan (US) and at Peking University (China). The survey was conducted in four counties, 
which were selected from a list of approximately 30 counties according to “a combination of 
purposive and accidental/convenience criteria2.”   The data provided valuable sources to a series 
of studies on political participation in the Chinese countryside, including two publications on the 
American Political Science Review (i.e., Manion 1996 and Kennings 1997), and one on the 
Journal of Politics (i.e., Jennings 1998).  Another survey aimed to study political participation 
nationwide.  This study was conducted by Tianjian Shi, who was still a PhD student at Columbia 
University.  It was initially conducted in cooperation with the Opinion Research Center of China 
under the Beijing Social Economic Research Institute.  However, it was interrupted by the 
Tiananmen Square protests right after the researchers finished their pilot study in Beijing.  The 
                                                 
2 As Jennings (1997) explains, the four counties were “purposely chosen so that they would differ in terms of 
economic well-being and diversification, proximity to large urban centers, population size, and province.  The 
accidental/convenience aspect of their selection rests on the fact that gaining access to the counties depended upon 
local cooperation, which hinged in large part on the presence of contacts and connections there” (Jennings 1997: 
362).   
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project was reactivated in the winter of 1990, with a new partner—the Social Survey Research 
Center of the People’s University of China.  Based on the survey data from both the pilot study 
in Beijing and the later nationwide study, Tianjian Shi enriched the literature on the empirical 
study of mass political culture and behavior, especially through survey techniques, which has 
been a weakness in Western scholarship of China (Shi 1997, 1999, 2001).   
Tang and Parish’s study on Chinese urban life under reform was also a breakthrough on 
using existing survey data to study political and social changes in China (Tang and Parish 2000).  
They employ a series of surveys conducted by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
(ESRIC), which was a government think tank designed to provide policy advice on economic 
reform.  These surveys were conducted by well-trained survey research professionals and in the 
most liberal period since the reform.  Analyses of these data provided a convincing picture and 
many intriguing findings on the Chinese reality on education, jobs, economic rewards, popular 
reactions, labor-management relations, and other important topics.   
As survey research enjoys more freedom in China, scholars are encouraged to introduce 
China into the community of comparative studies.  For example, the World Values Surveys 
(WVS) is a cross-national survey project coordinated by Ronald Inglehart, an American political 
scientist, in cooperation with numerous survey researchers and survey institutes throughout the 
world.  The WVS began to include China from its second wave (1990) and subsequently 
cooperated with various survey research organizations ranging from governmental apparatuses, 
market firms, to academic research institutes.3  All datasets have been published at the website of 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of 
                                                 
3 The WVS was conducted by the National Statistical Information Center in 1990, the Gallup (China) in 1995, and 
the Research Center from Contemporary China at Peking University in 2000. 
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Michigan.  These data are extremely precious for the study of Chinese politics from a global and 
comparative perspective (Tang 2005). 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION: THE VALIDITY OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
Though studies based on Chinese survey data have been accepted by most academic journals 
today, the quality of the survey data is often questioned by readers.  Warren (2001) proposes two 
basic prerequisites of acceptable opinion survey research.  First, the societies in which survey 
research is carried out should be “open and free, allowing their citizens to feel comfortable in 
giving honest answers to interviewers without fearing that their responses may be found out by 
the government and retaliatory steps taken against them for answers that governmental officials 
do not like”.  Second, these societies should be “relatively affluent and technologically advanced, 
making it far easier for pollsters to conduct costly yet methodologically sophisticated polls”.  As 
a developing country under communist control, China obviously cannot meet these conditions.  
Consequently, the validity of survey responses and the rigorousness of survey methodology in 
Chinese surveys are two major concerns when Chinese survey data are used in scholarly studies.   
The quality of Chinese public opinion surveys is often inflicted by the practitioner’s lack 
of adequate training.  “Bad” opinion surveys are pervasive.  For example, non-probability 
samples are widely used, especially in surveys conducted by government organizations and some 
marketing research firms.  Interviewer’s problems are also serious.  It is not uncommon in China 
that interviewers select respondents by their own convenience and do not follow the instructions 
as supervision is loose (Li 1994).  However, as the practice of survey research is becoming more 
 16 
mature and regulated, these problems are expected to decrease though they may not be 
completely eliminated.   
Survey researchers also dealt with sampling problems in Chinese surveys. For example, 
drawing representative national samples in China is uncommon due to China’s large area and 
huge population and the usual limitations of budget for survey research.  Thus, most Chinese 
public opinion surveys are based on local samples, that is, respondents within the localities are 
selected by probability model, yet localities are non-randomly selected.  Aware of this problem, 
Manion (1994) distinguishes “benign biases”, “manageable threats”, and “fatal blows” in making 
inferences from studies of local samples.  Both “benign biases” and “manageable threats” can be 
remedied through statistical techniques.  Thus she concludes, “while data from local samples 
cannot be relied on for descriptions of a larger population among any single dimension, this 
unrepresentativeness does not necessarily affect generalizability of findings about relationships 
between variables” (Manion 1994: 764).   
In recent years, a serious problem on the representativeness of survey samples arises with 
the growing number of migrant people in China.  Traditional sampling methods of Chinese 
public opinion surveys rely on household registration, but such methods are unable to reach the 
migrants and thus cause serious coverage errors.  Landry and Shen (2005) propose a new 
sampling method based on spatial sampling with the aid of global positioning system (GPS).  
The basic idea is to draw random samples from the block list which is generated by GPS 
technology.  Surveyors use GPS receivers to determine the latitudinal and longitudinal 
boundaries of each block and enumerate the households residing within the boundaries.  All 
households (or a fixed proportion of households to respondents) in the selected block are 
interviewed.   This method significantly reduces coverage bias.  However, it also incurred an 
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increase of cost and is only applicable in the areas that have perfect Geographical Information 
System (GIS).   
In contrast to the attempts to solve the problem of sampling bias, very few studies have 
examined the problems of the validity of survey responses in Chinese surveys.  Comparative 
analysis of Chinese survey data usually assumes three conditions.  First, the respondents in the 
surveys are assumed to give truthful responses.  They do not attempt to hide their true opinions 
by saying “don’t know” or giving norm-seeking responses.  Second, survey responses are 
assumed to reflect respondents’ independent opinions.  People can form their own opinions 
without or with minimal influence of political manipulation.  This condition is especially critical 
to test theories in China’s context. Third, the concepts measured in Chinese public opinion 
surveys are assumed to be comparable with those from other countries’ surveys. These 
assumptions, however, should not be taken for granted.  Instead, in China’s current situation, the 
conditions are rather variables that have impacts on the quality of survey data.  This project 
provides insights into the circumstances under which public opinion surveys have emerged as a 
promising technique to study public opinion in China.  More importantly, it investigates three 
survey response problems in the Chinese context: item non-response, norm-seeking response, 
and cross-cultural response. 
Item non-response, or “don’t know (DK)” answers, happens when respondents fail to 
give answers to certain survey questions.  In some scholarly works, “don’t know” respondents 
are typically excluded with an implicit assumption that they are identical to non-DK respondents, 
or to be placed at the mean of the variables, assuming that they really have opinions.  Another 
approach is simply to take DK responses as non-attitude responses; i.e., to assume that these 
individuals, were they to respond, would respond randomly (Rapoport 1979; Rubin, Stern, and 
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Vehovar 1995).  However, these assumptions may not be valid.  In fact many scholars have 
shown DK responses are systematically related to respondent attributes (Faulkenberry and 
Mason 1978; Francis and Busch 1975; Sanchez and Morchio 1992; Berinsky and Tucker 2006) 
or to characteristics of the data-gathering procedure (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984; 
Harmon 2000; Sanchez and Morchio 1992; Smith 1997).  Moreover, DKs may not only mean no 
opinion, it may also implies indecisive opinion (hard to choose), hidden opinion, uncertainty 
about the meaning of questions, and so on (Bogart 1967; Carnaghan 1996; Coombs and Coombs 
1976-1977; Noelle-Neumann 1984; Shoemaker, Eichholz, and Skewes 2002; Sicinski 1970; 
Smith 1984).  DK problems can also have adverse effects on the representativeness of survey 
findings and even lead to wrong policies as a consequence (Berinsky 2004). 
The second problem is norm-seeking responses.  A norm is “a principle of right action 
binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control and regulate proper and 
acceptable behavior” (Webster’s Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary: 790).  Norms can influence 
the formation and expression of public opinion, and four situations may result based on a 
compliance-acceptance model (Nail 1986).  The first situation is conversion.  In this case, the 
individual has accepted the group norm as “correct” and is willing to agree with the group 
verbally.  The second is compliance.  The individual is resistant to the group norm but will 
express agreement publicly due to certain perceived pressures.  In the third situation, anti-
compliance, the individual accepts the group norm privately but denies them publicly.  This 
situation is rare in reality.  The last situation is independence, in which the individual does not 
care what others think and insists to express his/her own opinions publicly.  Obviously, the 
second situation poses a problem on the validity of survey responses.  This problem is usually 
called “social desirability.”  It happens when respondents believe that there is a “right” answer to 
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the question which is shared by the majority or valued by society.  If asked about their own 
opinion, they are inclined to pick this response.   The individual tends to give norm-seeking 
responses when he/she perceives that the group has coercive power or the ability to reward; and 
such normative influence can be powerful if the reference group is very important to the 
individual (Hogg and Turner 1987).  Norm-seeking responses are existent in opinion surveys in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Welsh 1981).  They are also present at the mythological 
level of public opinion in states with moderate repression levels (Shlapentokh 1985, 1986). 
 Cross-cultural responses are often discussed in conjunction with comparability and 
equivalence (e.g., Warwick and Osherson 1973; Kohn 1989; Inkeles and Sasaki 1996).  
Equivalence is a key requirement for comparability.  It is fathomed by scholars in various 
disciplines, with different emphases, using numerous terms in cross-cultural studies (see a 
thorough review in Johnson 1998).  In these contributions, concept equivalence and 
measurement equivalence are critical to obtaining comparable survey responses.  Concept 
equivalence depends on the extent to which different culture-based respondents interpret a 
concept in a similar manner.  It originates from the problem of concept traveling, that is, whether 
concepts developed in one context carry the identical meaning in others (Sartori 1970).  Concept 
traveling cannot be avoided in doing comparative research since almost all concepts are 
originally developed in some particular contexts (historically, geographically, or culturally) and 
may not be readily applied to other contexts.  It is not surprising that words used in one country 
may have different meanings or even lose meanings in other countries.  Though complete 
equivalence in concept interpretation may not be practical in cross-cultural studies, ignorance or 
mistreatment of this problem carries a high risk in leading to false conclusions and invalid 
generalizations.   
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Measurement equivalence refers to the situation where cross-cultural survey responses 
are measured in a similar manner.  A common and simple practice of measurement equivalence 
is to ask the same question in different countries.  It often requires a proper translation across 
language groups to ensure consistency of measurement.  However, this method is easily subject 
to the concept traveling problem without regard to cultural differences.  In light of this problem, 
Przeworski and Teune (1966-1967) propose an approach that combines cross-national identical 
indicators and nation-specific indicators.  First of all, multiple indicators are preferred to measure 
complex concepts across nations. In addition to a few questions that use the similar wordings, 
some questions that are specific to nation’s contexts should be also included.  “According to the 
proposed procedure, measurement of similar variables in different countries are said to be 
identical if the same, interdependent indicators are used to assess the same phenomenon.  In 
other words, the measurement is identical to the extent to which the operations furnish 
homogeneous indices for all countries.  Measurements for specific countries are equivalent to the 
extent to which the specific measures are related to the identical measures.” (p.568)  Therefore, 
measurement equivalence is not limited by similarity of question wordings; it also relies on the 
similarity of interrelationship among multiple indictors of the same variable. 
Studying these problems are of special significance not only because it is fundamental to 
justify empirical research of Chinese politics based on survey data but also because these 
problems themselves to some extent can reflect the situation of Chinese political and social 
development.  In this sense, this project is a political study of survey quality rather than a pure 
methodological exploration. 
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1.5 DATA 
When choosing survey data for this project, I have several considerations in mind.  First, I wish 
that the data are from a survey that is designed and conducted by serious and professional survey 
practitioners.  Since this study focuses on the validity of survey responses, I would use data that 
is least contaminated by technical problems in the process of survey research operation.  Second, 
I wish that the survey includes some substantive political questions and the problems on survey 
responses to these questions are of academic interest to political researchers.  Third, I wish that 
the data have counterparts from other countries so that I can study the problems in a comparative 
perspective.  Fourth, I wish the data are from a study that is well-known and influential.  Thus 
the findings from this project can to some extent enrich the existing research literature. 
 The World Values Survey (WVS) data stand out as an ideal source for this research 
purpose.  The WVS originated from European Values Study (EVS) and extended to countries 
outside Europe in 1981, which constituted the first wave of the WVS.  The surveys aim to be 
longitudinal as well as cross-cultural.  The second wave of the WVS (1990) was conducted 10 
years after the first and embraces 42 countries.  The interval between the waves was shortened to 
5 years for the third (1995), fourth (2000), and fifth (2005) waves, which includes 52 and 64 
countries separately.  In total, the WVS covers 81 societies containing 85 percent of the world's 
population.   
 The WVS was conducted by the Institute of Social Research at the University of 
Michigan (ISR) in collaboration with leading survey research organizations in each country.  
Professor Ronald Inglehart from the University of Michigan is the principal investigator in this 
project.  The survey covers a variety of research topics, such as socio-cultural, moral, religious, 
and political values and attitudes.  It employs detailed questionnaires and face-to-face interview 
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techniques in methodology.  Representative samples were drawn from each country and the 
number varies from 1000 to 3500 per country.  The WVS in China started from 1990 and 
continued in 1995, 2000, and 2005.   Three survey research organizations participated in this 
project.  They were the Information Center at the National Bureau of Statistics of China for 
1990, Gallup-China for 1995, and the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking 
University (RCCC) for 2000 and 2005. 
 I finally selected the data from the fourth wave of the WVS for this project.  Other than 
that they included the largest number of countries among the five waves, they met other criteria 
in my mind.  The Chinese survey in this wave was conducted by the RCCC, a research institute 
with a focus on social surveys since 1995.  The director, Dr. Shen Mingming, is an alumnus of 
the University of Michigan.  He was well trained in survey methodology and had participated in 
numerous survey projects in the ISR.  Led by him, the RCCC has received substantive support 
from the ISR in terms of personnel training and methodological consultation.   It has also 
collaborated with many noted scholars worldwide in recent years and conducted a series of 
surveys of high quality (see Chapter 2 for more details about the RCCC).  Moreover, the RCCC 
is situated in China’s most liberal university – Peking University.  It enjoys relatively more 
freedom in research than governmental, commercial, and even some other academic survey 
research organizations.  For example, the questions on the political system and democracy, 
which were previously excluded from the Chinese questionnaire in the World Values Survey. 
were successfully asked in the fourth wave.  The responses to these questions constitute the main 
subjects of this study.4  
                                                 
4 A part of the fifth wave data of the World Values Survey was newly released at the WVS website 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) in October, 2008.  The Chinese survey was also conducted by the RCCC.  
However, the data correspond to 53 countries, in which 44 countries carried the complete questionnaire and 9 
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 In addition to the WVS, another representative national survey, “Chinese Value and 
Ethics Survey (CVES) 2004” (Zhongguo Gongmin Sixiang Daode Guannian Zhuangkuang 
Diaocha), serves as a complementary source for this project since it repeated many questions 
from the WVS, such as those on social norms and values, political attitudes, life satisfaction, and 
trust.  CVES was also conducted by the RCCC. In this research a pioneer spatial sampling 
technique with the aid of GPS was first employed for large scale survey and it finally drew a 
random sample of 7714 respondents in 200 townships and districts from 100 counties and cities.  
This method was expected to better capture the floating population than traditional sampling 
method based on household registration, and thus, to a considerable extent, reduced coverage 
biases. 
1.6 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
In chapter 2, I provided a detailed examination of the development of public opinion surveys in 
China.  I first give a brief description about the great changes in China since the reforms, which 
mainly consist of three processes: liberalization, modernization, and internationalization.  Based 
on this background discussion, I further analyze some particular contexts that are conducive to 
the growth of public opinion surveys in China.  I stress that social context generates demands for 
scientific public opinion research, which was quickly adopted by the Chinese government.  The 
revival of the social science discipline to a great extent creates the need for modern public 
opinion research.   Subsequently I describe three types of opinion survey research organizations: 
                                                                                                                                                             
countries carried the reduced version.  So I still use the fourth wave data as the major data source for this project 
since it contains data from 70 countries and it is more familiar to scholars. 
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government opinion research apparatuses, academic opinion research institutes, and commercial 
opinion research firms.  Some leading opinion research organizations of each kind are 
introduced.  Lastly, I address some problems of public opinion surveys in China, such as 
reputation of the profession of opinion survey research, the political impacts on conducting 
survey in China, and the academic needs of data openness and data sharing. 
 The following three chapters examine three problems of survey responses in Chinese 
surveys respectively.  These problems represent some general concerns in the mind of many 
western scholars towards Chinese opinion surveys.  Chapter 3 is devoted to exploring the 
problem of item non-responses.  Generally respondents have three reasons to give a “don’t 
know” answer: first, they truly do not know the answer; second, they do not care what the 
answer is; and third, they do not want to tell their true opinion.  Empirical analysis of survey data 
provide evidence that support the first two reasons, whereas the third reason, though supported 
by response effect, does not create a serious concern for survey research on Chinese politics.  
These findings are further confirmed by a comparative analysis of China with India, South 
Korea, Vietnam, and the United States.  My study suggests that modernization and culture play a 
more important role to cause item non-responses than does systemic effect or political fear.   
Chapter 4 deals with a follow-up question of Chapter 3: even if Chinese respondents give 
answers to survey questions, do they really mean it?  Taking survey responses on political 
support as an example, I examine regime type, culture, and rationality explanations for the high 
level of political support in China revealed by survey data.  I first demonstrate that political 
support based on survey responses has two dimensions: institution-based and performance-based 
support. At the macro (country) level, I find that the undemocratic feature of Chinese political 
system appears to be a major contributor to political support in both dimensions.  At the micro 
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(individual) level, the respondents may express more support for political institutions due to fear 
of political retribution or political desirability, but they do not have such concerns for regime 
performance related questions.  Moreover, those who are conservative, have strong feelings of 
nationalism or positive assessment of subjective well-being are more likely to be the institution-
based supporters, whereas the performance-based supporters are more likely to be acceptors of 
official information and beneficiaries of economic reforms.      
The comparability of survey responses is the analytical focus of Chapter 5.  Based on my 
reflection of the debates on the relationship of interpersonal trust and democracy, I conceive that 
comparative researchers should pay attention to two issues: measurement and inference.  I first 
examine the measurement of interpersonal trust in Chinese surveys and find that Chinese people 
think of trust mostly in terms of relationships with acquaintances, though the purpose of  the 
researchers is to identify interpersonal trust in general.  Subsequently I propose a nonparametric 
approach to measuring democratic support based on the people’s attitudes to four political 
systems including democratic systems.  Cross-validation proves that this measurement of 
democratic support, when aggregated, has a stronger association with the Freedom House scores 
on civil and political rights than other measurements of democratic support based on a single 
question.  Lastly I conduct a multilevel analysis to investigate the relationship of interpersonal 
trust and democratic support at both country and individual levels.  The results show that 
interpersonal trust is not associated with levels of democratic support at the country level, and its 
effects at the individual level vary across countries.  The variation to a certain degree is caused 
by different cultural contexts and institutional settings.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I recapitulate my early findings and highlight the contextual effects 
on public opinion surveys in China.  I also discuss the implications of public opinion surveys for 
 26 
Chinese political studies and suggest directions for future research in the relationship between 
public opinion surveys and policy making. 
 
 
 27 
2. SURVEYING PUBLIC OPINION IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA 
“Until recently, U.S. scholars specializing in China paid episodic attention to Chinese mass 
sentiments.  The concept of public opinion did not appear in the lexicon of contemporary 
U.S. sinology until the 1980s.” (Allan Liu 1996: 2) 
 
As public opinion entered the scope of China studies among western scholars, concerns rose over 
how to collect public opinion accurately in contemporary China.  This chapter will study the 
development of public opinion surveys in the context of transitional China.  Since the reforms, 
China has experienced great changes as a result of liberalization, modernization, and 
internationalization.  These changes opened a door for modern public opinion survey research 
and led to a proliferation of various types of opinion survey organizations in China.   After a 
brief examination of the changing process in China since the reforms, this chapter will address 
the following questions: why has public opinion survey, which has been an integral part of 
political life in most democracies, mushroomed in contemporary China?  How have public 
opinion surveys grown in terms of organizations and research topics?  And what are the 
problems of public opinion surveys in China? 
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2.1    CHINA UNDER TRANSITION 
The communist China was founded in the wake of the defeat of the Japanese invasion and the 
expulsion of the Kuomintang to Taiwan Island.  The Chinese Communist Party had obtained 
pervasive trust and support from the mass in the first several years (Fairbank 1987).  It not only 
promised egalitarian and affluence by inculcating Marxism ideology in Chinese people but also 
carried out concrete measures to control inflation, curb corruption, improve health care, spread 
literacy, and so forth.   Meanwhile, it established strong bureaucratic political system and 
central-planning economic system that put the society under the tight control of the state.  This 
situation, however, has started to change since 1979.  First, a series of radical campaigns since 
early 1950s, with a peak at the Cultural Revolution, to a great extent shook or even destroyed 
people’s beliefs in communism as well as their confidences in the communist governments.  The 
death of Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 further endangered the 
government’s legitimacy which was mostly based on charisma.  In the aftermath of the 
devastating mass movements, an urgent task for the Chinese Communist Party was to reestablish 
the social order.  However, neither ideological nor repressive measures were as effective as 
before.  At this critical point, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party was held in late 1978. A group of more pragmatic party leaders 
regained dominant political power and started some new trials to direct political and economic 
development in the country. 
Different from the early socialist reforms, the new reforms lacked a blueprint.  Though 
reluctant to admit the failure of the socialist trials, the reformists, especially Deng Xiaoping, 
obviously gave up theoretical guidance of Marxism and Leninism to a considerable extent.  On 
the one hand, they proposed a higher “doing” standard to test the “guiding” theories and claimed 
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that “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.”  On the other hand, they set up some new 
pragmatic guidelines for the reforms, which were reflected in Deng’s words such as “white cat or 
black cat, the cat that catches mice is a good cat,” and “wading across the rive by finding 
stepping-stones.”  With these thoughts in the mind of “the chief architect” for the reforms, it was 
hard to predict where China would go.  In retrospect, China’s transition involved three processes 
of change: liberalization, modernization, and internationalization.   
The process of liberalization started right after the Cultural Revolution.  To fight with the 
extreme left thoughts among the people, especially among the government officials, the 
reformists initiated a series of discussion on “truth.”  Playing a role of icebreaker, the discussion 
put the official ideologies under question and reexamination.  While being consciously aware 
that their reform proposals could not fit in the frame of the official ideologies completely, the 
reformists could not deny the official ideologies which constitute the legitimacy base for the 
Chinese Communist Party.  In a crafty way, they selectively adopted some arguments from 
Marxism, Leninism and Mao’s thoughts as theoretical support of their reform plans under the 
umbrella of Chinese characteristics.  In addition, they purposefully collected Deng’s speeches 
since the reform and developed it as the theories of Deng Xiaoping to guide the reform process.  
While still claiming Marxism, Leninism and Mao’s thoughts as the official ideologies, the party 
had gradually adapted a pragmatic approach to replace the role of the Communist ideology.   
Modernization had been a goal for Chinese reformists since the late Qing dynasty.  In the 
reform agenda of the Chinese Communist Party, three aspects stood out.  The first was education 
improvement.  Elementary education was overly emphasized in China under Mao.  The policy 
had significantly reduced the number of illiterate people, though at the cost of higher education.  
A relatively balanced education system had been gradually reestablished since the reform.  
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People had more opportunities to get higher education as a variety of colleges, universities, 
televised and night schools had been established to meet all kinds of educational needs.  The 
policy of mandatory nine-year education also effectively kept young children in school.  As a 
result, the average education level of Chinese had been improved greatly.  The second aspect of 
modernization was technology advancement.  The reformists gave up the populist approach to 
develop economy and turned to intellectuals’ talents.  Factories were enthusiastic to replace 
outdated equipments; technical inventions were highly encouraged; new technologies were 
quickly imported from abroad; many technicians or researchers were sent out abroad for better 
training.  China had quickly caught up with some developed countries especially in 
communication and computerization technologies.  The process of modernization also involved 
an increasing attention to scientific management.  As market competition was integrated into 
China’s economic system, factories and enterprises had to respond to market needs rather than 
plan their activities according to commands from higher ups.  As a result, productivity and profit 
became major concerns of the entrepreneurs and successful management paradigms were in great 
demand.  This tide also extended over to government administration management.  Effective 
governance had been a focus of administration reforms, and it had attracted growing attentions in 
recent years. 
Reform and open-up were two integral parts of China’s transition.  Accompanying the 
processes of liberalization and modernization, China had boarded a train for internationalization.  
The first sign was the influence of western culture. An immediate result following the initiation 
of liberalization was a booming market of publications.  A great number of books and journals 
introducing western thoughts and cultures flooded into China.  They exerted significant influence 
on intellectuals and young students.  The second was the development of inter-dependent 
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markets.  To achieve rapid modernization, China imported advanced technologies and 
equipments from overseas.  Meanwhile, China also formed one of the largest export markets by 
selling cheap manufactures to the world.  The third was the collaboration between domestic and 
foreign organizations.  The reforms offered opportunities for foreign organizations to enter 
China.  They usually collaborated with domestic partners in order to get more freedom and 
resources.  This collaboration could be in various types and to various extents.  It started from 
some joint projects between civil and economic organizations, and quickly extended to even 
political domains.   
It is hard to describe the current state of Chinese political system.  Some scholars tried to 
capsulate it as “authoritarianism” with constraint of different adjectives, such as “consultative 
authoritarianism”, “fragmented authoritarianism” or “soft authoritarianism”.   A consensus of 
these arguments is that China had grown out of its Leninist system of party-state governance and 
deviated from its totalitarian path.  They, however, differ from one another in research 
perspectives by emphasizing different features of political changes in China.  
“Consultative authoritarianism” was first discussed by Skilling (1970) based on his 
comparison of the characteristics of Communist systems from an approach of group conflict.  He 
described that consultative authoritarianism was a period in which interest groups still had 
limitation in freedom of expression, but they were valued for their expertise and thus acquired an 
opportunity to articulate their interests.  Harding (1987) argued that China has entered a period of 
“consultative authoritarianism” in the post-Mao era.  He observed that China “increasingly 
recognizes the need to obtain information, advice, and support from key sectors of the 
population, but insists on suppressing dissent, cultivating its vision of public morality, and 
maintaining ultimate political power in the hands of the Party” (Harding 1987: 200).  The 
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concept of “consultative authoritarianism” helps to understand the process of political 
liberalization during the Deng era.  “Consultative” pinpoints the attempt of the Chinese 
Communist Party to seek effective governance and incorporate social groups within the party-
state structure.  “Authoritarianism” indicates the Party had the retention of ultimate authority 
over the society.  It sheds light on the successive loosening and tightening of political controls, 
which may “reflect the uncertainty within the Party over the proper blend between consultation 
and authoritarianism, and over the proper boundaries between the permissible and the 
proscribed” (Harding 1987: 200).  However, it makes the transitional process more volatile and 
less predictable.   
Examining the relationship between central and local governments, Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) found that the central government has lost its powerful control within the 
bureaucratic structure as a result of decentralization in the reformed China.  They posit a new 
concept of “fragmented authoritarianism.”  On the one hand, China was authoritarianism in 
nature.  There was only one dominant party which strongly controlled the bureaucratic system 
and penetrated into the society.  On the other hand, local governments had gained relatively more 
freedom in policy-making and thus had more leverage in bargaining with the central government.  
Moreover, without a powerful control from above or effective central coordination, local 
protectionism arose and led to a state of “fragmentation.”  This concept captures the disorderly 
situation of the inception of administrative reform.  However, it overstates the weakness of the 
central government, which still enjoyed great power in controlling the bureaucratic systems in a 
party-state. 
“Soft authoritarianism” has gained scholars’ attention as an alternative of Western liberal 
democracy in Asia.  It has two distinguishing characteristics.  First, it emphasizes Confucian 
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culture in which people should conform to group interests over individual rights.  Second, it 
combines a free market economy with “a kind of paternalistic authoritarianism that persuades 
rather than coerces” (Fukuyama 1992).  Thus it results in a regime which is “economically 
liberal but politically quasi-authoritarian” (Roy 1994).  Singapore is a typical example of “soft 
authoritarianism.”  Its former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argues that good government is the 
real objective of a political system while democracy should be as a means rather than as the ends.  
The most important elements of good government are order and economic well-being.  To a 
great degree his thoughts favor Chinese leaders, who are seeking prosperity through economic 
reforms while trying to prevent political reforms from threatening the one-party system.    Soft 
authoritarianism, thus, legitimizes China’s pro-economics and anti-democracy reform plans. 
In summary, China’s transition started in the aftermath of the political crisis of the 
Cultural Revolution.  It involved three major processes of change: liberalization, modernization, 
and internationalization.    Scholars commonly agree that China had stepped out of a totalitarian 
state and embraced many authoritarian features.  Lacking a clear political scenario, however, 
China’s transition is more uncertain than predictable.  
2.2 CONTEXTS FOR PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY RESEARCH 
When public opinion survey was introduced to China in early 1980s, it had become a 
conventional tool of collecting public opinion in many Western countries.  Surprising to most 
China observers and western scholars, public opinion survey had developed so fast in China that 
today numerous survey research organizations have been established and survey data have been 
extensively used by governments, academia, and commercial companies.  What are the driving 
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forces for this development?  I will seek explanations in historical, political, social, and research 
contexts of China. 
2.2.1 Historical context 
Traditional public opinion research in China differed in many ways from that in the Western 
world.  It was guided by totally different theories of public opinion and evolved from some 
particular experiences. 
The traditional political culture of China did not value participation and consultation with 
mass public opinion.  The core of Confucianism is to educate people to behave in proper way 
and thus create a harmonious society, in which all members fulfill their social duties yet do not 
act beyond that.  The rulers’ duty is to rule the masses, while the masses’ duty is to obey the 
rulers.  Thus Confucianism rules out opportunities for the masses to participate in political 
process and cultivates a passive public.  However, in Confucianism it is also believed that the 
ruler’s power is mandated by Heaven, which is different from the Western divinity.  If the ruler 
fails to fulfill his moral obligation, the ruled have the right to revolt and Heaven would pass the 
ruling power to another person with better virtue and benevolence.  So governments are often 
under the evaluation of the mass in Chinese traditional culture.  Lin found that “the Chinese are 
great critics of their rulers, perhaps even more so than western people.  What makes the Chinese 
such great critics of their government is the fact that they are consistently and thoroughly cynical 
about most of their officials all the time – a fact which it often superficially ignored through the 
apparent quiet submission of the people to their oppressors” (Lin c1937: 136, quoted in Liu 
1996: 1).  In Chinese history, public opinion was often used in the context of advising the ruler to 
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comply with popular aspirations.  The famous saying, “it is the river that carries and overturns 
boats,” depicts the relationship of the mass and the ruler in feudal China.   
Therefore, in feudal China, the mass and the ruler were two opposite classes.  Even 
though some rulers were peasant rebels and got support from the mass, once they came to power, 
they immediately betrayed the mass and perceived the mass as a big threat to their power.  
Emperors always had wishes to stay in power for as long as possible, thus they must pay 
attention to public opinion to avoid being “turned over.” The commonly used tool of learning 
public opinion is official reports from lower level government; that is, the local level officials 
reported certain social problems to the higher-level officials.  However, this method was 
inefficient because of the huge bureaucratic structure.  The reports could not reach the highest 
ruler (the emperor) within short time. Moreover, it is also very likely for the reporters to distort 
public opinion due to their self interests.  The rulers were well aware of this distortion.  So they 
also employed other tools as complementary ways of learning public opinion, such as 
establishing secret police, sending investigators, and even conducting field investigation by 
themselves.   
 In communist China under Mao, Marxism-Leninism was a dominant ideology that 
guided political practice.  According to Marxism, there is a nearly perfect identification of 
opinion between the leaders and the masses and this congruence comes from their common 
ideological orientation (Gitelman 1977).  The communist party is the vanguard of the proletariat, 
and also a party of the majority in the society.  The party represents the interests of the masses 
and thus unify with the masses.  On the basis of identification theory, there should be no need for 
the Party to probe mass opinion since it is much the same as that of the political decision makers.  
The characteristic of self-affirmation, however, can be neither practical in politics nor convincing 
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to the masses.  Having recognized the limitations of Marxism, Lenin distinguishes between the 
party and the mass and admitted difference between the party opinion and public opinion.  A 
major task of the party, however, is to narrow down the gap and manipulate a new identification.  
Rather than catering to public opinion as doing in democracies, the party has the responsibility to 
“drag” the masses along if the masses would not keep up with the vanguard.  As Stalin put it, 
“The Party is no true party if it limits its activities to a mere registration of the suffering and 
thoughts of the proletarian masses…if it cannot rise superior to the transient interests of the 
proletariat.”5   
Therefore the new identification theory aims to match up the party opinion and public 
opinion.  Even though the leaders cannot disregard public opinion, they need not be influenced 
by public opinion.  The latter action was contemptuously labeled by Lenin as “tailism,” that is, 
“political action should be determined above all by the masses who wishes the vanguard would 
be obliged to carry out” (Gitelman 1977: 2).  The outcome of “manipulated identification,” 
called “Socialist public opinion” by Soviet theoretician A. K. Uledov, was “the result of a 
general agreement among all social classes and groups, and therefore, it was of a higher quality 
than the opinion of a simple majority” (quoted in Vreg 2001: 243).   
The identification theory had also influenced public opinion research in China in two 
aspects.  First, it resulted in the propaganda purpose of public opinion research.  The reported 
public opinion should be positive and consistent with the official doctrine.  Any public opinion 
research aiming to disclose social problems were discouraged and muffled.  Second, the 
traditional channel of learning public opinion through bureaucratic structure was paralyzed.  
Only the opinions that favor the officials were reported in order to demonstrate the identification 
                                                 
5 “Foundation of Leninism,” quoted in Gitelman (1977), p. 2. 
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of public opinion with government guidance.  In consequence, true public opinion became 
intangible both to the public and to the government. 
Panel discussion became a dominant approach to study public opinion in communist 
China.  Panel discussion was developed by Mao Zedong when he was engaging in guerilla 
warfares in the late 1920s and the early 1930s.  He went to mountain villages in the heartland, 
talking with a wide variety of people there.  On the basis of the interviews, Mao figured out the 
social structure of China, and in turn set up his revolutionary strategies and tactics.  This 
eventually led to the success of the communist revolution.  Panel discussion thus became a major 
method of studying the society in Mao-era.  Following Mao’s model, government officials or 
social scientists used to go to a handful of farms or factories to interview people on the spot.  By 
doing so they claimed that they grasped the whole situation of the country. 
The assumption underlying the method of panel discussion was that “a sparrow may be 
small but it has all the vital organs.” 6  The method works well on the population that is 
homogeneous.  However, the generalization is not safe when the society becomes heterogeneous.  
China was mainly a rural society in the early twenty century, when Mao conducted his research 
using the method of panel discussion.  So he could successfully make generalizations from no 
more than a few cases at that time.  When China was under the socialist transformation, it was 
impossible for the whole society to keep the same pace in the transition.  As a result, this method 
gradually became inappropriate as China moved to a heterogeneous society. 
Moreover, the method of panel discussion is likely to invite bias due to the researchers 
themselves.  For example, both Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, a veteran Communist, carried out 
panel discussions in 1950s separately at their hometowns, Shaoshan and Wushi.  While these 
                                                 
6 It is an old Chinese proverb, which means one can deduce general laws from a small but complete case. 
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cities are within miles of each other, they reached completely opposite conclusions.  Mao was 
pleased by the scenery of harvest, but Peng was very upset by the waste and bad future.  The 
reason was obvious.  Mao, as the Chairman of China, was accompanied by many bodyguards 
and officials.  He could not reach out to the villagers as he did in 1930s, and all the interviewees 
were carefully selected by local officials.  Peng, in contrast, visited the village without notifying 
local officials in advance.  So he had much freedom in conducting the interview and thus heard 
the true opinion from the people (Feng 1993).   
Even though the problems of panel discussion were well known by the researchers, there 
was no alternative due to the political climate and limited academic resource.  This situation did 
not change until the economic reform in 1979, when a great transition in China started. 
2.2.2 Political context 
Seeking public support is a main reason why governments care about public opinion research.  
The more important public support is in the policy making process, the more useful opinion 
surveys are to governments.  For example, opinion surveys are most decisive in the United 
States, where a key instrumental goal of the presidency is to maintain public support for policies 
(Denton and Woodward 1990).  Presidents do not rely on party factions in Congress.  Instead, 
they need to seek the support of the general public (Eisinger and Brown 1998).  As a result, 
opinion surveys can influence presidents’ political positions and policy choices directly.  In 
contrast, polling of the public may not be so important in some other democratic systems.  The 
Swiss governments, for instance, “seek first to gain support of, or to find a viable compromise 
among, the major parties and interest groups, rather than to demonstrate the support of the 
general public through opinion polling” (Rothmayr and Hardmeier 2001: 126).   They use such 
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support to pass a project in parliament and avoid a possible referendum.  They also rely on 
interest groups and parties to mobilize the voters through campaigning in the case of a popular 
vote.     
The Chinese government, without pressure of direct election and free of party 
competition, seem to have no reason to care about maintaining or creating public support by 
opinion surveys.  It would be a mistake, however, to focus undue attention on the institutional 
limitations and think that opinion surveys have no impact in the policy making process.  In fact, 
the institutional limitations rather make opinion surveys important for the Chinese government in 
the political context.    
Effectiveness and legitimacy are two key elements for political stability.    Effectiveness, 
in Lipset’s definition, is “the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it 
satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a 
society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such 
as the armed forces.” “Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for 
the society” (Lipset 1959: 86).   On the basis of western democracies’ experiences, Lipset argues 
that political stability usually results from the interaction of effectiveness and legitimacy.  
Economic crisis may not threaten an existing political system if the latter still enjoy high 
legitimacy among the public.   On the other end, if the legitimacy of a system is low while its 
effectiveness is high, the system is in a transitional state.  It may either move to a high stability 
by increasing its legitimacy or shift to the breakdown as its effectiveness declines.   
Empirical studies on political stability have confirmed this argument.  For example, 
Seligson and Muller (1987) use the case of Costa Rica to demonstrate that “democratic political 
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system can remain stable when undergoing crises of effectiveness as long as they enter those 
crises with the legitimacy of the system firmly established” (p. 322).  On the other side, Park 
(1991) concludes from the experiences of the South Korea that authoritarian states could face 
political predicaments despite economic success.   
There were mainly three sources of the legitimacy of Chinese political system before 
economic reforms.    First, the legitimacy is based on the charisma of Mao and other 
revolutionists.  Leading the poor peasants to fight against the rich and successfully defeat the 
Kuomintang and Japanese invaders, Mao and other revolutionists were regarded as heroes and 
even saviors in the Chinese people’s mind.  Political propaganda further strengthened the 
impression.  The mass worship of Mao culminated in the Cultural Revolution in which Mao 
easily aroused the masses against his political opponents.  The second source of the legitimacy is 
from the communist ideology. Under the intensive socialist education, the masses had great 
confidence that a communist society would become true under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  Third, the government legitimacy was also rooted in its socioeconomic 
performance.  To be more specific, “This mode of legitimation is based upon the role of 
government in providing social and economic benefits for its citizens” (White 1986: 463).  Thus 
an exchange relationship existed between the government and the masses as the socialist social 
contract (Cook 1993; Ludlam 1991; Tang and Parish 2000).   
Before economic reforms, the government did not confront a crisis of legitimacy even 
though the government had made disastrous mistakes in economic policies.  However, the 
Cultural Revolution and Mao’s death in 1976 greatly weakened the legitimacy of the Chinese 
governments.  The following economic reform gradually broke the socialist social contract by 
adopting the market economy.  It has been found in Russia that there is a significant link between 
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the mass support for democratic reform and the economic transition (Duch 1993).  Democratic 
values and support for free markets are even mutually reinforcing.  Therefore, the government in 
reformed China is under a tension of maintaining its authority and pushing forward economic 
reforms. 
Effectiveness is not a big concern for the Chinese governments when its legitimacy is 
high among the public.  However, as the reform changed China from central-planning economy 
to free-market economy, demands for effective governance increased.  The Chinese governments 
recognize that information is essential to the proper functioning of a political system.  There are 
two kinds of information flowing towards opposite directions: one is the information needed by 
the governors in order to control the governed; the other is the information needed by the 
governed in order to comply with the commands from the above.  An effective political system is 
what is “equipped with adequate facilities for the collection of external and internal information 
as well as for its transmission to the points of decision-making, and reasonably well equipped for 
its screening and evaluation before the decisions are made” (Deutsch 1966: 161).  High 
information systems have a problem of “overloading.”  That is, the decision-makers may receive 
so much information that they have difficulty to formulate it and react to it.  However, if 
information is low, external forces may be needed to enforce the governance.  David Apter 
observes that “different polities employ different mixtures of coercion and information in trying 
to maintain authority, achieve stability, and increase efficiency” and posits “an inverse 
relationship between information and coercion in a system: that is, high coercion systems are low 
information systems” (Apter 1965: 40).   
Under Mao, the Chinese system “was strongly geared toward transmission for orders 
downward, with much less sensitivity to the need for a good flow of data upward” (Lieberthal 
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1995: 178). As the reformed China gradually loosened its control over society, more information, 
especially that from the below, was demanded.  However, the old information collecting system 
in China confronts two problems.  On the one hand, its efficiency is often reduced by multiple 
layers of bureaucracy.  Not only the transmittal incurs high transitional cost, the information, 
even if it reached the top through the existing institutional channels, was also subject to 
distortion and loss.  On the other hand, the society is becoming increasingly informationalized 
due to the technological advance.  The controlled media is no longer the only channel that the 
masses can obtain information from the above.  Moreover, horizontal information exchange 
among the people increases remarkably, making the society more complex than before.  The old 
information collecting system is incapable of “screening” and “evaluating” the heavy load of 
social information.  Consequently government effectiveness was greatly limited under the 
current institutional framework.   
Chinese political system would be in danger if both legitimacy and effectiveness are low.  
Under the circumstances, the Chinese governments have been alert to the possibility of social 
unrest.  Opinion survey, as an effective tool of observing public mood, was quickly integrated 
into the information collecting system of the governments after it was introduced to China.  At 
the beginning, the governments mainly entrust research institutes to conduct opinion surveys.  
Gradually they also create public opinion apparatus to commission opinion surveys themselves.  
A major function of the opinion surveys is to detect public pulse under the economic reform.  
They have also been used for administrative purpose to improve governments’ effectiveness.   
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2.2.3 Social context 
The processes of liberalization, modernization and internationalization have transformed the 
society to a more diversified and dynamic one.  In order to accommodate more pragmatic-
oriented reform guidelines, the state has intentionally loosened its thought control over the 
society. This trend was accompanied by a significant weakening of the effectiveness of 
government propaganda caused by media commercialization.  Therefore the Chinese people are 
released from the confinement of official doctrines to a great extent since the reform.     
Meanwhile, as individual interest has been boosted by economic reforms, the Chinese 
people have become more rational and individualistic than before.  Moreover, western thoughts 
have been flooding into China and gradually influenced the ideological bases of individual 
opinions.  In an increasingly complex society, the Chinese people are more likely to form their 
opinions based on personal considerations and various philosophies rather than being shaped by 
the government propaganda. 
 The public sphere is also becoming more dynamic.  The Chinese people usually talk 
about social and political issues among relatives, friends, and colleagues before.  Now they not 
only have less concern to express their opinions in public, they are even enthusiasm to exchange 
their opinions with strangers through Internet which has been rapidly developed as a result of 
modernization.  It seems that China has been evolving into a pluralistic society, in which 
different values and opinions are tolerated.   
 In this context, the efficacy of public opinion survey has been acknowledged by the 
public. According to a survey conducted in the urban area of Beijing in 1993, about 85% of the 
respondents think that public opinion surveys are necessary.  Regarding the role of public 
opinion survey, about two thirds of the respondents believe that it can reflect mass opinions, 60% 
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of them think it can influence the society and 40% of them think it can be used for policy-making 
(Luo 1994).   
2.2.4 Research context 
China has experienced a boom in academic education and research since the reforms.  The 
recovery of sociology in 1979 lent great support to public opinion survey in terms of 
methodology and personnel.  Reviewing the twenty years of development of the research 
methods in sociology, Feng (2000) suggests three stages demonstrating a path of study-practice-
improvement.  On the first stage (1979-1985), the domestic scholars spent about six years in 
studying the advanced research methods abroad, especially survey methodology and social 
statistics.  After that, from 1986 to 1992, many scholars attempted to employ the new methods to 
study social phenomena.  This period was a heyday of public opinion survey in China.  Among 
the 86 research projects published in a leading journal Sociological Research in 1986-1992, 
about half of them were based on survey research methods (see the appendix in Bian, Li and Cai 
2004 for a detailed account).  The third stage (1993-1999) witnessed a great improvement in 
methodology.  A series of academic conferences were held to examine the problems of survey 
research in China and to explore solutions.  Public opinion surveys were greatly benefited by the 
improvement of the research methods in sociology.  Not only academic scholars served as 
consultants in various surveys, the department of sociology also trained many students in survey 
research who would become core figures in the industry of public opinion survey later. 
 Today the departments of social sciences in many universities have gradually shifted their 
emphasis from qualitative studies to quantitative oriented researches.  Statistical courses, which 
were usually absent from the department curriculum, now have been strengthened at both 
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undergraduate and graduate levels.  The School of Government at Peking University is the first 
academic institution in China to launch a PhD program in political quantitative research methods. 
Presently a majority of scholars in China share a belief that the arguments based on data analysis 
are more scientific. 
 Meanwhile, as China opened up to the west world, a considerable amount of research 
funding has flowed to China.  In this milieu, many opinion surveys were well funded and 
conducted with international cooperation.  Some examples are the survey projects on Chinese 
political culture and political participation (Shi 1997), on the local political and economic 
development (Jennings 1997, 1998), on political support (Chen 2004), on political attitudes 
(Tang 2005), and on social justice (Han and Whyte 2008).  The cooperation not only provides a 
wealth of survey data to study China, it also plays a role of introducing advanced survey 
technologies and further internationalizing survey research in China. 
 
 To summarize, the emergence of public opinion surveys in China can be accounted by the 
collective role of historical, political, social and research contexts.  In brief, the changing society 
generated more needs for public opinion researches, and these needs were quickly recognized by 
the government in order to maintain political stability.  While traditional public opinion research 
methods encountered serious limitations to study the complex society, modern survey research 
was imported from abroad and started to exert extensive influence in public opinion research in 
China with substantial support from the development of academic research.   
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2.3 THE ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 
RESEARCH 
The first public opinion survey in Chinese history is commonly believed to be the one conducted 
by Zhang Yaoxiang in1922, who obtained his PhD in psychology in the United States.  Many hot 
topics were covered in the questionnaire such as presidential election, religious belief, public 
management, social culture, and so on.  A similar survey was conducted in Peking University at 
her anniversary in 1923.  However, public opinion survey had not got much attention until 1979 
when China started to carry out the economic reform.  In September 1979, a division of Beijing 
Daily, whose main task is to provide information to government through internal channels, 
conducted the first survey since 1949 in a local factory in Beijing.   The survey was designed to 
find out the workers’ attitudes to some important issues, such as modernization, the discussion 
about the truth, the urgent social problems, and so on (Yuan and Zhou: 5-6).  Since then, public 
opinion surveys have mushroomed.  Many survey organizations were established which were 
either attached to the government, belonged to universities and research institutes, or run by 
independent private firms.  The results of public opinion surveys were widely published in 
internal publications, governmental newsletters, academic works, journals and newspapers.  
Public opinion survey was no longer a new term to Chinese people and it began to influence their 
lives.   
2.3.1 Government opinion research apparatus 
As survey research was introduced to China in the early 1980s, it was quickly employed by the 
reformists to study mass attitudes towards the ongoing urban economic reform.  The Economic 
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System Reform Institute of China (ESRIC) and the Beijing Young Economist Association 
(BYEA) had conducted 14 longitudinal social surveys by the end of 1986.  These surveys 
revealed the public enthusiasm towards the reform.  The reform policies were embraced by the 
public and most people had started to enjoy the benefits from the reform, such as improved 
standard of living and increased respects to consumers.  Moreover, the people’s capability of 
adapting to a commercial society had improved as well under the reform (Sun et al 1997).  These 
findings played a positive role in pushing the reform agenda forward.   
The surveys successfully provided social information and in-time support to the 
reformists.  It was said that “the conservatives were especially afraid of the reformers’ using and 
especially manipulating survey results to justify their policy proposals and to counter those 
proposed by conservative leaders” (Shi 1996: 217).  The reformists thus were enthusiastic to 
integrate public opinion apparatus in the Chinese political system.  The Institute of Chinese 
Social Survey (ICSS) was born in such a situation.  It was a semi-official survey research 
institution under the ESRIC.  Most staff members were from the Society Research Office and the 
Social Opinion Investigation Office of the ESRIC.  The director of the ICSS, Du Yan, strived for 
independence from ESRIC, but he failed to accomplish it and was eventually ousted from the 
ICSS (Li 1994).  The China Social Survey System (CSSS), headed by Bai Nansheng and Yang 
Guansan, replaced the ICSS, and conducted social surveys twice every year from 1987.  
However, as the findings from the surveys became mixed and even negative, the Chinese 
leadership was compelled to reassess the public’s role in the reform process.  As a result, the 
influence of the ESRIC started to decline.  When the economic turmoil happened in 1988, the 
ESRIC was criticized to be part of the causes (Rosen 1989).  The ESRIC was dissolved after 
June 4th in 1989 but reemerged in July 1991 under a new name the Chinese Economic 
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Management and System Research Institute (CEMSRI).  The CSSS also resumed its opinion 
survey activities in September 1991 and its survey network was extended from 40 cities in 1987, 
68 cities in 1992 to 108 cities in 1996 (Sun et al 1997).  But the surveys were no longer a tool of 
political struggle.  As reform became an irreversible national policy after Deng’s visit in 
Shenzhen in 1992, the surveys were mainly used to detect the changes of social mood and the 
situation of public mentality under the reform so that the central government could adjust the 
reform speed accordingly.   
Opinion surveys also attracted attentions of a few local governments.  There were many 
uncertainties about the direction of China’s development in the late 1980s.  The price reform 
caused widespread panic among city dwellers.  Corruption and inflation severely disturbed the 
people’s life.  Student democratic movements further threatened political and social stability.  
The situation was especially serious in Beijing, the place of the central government.  It has many 
colleges including Peking University, which has a tradition of student movements.  The Beijing 
Communist Party Commission (BJCPC) was quite bothered by the situation.7  In order to better 
monitor the society, some officials from the propaganda department of the BJCPC were sent to 
establish the Beijing Research Institute of Social Mentality (BJRISM) under the BJCPC in 1988.  
The institute conducted a series of surveys on a variety of issues starting from 1989, such as the 
study on the social mentality of Beijing college students (1989), the study of mass attitudes to the 
Romania’s political change (1990), the public’s evaluation of the current social situation (1991), 
and so on.8  It has also conducted an annual survey on the social mentality of Beijing residents 
since 1993.  As a formal apparatus, the institute receives funding from the Beijing Municipal 
                                                 
7 Student demonstration often happened in weekends or holidays.  The officials had to work all days without break 
during that period.  They wish that they could prevent such events in advance instead of passive reaction.  Interview 
with Huang Xun, the director of BJRISM, 06/02/2005.   
8 A complete list of the opinion polls conducted by the BJRISM can be found at http://www.minyi.org.cn. 
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Government to conduct the surveys.  But they are relatively independent in choosing research 
topics.  Most of the results were published on the internal publication Public Opinion (Min Yi)9 
and some were delivered directly to the BJCPC.  In fact, topic selection is critical for the 
institute.  When a topic is important and the findings are new to the leaders, the institute can get 
positive evaluations from the leaders above.   
Guangzhou Public Opinion Research Center (GZPORC) was also established in 1988.  
Similar to the BJRISM, the establishment was proposed by the Guangzhou Communist Party 
Commission (GZCPC). However, the research center is different from the BJRISM in three 
aspects.  First, it was originally a semi-official polling organization.  In April 1988, the GZCPC 
announced the establishment of the GZPOPR.  It was registered under the Policy Research 
Office of the GZCPC, but was sponsored by a local pharmaceutical factory.  Some officials in 
the Policy Research Office had been in charge of the GZPOPR until they were completely 
disengaged from the Policy Research Office in 1993.  All other staffs were recruited from the job 
market.  The pharmaceutical factory was assigned by the GZCPC to sponsor the center for three 
years.  In the following years, GZPORC successfully established a council consisting several 
large companies in Guangzhou, such as the Guangzhou Development Cooperation, Guangzhou 
Telecom, the company of Procter & Gamble in China, and so on.  Currently, the center conducts 
about 40 public opinion surveys every year.  One third of them are sponsored by the 
governments.  And the rest are mainly from the council’s support.  It also conducted commercial 
surveys occasionally for self-support.   
Second, besides monitoring public mood under the reform, GZPORC was also directed to 
assist policy making and improve government performance from the beginning.  As the market 
                                                 
9 Public Opinion (Min Yi) was first published as an internal publication by the BJRISM in 1993.  It stopped in 1997 
when the system of internal publication was normally cancelled.   
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economy developed very quickly in Guangzhou, the government put much effort in improving 
effectiveness of management.  The GZPORC has conducted the annual survey on social 
mentality and mood in Guangzhou since 1989.  These surveys revealed three shifts of mass foci.  
In the early 1990s, the urbanites were mainly concerned about price, public security, and housing 
reforms.  The public’s focus had shifted to city transportation, environmental protection and 
state-owned enterprise reforms by the end of 1990s.  Since then, the urbanites have shown their 
concerns over employment, social security, medicare reform, and corruption.10  In 1988 when it 
was first established, the center was involved in the housing reform in Guangzhou to collect 
public opinion towards the reform policy.  It has also conducted opinion polls on the public 
image of the Guangzhou governments since 1995.11  The center publishes two internal journals: 
Public Opinion Reference (Min Yi Can Kao) and Public Opinion for Internal Reference (Min Yi 
Nei Can).  The former is distributed among universities and academic research institutes, while 
the latter is directly delivered to the Guangzhou provincial governments.   
Third, the center aims to be a bridge between the public and governments.  It claims its 
purpose as “letting governments to understand the people, and letting the people to understand 
governments.”  The center helps governments to collect information they need for making 
policy.  It also provides a channel to reflect public opinion to governments.  For example, a bill 
on increasing water fee was sent to the local people’s congress for approval by the Guangzhou 
municipal government in December 2002.  The center conducted an opinion poll on the mass 
attitude toward this bill immediately.  It turned out that the public were strongly against it.  The 
poll results were reported to the local people’s congress and relevant agencies through internal 
                                                 
10 Chen, Shanzhe, “The seventeen years of Guangzhou Public Opinion Research Center.”  Twenty-first Century 
Economic Report (21 shiji jingji baodao), 01/26/2005.   
11 A complete list of the opinion polls conducted by the GZPORC can be found at http://www.gzoporc.com. 
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channels.  This eventually caused the bill to fail.12  Moreover, the center makes great use of the 
local media to publish poll results.  Poll reports composed by the center can be easily found in 
some major newspaper in Guangzhou such as Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou Ribao), South 
Daily (Nanfang Ribao), South Metropolitan News (Nanfang Dushi Bao), Yangcheng Evening 
News (Yangcheng Wanbao), and so on.  The center has conducted a series of opinion polls on the 
mass satisfaction with government services since 2002.  All results have been openly published.  
While some agencies that got bad ratings were compelled to solve the problems immediately, 
others instead came to the center and quarreled about the polls.  The center has to deal with such 
pressures while trying to reflect public opinion impartially.   
The CSSS, the BJRISM and the GZPORC were born when the direction of the 
development was ambiguous and the society was unstable under the influence of the reform.  
Though the government had made several attempts to streamline the bureaucratic structure since 
then, these apparatus were maintained and they even conducted more opinion surveys than 
before.   
The second tide of establishing public opinion apparatus began in early 2000s.  On the 
sixteenth Plenary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, Chairman Jiang Zemin addressed 
that “policy-making should deeply understand public opinion, adequately reflect public 
opinion…by establishing a mechanism of reflecting social situation and public opinion.”  All 
provincial Communist Party Committees (CPCs) are required to send a report on local social 
situation and public opinion to the Central Committee in a quarterly basis.  Some provincial 
CPCs entrust local institutes of social science research to collect relevant information; others 
started to establish governmental public opinion apparatus.   
                                                 
12 Chen, Shanzhe, “The seventeen years of Guangzhou Public Opinion Research Center.” Twenty-first Century 
Economic Report (21 shiji jingji baodao), 01/26/2005.    
 52 
The GDP per capita of China reached 1,000 dollars, and the GINI index hit 47 in 2004 
(WDI 2004).  It was widely alerted by domestic scholars that China had stepped over a threshold 
– the Chinese society would be more plural and more subject to potential turmoil due to big 
income gap.   In the fourth meeting of the sixteenth Plenary of the CCP, Chairman Hu Jintao 
further emphasized to construct a harmonious society.  In response to his address, the State 
Statistics Bureau decided to promote the establishment of public opinion apparatus under its 
Provincial branches and accelerate the use of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) 
system in these apparatus.  By the end of 2004, public opinion apparatus had been established in 
over ten provinces.  This trend was commented as “a moderate governmental adjustment instead 
of a political storm” by an official from the Hunan Public Opinion Research Center.13   
These new public opinion apparatus, on the one hand, institutionalizes public opinion in 
policy-making process and grants opinion polling a legitimate role in collecting public opinion.   
Some local governments even regulated opinion polling as a routine and regular component of 
policy-making through legislature.14  It was also suggested to incorporate opinion polls into the 
system of the people’s congresses (Shi 2004).  During this period, mass attitudes toward 
particular policies have become a main theme of the polls.  On the other hand, opinion polling is 
thus strictly controlled by the governments by installing public opinion apparatus under statistics 
bureaus.  The statistics law is applicable to opinion polls and statistics bureaus have the 
jurisdictional power over all opinion polls conducted within China.   Therefore, the content, the 
procedure and the publishing of opinion polls are all under the government’s review.   
                                                 
13 Liu Liu, “Public opinion gradually influences policy making?”  News Weekly of China (zhongguo xinwen 
zhoukan), 01/24/2005.   
14 For example, the Qiqihaer Municipal Government of Heilongjiang province regulated that the governments must 
carry out opinion polls when making important policy.   
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2.3.2 Academic survey research institutes 
Public opinion surveys have also received an enthusiastic welcome from academic institutions.  
These institutions either incorporate opinion survey research into their research activities or 
establish new institutes with special focus on social survey research.  Compared with the 
government opinion research apparatus, academic survey research institutes have advantages in 
familiarity with survey research methodology and flexibility in topic selection.  However, they 
often lack administrative and financial support that are necessary for conducting opinion survey 
research in China (Bian, Tu, and Su 2001).  Therefore, most academic survey research institutes 
seek cooperation from governments or international organizations to accomplish their tasks.  
Two noted academic institutions who are active in conducting opinion surveys in China are the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Research Center for Contemporary China 
at Peking University (RCCC). 
CASS is an institution directly under the State Council and the highest academic research 
organization in the fields of philosophy and social sciences in China.  It is also the most 
important think tank to the Chinese government.  The research units in the CASS have started to 
employ opinion surveys for their research purpose for almost 30 years.  The survey projects were 
usually well funded by government research grants.  Moreover, CASS has affiliates in each 
province, which makes it capable to carry out large scale social surveys in China.  For example, a 
research group led Lu Xueyi, a famous Chinese sociologist, launched a project to study the 
change of social structure in contemporary China in 1999.  They conducted a probability national 
survey, in which 6000 respondents from 72 counties/districts of 12 provinces were interviewed.  
Using the level of the possession of organizational, economic and cultural resources as the 
criteria, they propose ten social classes to replace the traditional division of workers, peasants 
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and intellectuals.  Their research report aroused strong social reactions not only because its 
framework of analysis, to some extent, deviated from orthodox Marxist class theory but also 
because it lists government officials, who claim to be people’s servants, on the top rank and 
workers, who should be leaders and owners according to the socialist theories, to the rank near 
the bottom (Lu 2002).   
The local affiliates of the CASS also actively conduct opinion surveys, and their studies 
are more policy-oriented.  For example, in 1983 the Tianjin municipal government carried out 
several projects to improve the residents’ living conditions.  The government leaders were eager 
to know how the public thought of these projects.  So they asked the Academy of Social Science 
(ASS) at Tianjin to conduct a survey to collect public opinions.  This survey finally developed 
into an annual survey that provides valuable data for social and policy research (Wang 1995) 
The Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University (RCCC) was 
established in 1988. Its original initiative is to promote interdisciplinary research, foster 
international academic links, and contribute to the progress of Chinese society.  The RCCC has 
emphasized on survey research and quantitative data analysis since Dr. Shen Mingming, who 
received his PhD degree from the University of Michigan, joined the center in 1995 and was 
appointed the director in 1996. 
While the RCCC is formally under the auspices of Peking University, it is to a great 
extent independent of the university’s administration, enjoying substantial autonomy in making 
its own academic, personnel, and budgetary decisions. RCCC is completely self-financed, 
mainly through institutional academic grants from, e.g., the Ford Foundation, the Smith Richard 
Foundations, the Asia Foundation, the Japan Foundation, and international organizations like 
UNDP, WHO, etc., as well as from other domestic sources. 
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The RCCC normally conducts three types of opinion surveys.  The first type of opinion 
surveys is the center’s own projects, which are designed by the researchers in the RCCC 
independently and are funded through research grant applications.  In order to obtain 
administrative support from government, the RCCC usually finds a government partner and 
carry out these projects as a collaborative effort.  For example, in 1995 the RCCC launched its 
flagship project, the Beijing Area Study (BAS), an annual survey with a random sample of 1,200 
Beijing urban residents. This project got support from the Beijing municipal government and has 
published its first ten-year data report (Yang 2007).  Another milestone project of the RCCC is 
“Chinese Value and Ethics Survey (CVES)” conducted in 2004 in coordination with the 
Department of Propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party.  This survey project employed an 
innovative sampling method that combines the PPS sampling techniques and the GPS-aided 
spatial sampling method, which significantly improved the sample’s representativenss by 
covering more migrant people.   
The second type of opinion surveys is conducted on behalf of government agencies at the 
national or local levels.  Research topics of these projects are usually policy relevant issues.  For 
example, sponsored by the State Agency of Environment Protection and the Ministry of 
Education, the RCCC conducted a survey project of “Public Awareness on Environmental 
Protection in China” in 1998. It is a national survey on general public, with a random sample of 
the Chinese population on mainland and completing more than 9,000 interviews (Ren 2002).  
The third type of opinion surveys is collaborated projects between the RCCC and foreign 
research organizations.  These projects are numerous, such as “Political Participation in Beijing 
(1996),” 15  “Local Government and Local Development (1997),” 16  and “The World Mental 
                                                 
15 It is a subsequent project investigated by Tianjian Shi after his publication with the same title (Shi 1997). 
 56 
Health Survey, China (1999-2000).”  The RCCC is also the China partner of the World Values 
Survey which was responsible for conducting the national survey in China for both the 2000 and 
the 2005 waves. 
In addition to conducting social surveys, the RCCC has also established a training 
program in social science methodology.  The center regularly invites both domestic and 
international scholars to come to Peking University to share their experience and knowledge with 
respect to research methodology.  The Beijing Area Study serves as a practical vehicle for 
teaching the various aspects of social survey research.  Supported by the Ford Foundation, the 
center has also sponsored a Joint Training Program on Research Methodology with the Institute 
for Social Research at the University of Michigan since 1997. 
2.3.3 Commercial opinion research firms 
As the deepening of marketization, many private marketing firms gradually stepped into the 
industry of public opinion survey.  Statistics shows that there were 750 registered survey 
organizations in 2000.  This number rocketed to 4221 in 2002.  Half of them cluster in the 
relatively developed areas in the east.17  For example, established in 1992, Horizon Research has 
developed into one of the largest private survey organizations in China.  It has conducted and 
published the results of over 600 surveys (Yuan and Zhou 2005).  A variety of topics are covered 
in these surveys. Mainly they include: (1) policy issues such as price, unemployment, corruption, 
and some specific regulations; (2) evaluation of government; (3) life satisfaction; (4) attitudes to 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 It is a survey research project on local elites and masses in four Chinese counties, in collaboration with 
researchers from University of California at Santa Barbara, University of Michigan, and University of Rochester. It 
is a second wave (panel) of the survey conducted in 1990. Publications based on the first wave data are, for example, 
Manion (1996) and Jennings (1997)  
17 The statistics is from The Statistics Yearbook of Chinese Basic Units (2003, 2001).   
 57 
current news, such as WTO, Olympic game, and the Middle East peace; (5) attitudes to social 
change and problems such as divorce, AIDs, SARS, and environmental problems. Some 
relatively sensitive topics such as religious belief and Taiwan issue are also included in the 
questionnaires.18   
Public opinion survey also attracted the attention of the media.  A new form of news 
report, “Precision Journalism,” which is mainly based on survey results, quickly developed in 
China.  Beijing Youth Daily (BYD), a local newspaper in Beijing, started to report the results of 
public opinion survey from the early 1990s.  Originally, a small column named “Public Emotion 
Barometer” was opened in the BYD of March 30, 1993.  Two or three questions were posted in 
the column every two weeks and readers were encouraged to mail their answers to these 
questions.  The results were also published in a two-week base followed by new polling 
questions.  After about half of a year’s experiment, a weekly edition of “Public Survey” was 
formally published in January 1, 1994.  It is the first attempt of reporting survey results in a 
special section of newspaper in China.  BYD initially worked with colleges and academic 
research institutes to conduct street-corner polls and straw polls.  Later a couple of private survey 
organizations became the partners of BYD and provided survey reports regularly for the special 
edition.  So far 25 domestic newspapers have opened special editions to report the results of 
public opinion survey (Yuan and Zhou 2005).   
In the meanwhile, foreign polling enterprises were seeking opportunities to enter Chinese 
market.  Gallup China, for example, was established in 1991 as the first foreign survey research 
organization licensed to do business throughout China.  Gallup had some initial difficulties in 
opening the branch because the Chinese government was concerned that sensitive political and 
                                                 
18 Source: www.horizonkey.com. 
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social questions would be asked.  Only after Gallup asked Henry Kissinger to lobby on its behalf 
did it finally obtain a 20-year license (Laris 1994).  Now many well-established foreign polling 
organizations have opened their branches in China.  Almost all of them are engaged in market 
research.  Some of them have gotten permission to conduct foreign survey projects in China.  But 
questions on political and social issues are often under deliberate review by the government. 
2.4 PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY IN CHINA 
As public opinion survey proliferates in contemporary China, many people express their 
concerns over its role in collecting and studying public opinion. 
Survey research practitioners are worried about the reputation of this profession.  Public 
opinion is so hot in China so that all kinds of organizations are enthusiastic to conduct opinion 
surveys.  However, very few people are well trained in survey methodology, particularly in 
governments and some private firms.  They commonly design questionnaires by themselves and 
choose convenient sample to interview.  Moreover, without sufficient skills on data analysis, 
they usually conduct very basic descriptive or cross-tabulate analyses in their reports or even 
publications.  What’s worse, some practitioners have little sense of work ethics in this 
profession.  They either purposely design questions to solicit favorable responses or relax the 
standards for quality control to save costs.  Non-professional practices severely endanger public 
confidence in public opinion surveys.  Propelled by this situation, in 1998 about one hundred of 
marketing research firms convened the first meeting to regulate public opinion and marketing 
research activities. A formal organization, Chinese Marketing Research Association (CMRA), 
was established in 2000.  CMRA regulated the work ethics of public opinion and marketing 
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research, which signifies the standardization of public opinion survey research in China.  In 2006 
a new job title, research analyst, was announced publicly by the State Bureau of Statistics and the 
Department of Labor.  Research analysts refer to those who utilize qualitative or quantitative 
methods to collect information, analyze data and provide reports for consumers.  They are 
certified by the State Bureau of Statistics through examinations.  This new certification 
obviously benefits public opinion survey research in China by improving the quality of survey 
practitioners. 
Domestic scholars raised another important problem of Chinese opinion surveys: data 
openness and sharing.  Academic institutions in China usually conduct opinion surveys 
independently and hold survey data privately.  These survey data are severely underused.  
Moreover, without effective communication among investigators, some projects are even 
overlapped in topics, which results in more waste in research resources.  Another difficulty for 
data sharing is the lack of agreement on survey standards and coding formats.  Even if some 
survey data are available to users via requests, researchers often encounter troubles when trying 
to compare the results.  Some institutions have started to construct a common platform for data 
sharing.  For example, to fulfill the requirements for participation of the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), the Department of Sociology of People’s University of China 
launched Chinese Social Survey Open Database (CSSOD)19 in 2005.  The data of the Chinese 
General Social Surveys (2003-2006) 20  have been open to the public through this database.  
CSSOD also invites data input from other academic institutions. The responses they have 
                                                 
19 The official website of CSSOD is http://www.cssod.org. 
20 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), a counterpart of General Social Survey (GSS) in China, is a collaborative 
project of the Department of Sociology at People’s University of China and the Survey Research Center at the Hong 
Kong University of Science & Technology. 
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received, however, are very few.  So far only several datasets from their own department have 
been added to the database.  
Western survey researchers are mainly concerned about the political impacts on public 
opinion surveys in China.  First, certain sensitive topics are not allowed to be asked in opinion 
surveys.  For example, when Pew Research Center conducted a global attitude survey in 2002, 
many questions concerning religion, politics, government/policy and corruption were screened 
out due to government regulation.  Second, foreign enterprises and researchers cannot conduct 
surveys on political issues and even social issues in China according to a document of the State 
Bureau of Statistics of China publicized in 2002.  But “where there is a need to conduct such 
surveys, they shall be conducted by domestic institutions with the qualification of conducting 
foreign-related social survey.” 21  It is important to choose domestic partners carefully to ensure 
good survey quality.  Moreover, domestic survey research organizations usually enjoy more 
freedom than foreign commercial firms in conducting surveys on social problems.  In contrast to 
the 2002 Pew survey in China, which was conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres (Guangzhou), the 
2000 Chinese Values Survey, a collaboration between the RCCC at Peking University and the 
World Values Survey project, successfully asked many sensitive questions, including those about 
religion and democracy.  Third, western scholars are also concerned about the validity of survey 
responses in the China’s political context. It is found that Chinese survey data often contain a 
considerable amount of item nonresponses.  Analyses of these data also yield many 
“unbelievable” results in comparison with those from other countries.  Since China is not a 
                                                 
21 In this document, it is stipulated that “organizations and individuals from outside the territory, subsidiaries of 
foreign enterprises and resident representative offices of foreign enterprises within the territory and resident 
institutions in China of other foreign organizations shall not, by their own, conduct social survey activities within the 
territory of China.  Where there is a need to conduct such surveys, they shall be conducted by domestic institutions 
with the qualification of conducting foreign-related social survey.  Institutions without such qualification shall not 
be commissioned for any survey.”   
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democracy, political fear and political manipulation are suspected to be major causes of these 
findings.  These problems are crucial to the usefulness of Chinese survey data in academic 
research.  In light of this, I launched this project to study these problems in terms of truthfulness, 
meaningfulness, and comparability, which will be addressed in the following chapters. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines the emergence and growth of public opinion surveys in the transitional 
context of China.  It might be surprising to western researchers that public opinion survey, a 
conventional tool of collecting public opinion in democratic societies, has achieved such a rapid 
development in authoritarian China.  It is even more counterintuitive to them that Chinese 
government organizations show such a great interest in it that from its inception, official 
organizations have been the major sponsors.  This chapter provides a detailed account about this 
phenomenon. 
 First, when public opinion survey was introduced to China, China had just initiated a 
series of reform policies which had tremendous impacts on China’s development.  Three 
orientations underlying these policies are liberalization, modernization, and internationalization.  
Liberalization granted much freedom not only to the common people in forming and expressing 
opinions to social issues but also to researchers in collecting and studying public opinions.  
Modernization led to information explosion and mobility in Chinese societies by developing or 
importing advanced technologies especially in telecommunication.  Facilities for opinion survey 
research, such as computerized data processing and interview techniques, were updated almost in 
the same breath of those in developed countries.  Internationalization provided conditions for 
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liberalization and modernization and further strengthened their effects.  In this process, Chinese 
public were gradually exposed to western thoughts and cultures.  Many public opinion surveys 
were often conducted as collaborative effort between domestic and international organizations.   
Therefore, the emergence and development of public opinion surveys are closely related to the 
historical, political, social, and research context in transitional China.   
 This chapter also describes the organizational growth of public opinion surveys in China.  
After 30 years, public opinion survey has become a promising discipline with a proliferation of 
opinion survey research organizations.  These organizations can be categorized into three types: 
governmental, academic, and commercial.  Each type of organization has its own comparative 
advantages as well as shortages.  Government opinion research apparatus are privileged in 
administrative resources to obtain sampling information and interviewee cooperation, whereas 
manipulation and response effect are always big concerns for the quality of such surveys.  
Academic survey research institutes have a wealth of well-trained survey researchers, yet they 
often confront insufficient research funding which greatly limits their capability to conduct large 
scale or high quality surveys.  Commercial marketing research firms enjoy much freedom in 
topic selection, and driven by cost-benefit considerations in practice, they conduct surveys in a 
more efficient fashion.  However, survey quality might be compromised due to the same 
consideration.  The amount of opinion survey organizations is likely to keep increasing as 
opinion survey data is in a greater demand in China. 
 Some problems of public opinion survey in China are addressed lastly.  These problems, 
which represent concerns from different people that are involved in opinion surveys, include the 
reputation of the profession of public opinion survey, the political impact, and academic needs 
for data openness and data sharing.  Evidence show that survey practitioners have taken some 
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measures to deal with these problems, and opinion survey research is expected to become more 
mature and established in the foreseeable future.   
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3. DECIPHERING THE SILENCE: DON’T KNOW, DON’T CARE, OR DON’T 
WANT TO TELL 
The validity of survey responses in Chinese public opinion surveys is often speculated as a 
problem but rarely researched.  One concern is about item nonresponse: do people fail to give 
substantive answers in Chinese surveys because they truly don’t know, don’t care, or don’t want 
to tell?  Based on the data from the World Values Surveys (1999-2004), this chapter investigates 
this question empirically and comparatively by analyzing “don’t know” answers in surveys of 
China, India, Vietnam, South Korea, and the United States. Evidence show that item 
nonresponse in Chinese survey is highly related to difficulty of the topic, respondents’ cognitive 
ability, and respondents’ interest in politics and in the survey.  Though third party presence may 
increase nonresponse, it is unclear whether social desirability or political fear is the major reason.    
In addition, education and political interest are found to have converging effects among the five 
countries, suggesting that the high rates of item nonresponse in Chinese public opinion surveys 
are mainly caused by poor education and political alienation. 
3.1 THE ISSUE: ITEM NONRESPONSE 
Survey research has been widely used in public opinion research in China (Tang 2005).  While 
scholars in Chinese field or comparative studies are excited about data richness, they are also 
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worried about data quality.  Among all such concerns, item nonresponse (or “don’t know” 
answers) has caught scholars’ special attention.  For example, the World Values Survey (1999-
2004) includes a battery of eight questions on democracy.  Item nonresponse rates among 
Chinese respondents on average are as high as 33.6%, while the average is only about 3% for US 
respondents.  Comparative studies are seriously plagued by this problem: it is obviously not 
appropriate to ignore it and discard all “don’t know” answers, but what should we do when 
confronting such a large amount of missing data while still purporting to draw valid inferences 
from the available data?   
By definition, item nonresponse is “the failure to obtain information for a question within 
an interview or questionnaire” (de Leeuw 2001).  It results in missing values to a particular 
question.  However, it does not mean that item nonresponse fails to contain any information.  
Although the information is not self-evident, it can be revealed by further analysis of the 
missingness.  In general, there are three types of missing data based on the analysis.  The first 
type is missing-completely-at-random (MCAR).  The missingness is not related to the unknown 
values of the question in case, neither is it related to the values of other questions.  Possible 
causes for MCAR are interviewers’ careless omission of questions or illegible record of answers.  
The second type is missing-at-random (MAR).  The missingness may be caused by some 
particular reasons that are irrelevant to the question in case.  By analysis it will show that the 
missing data is related to the values of other observed data (e.g., age, education, etc.), but not to 
the value of the question itself.  The third type of missing data is not-missing-at-random 
(NMAR).  In this case, the missingness is related to the answer to the question itself.  It usually 
occurs when respondents are asked on sensitive questions.  For MCAR data, discarding the 
missing data will not affect the analyses since they are randomly distributed.  For the MAR and 
 66 
NMAR data, however, simply discarding the missing data will have adverse effect on the 
validity of conclusions.  For instance, Berinsky (1999, 2004) found that some individuals who 
are against school integration are more likely to hide their socially undesirable opinions by 
giving a “don’t know” response. As a result, public opinion polls often overstate public support 
for government efforts to integrate schools.  In another research, Berinsky also demonstrated that 
public opinion poll on social welfare controversies gives disproportionate weight to respondents 
who oppose expanding the government’s role in the economy.  The supporters of the welfare 
state are mostly economically disadvantaged and those who support principles of political 
equality.  However, they are less able to form “coherent and consistent opinions” on such 
policies and thus less likely to articulate opinions on surveys (Berinsky 2002, 2004). Therefore, 
it is crucial to have a better understanding of “don’t know” answers before dealing with the 
missing data. 
However, item nonresponse in Chinese surveys is often speculated as a problem but 
rarely researched.  A big concern is about the validity of survey responses in China.  Geer (2004) 
stated in Public Opinion and Polling Around the World : A Historical Encyclopedia, that 
“(Chinese) people expressed opinions in public—as well as in survey and market research and 
public opinion polls—that might not reflect their true opinions because they do not want to get 
into trouble with the government.  Even without sampling problems, this should be a great 
concern for those who might wish to do polling on political issues in China” (p. 553).  There may 
be more than just a few students in comparative studies who hold this opinion, and they usually 
consider two strategies that may be employed by the respondents to avoid the trouble: one is to 
tell a lie, another is to keep silence.  Yet, relevant evidence from empirical research are rare.  
Tang (2005) finds that the percentage of “don’t know” increased 10-20 percent for the questions 
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related to satisfaction with the party, the government, and market reform after the 1989 
crackdown.  But whether the increase was caused by the particular political atmosphere at that 
time is still guesswork without any systematic examination.  It is also suspected that the 
prevalence of MAR problems may also be caused by insufficient education resources in China.  
Ordinary Chinese people may lack cognitive abilities to form concrete opinions to certain survey 
questions due to their low education level.  These suspicions give rise to the controversial role of 
Chinese surveys in public opinion research.  Therefore, more and in-depth research to address 
these problems is in great need.   
The aim of this chapter is to shed some light on understanding item nonresponse in 
China’s surveys from a comparative perspective.  I first provide brief theoretical background of 
existing research on item nonresponse.  Cognitive interpretation and empirical findings are 
abundant in democratic contexts.  In contrast, systematic examinations are few in the studies of 
non-democratic countries.  I then proceed with methodological details, describing the data used, 
the cases selected, and the measures constructed in my analysis.  In the following section, I test 
my hypotheses and present the empirical results in three parts.  First, I examine topical effect on 
the distribution of “don’t know” answers and compare them across five countries.  Second, I 
identify factors that contribute to item nonresponse on a topic-by-topic basis in Chinese surveys.  
Finally, I focus on the politics-related questions and compare the effects across countries.   
3.2 ITEM NONRESPONSE IN PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS 
Item nonresponse has drawn scholars’ interest from the very beginning of the development of 
scientific public opinion polls (for a thorough review, see Krosnick, 2002).  A school of scholars 
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believe that a simple “don’t know” response may reflect several possible mind states: no idea, no 
opinion, and refusal.  Findings from empirical studies are consistent with their belief and confirm 
that the distinctions are evident in examination of the linkage of underlying attitude and opinion 
expression (e.g., Bogart 1967; Coombs and Coombs 1976-77; Faulkenberry and Mason 1978; 
Bishop et al 1980; Duncan and Stenbeck 1988; Gilljam and Granberg 1993).  
From psychological approach, in order to understand formation of survey response, 
Krosnick (1991, 1999) describes the cognitive process when respondents answer questions. He 
claims that this process involves four steps. (1) Respondents must interpret the question and 
deduce its intent.  (2) They must search their memories for relevant information. (3) They must 
integrate that information into a single judgment. (4) They must translate the judgment into a 
response by selecting one of the alternatives offered.  On the one hand, a respondent’s effort, 
including ability and motivation, in performing the necessary cognitive tasks can determine 
whether they are optimizing or satisficing their answers.  On the other hand, task difficulty may 
also influence their responses.  Giving “don’t know” answers, in this sense, is one of the 
strategies in which respondents satisfice their answers.   
While “no idea” and “no opinion” are direct output of the cognitive process, “refusal” 
usually occurs in the process of opinion expression.  Berinsky (2004) argues that cost/benefit is 
the big consideration when respondents give response to questions.  Respondents may fail to 
answer questions because of cognitive costs—they are short of the ability or motivation to form 
substantive answers.  They are also likely to abstain from articulating their opinions due to 
contemplation of social costs.  When respondents realize that certain social costs are associated 
with the free expression of opinion, they usually compare the costs with possible benefits to 
answering questions in a rational way.  “Don’t know” response is a result of such comparison 
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when costs are greater than benefits.  Respondents hide their opinions in silence in order to avoid 
certain loss—socially or politically.   
Beatty and Herrmann (2002) synthesize a theoretical framework explaining the cognitive 
processes that lead to either substantive answers or item nonresponse.  They introduce four 
cognitive states: available (“the requested information can be retrieved with minimal effort”), 
accessible (“the requested information can be retrieved with effort or prompts”), generatable 
(“the requested information is not exactly known, but may be estimated using other information 
in memory”), and inestimable (“the requested information is not known and there is virtually no 
basis for estimation”).  Any of the four cognitive state may lead to either a substantive response 
or item nonresponse.  For example, in the two extreme states—available and inestimable, 
respondents may choose not to answer questions even though they clearly have an answer in 
mind; they may also fabricate an answer rather than admitting ignorance.  Their decisions of 
what to report can be explained by communicative intent, which could be influenced by a variety 
of factors, such as interest in survey content, complexity of the question, length of the 
instrument, and perceived risk in answering or not answering. 
These arguments are confirmed by numerous findings from empirical studies of survey 
data.  From the approach of cognitive ability, it is found that the propensity to give “don’t know” 
responses is related to formal education level, age, knowledge of the topic, and information 
exposure (e.g., Francis and Busch 1975; Converse 1976-77; Rapoport 1979).  From the approach 
of motivation, interest in the topic or in the survey as a whole plays an important role to 
determine whether respondents optimize or satisfice their answers (e.g., Goyder 1986; Stocke 
2006).  Topical effect is demonstrated in two aspects: first, more sensitive questions get more 
refusals; and second, questions that require more cognitive effort to answer receive more “don’t 
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know” responses (Shoemaker, Eichholz and Skewes 2002).  In addition, item nonresponse is also 
influenced by questionnaire design (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984; Harmon 2001; 
Schuman, Presser and Lubwig 1981), interview process, mode of data collection, and context of 
surveying (de Leeuw 2003; Kampen 2006).  Respondents from different countries may have 
different response style.  For example, based on data from a cross-national survey dealing with 
opinions about international relations, peace and war, and disarmament conducted in France, 
Norway, and Poland in 1964-65, Sicinski (1970) finds that the Norwegians are clearly much 
more inclined than the Frenchmen and the Poles to guess answers rather than admit ignorance 
when being asked questions on political knowledge.  Cultural effects caught scholars’ attention, 
but cross-cultural comparative studies are still few at this point of time. 
Almost all studies reviewed above are based on survey data from developed democratic 
countries.  Relevant studies in under-developed or non-democratic countries are still at the 
primary stage and with controversies.  In recent decade, with increasing availability of survey 
data from Russia or former Soviet Union, it becomes possible to test the hypothetical effects of 
political context/legacy on the validity of survey response.  Carnaghan (1996) considers three 
factors that affect respondents’ motivation to give nonsubstantial responses: political alienation, 
political apathy, and ambivalence to questions.  She finds that political fear does not play an 
important role in making Russians reluctant to answer survey questions although it is not 
possible to eliminate its effects completely.  Instead, most Russians did not answer questions 
because they had little interest in or minimal information about the question.  Berinsky and 
Tucker (2006) explore the interaction of non-response bias and attitudes towards economic 
policies in Russia in the period of the economic transformation.  They find that Russians who 
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failed to answer survey questions are on average less economically liberal than their counterparts 
who answered such questions.   
 
Table 1 An examination of item nonresponse in public opinion surveys 
Meaning Underlying attitude Influential factor 
Don’t know Ignorance 
Ambivalence 
Conflict 
Gender 
Age 
Education 
Don’t care Apathy 
Alienation 
Interest in the topic 
Interest in the survey 
Don’t want to tell Political fear 
Social desirability 
Topic sensitivity  
Response effects 
 
 
The existing research on item nonresponse is summarized in Table 1.  In general, when 
respondents fail to answer a survey question, there are three possible meanings: don’t known, 
don’t care, or don’t want to tell.  Don’t know, as an easy expression of no idea, no opinion, and 
hard to choose, is mainly because of ignorance, ambivalence, or idea conflicts.  It can be 
regarded as truthful answers but limited by respondents’ cognitive abilities.  Influential factors 
include gender, age, and education.  Don’t care discloses to what extent a respondent makes 
efforts to formulate an answer to a survey question.  For apathetic or alienated respondents, they 
are likely to lack the motivations to optimize their answers.  In this case, respondents’ interest in 
the question or in the survey as a whole may play a role in item nonresponse.  Finally, don’t want 
to tell is usually associated with political context and prevalent social norms.  Respondents may 
fail to answer questions because of political fear or social desirability.  Their responses may be 
influenced by topic sensitivity or certain response effect, such as trust in the interviewers or 
presence of third parties.   
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3.3 DATA, CASE SELECTION, AND MEASURES 
This chapter investigates item nonresponse in Chinese surveys from a comparative perspective. I 
use the data from the 4th wave of World Values Surveys (WVS) project conducted in 1999-
2004.  In addition to China, the countries included in this study are the United States, South 
Korea, India, and Vietnam.   I selected these countries with three considerations in mind: 
political freedom, economic development, and cultural difference.  Specifically, first, both China 
and Vietnam are under political transition from communism to directions still unclear.  They are 
at the same level of political freedom and economic development, and share a similar Confucian 
tradition. Due to these similarities, the two countries should produce similar results in item 
nonresponse. Second, India shares similar population size and economic development with 
China. But the two countries differ in the nature of political systems.  Third, South Korea is close 
to China in culture, but differs from China in political freedom and economic development as a 
new democracy with a higher level of industrialization.22  Cultural effect can be revealed by 
commonality of these two countries.  Lastly, the United States is chosen as an affluent 
democracy, which meets the conditions for good opinion polls (Warren 2002).  A typology of 
countries in the three dimensions is presented in Figure 1.  Political freedom is indicated by the 
Freedom index of political rights and civil liberties23, and economic development is represented 
by GDP per capita (in dollars) of 1999.  As expected, China and India are close to each other on 
the economic development dimension, Vietnam is almost on the same scale with China on the 
political freedom dimension, and China, Vietnam and South Korean share the same surface of 
Confucianism. 
                                                 
22 Taiwan would be a better candidate for the comparative study controlling cultural effects.  Regrettably Taiwan 
was not included in this wave of WVS. 
23 The data is accessible at http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
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Figure 1 Countries for comparison 
Notes: Political freedom is the average of indices of political right and civil liberty, scored (1) low to (7) high. 
Economic development is measured by GDP per capita in dollars (1999). 
 
The dependent variable, noted as DKs, is used to count  the number of questions to which 
a “don’t know” response is given by  each individual in the sample.  Three criteria were used for 
the exclusion of questions: (1) questions not common to all questionnaires in the five countries;24  
(2) questions contingent on a previous response; and (3) questions used by this study as an 
independent variable.  A total of 109 questions are included in my analysis.  Table 2 presents a 
summary of distribution of total DKs for each country.  It indicates that the proportions of 
respondents who never gave “don’t know” answers are similar between China and India.  Only 
                                                 
24 By this criterion, Russia was not included in the study because over 30 questions that are common to the 
questionnaires in other four countries are not asked in Russia, even though it would be a good case for comparison 
with China since they have similar political legacy.   
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about 12% of respondents in China and 15% of respondents in India gave substantial answers to 
all questions in case.  In contrast, respondents who gave substantial answers to all questions 
amounted to one fourth in South Korea, more than a half in the US, and over one third in 
Vietnam.  From the five-number summary of distributions of DKs for each country, we can see 
that the distributions are far from normal.  The distributions of DKs in all five countries are 
highly skewed to the right.  The five-number summary of distributions of DKs for each country 
reveals a far from normal picture: they are all highly skewed to the right.  China and India seem 
to have similar feature with 50% (median) respondents who give “don’t know” answers to about 
10 questions, while for the US, South Korea, and Vietnam the medians are only 2 or 3.  Further 
analysis will be given in the next section. 
 
Table 2 Distribution of total DKs by countries 
 
Distribution of DKs 
 
Country 
 
Proportion 
of no DKs 
(%) 
Minimum 1st 
quartile
Median 3rd 
quartile
Maximum 
 
 
N 
China 11.90 1 3 8 19 90 1000 
India 15.73 1 3 10 32 109 
Vietnam 36.50 1 1 3 7 89 1000 
S. Korea 26.33 1 2 3 6 84 1200 
U.S. 52.42 1 1 2 4 37 
2002 
1200 
 
Notes: A total of 109 survey questions are included in this analysis.  The distribution of DK 
answers is described by five-number summary, which consists of the minimum (smallest 
observation), the first quartile (which cuts off the lowest 25% of the data), the median (middle 
value), the third quartile (which cuts off the highest 25% of the data), and the maximum 
(largest observation). 
Source: The World Values Survey  
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3.4 EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Scholars have proposed many factors that may lead to item nonresponse in public opinion 
surveys.  What are the major factors that cause respondents to give “don’t know” answers in 
Chinese surveys?  Do these factors work in similar ways as those that impact respondents from 
other countries?  Are there any particular reasons that make Chinese respondents fail to answer 
survey questions?  I will inquire into these questions with four factors in consideration: topical 
effect, cognitive ability, apathy, and fear of political retribution.  The first three factors may be 
common for all countries, while the last factor may only have effects on respondents from 
countries with legacy of repressive rule.  After identifying the topical effect based on the data, I 
analyze the effects of cognitive ability, apathy, or political fear with controlling topical effect. 
 
Topical effect 
Topical effect is demonstrated in public opinion surveys everywhere.  It usually involves effects 
from two aspects: difficulty and sensitivity.  Respondents are inclined to give “don’t know” 
answers to difficult questions due to limitation of cognitive ability, or to sensitive questions due 
to social desirability or political fear.  The WVS covers a variety of topics so that it enables us to 
test topical effect on item nonresponse.  I grouped the 109 questions into three categories: life-
related, value-related, and politics-related (See Appendix A for more details about grouping).  
Life-related questions include those on attitudes to life, job, marriage, religion, and morality.  A 
total of 58 questions are in this category. Value-related questions consist of those reflecting 
personal values on environment, country priority, future changes, and governance.  There are 21 
questions in this category.  Finally, I assigned 30 questions into politics-related category, 
covering institutional trust, political system, and international politics.  Politics-related questions 
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may be the most difficult to answer in terms of task difficulty while life-related questions are the 
easiest.  However, questions in all three categories can be sensitive depending on social and 
political contexts. Therefore, I expect that in Chinese surveys politics-related questions are 
associated with most serious problems of item nonresponse, and life-related questions the least 
problematic.  I also expect that this pattern would be similar among all countries. 
 
Cognitive ability 
The core factors related to a person’s cognitive ability are gender, age, and education.  It is 
commonly believed that females, less-educated, or older people are associated with lower 
cognitive ability, and thus give more “don’t know” answers in public opinion survey.  In this 
study, education is adjusted to five levels in all five countries.  Age may have a complex effect 
that not only involves cognitive ability but also relates to other effects.  Therefore, I divided the 
respondents into three age groups: the first group includes people from18 to 35 years old, the 
second from 36 to 50 years old, and the third older than 50 years.  I expect that gender, 
education, and age have similar effects on Chinese respondents as on respondents from other 
countries. I also expect that the effects are most prominent on responses to politics-related 
questions. In particular, since China and India are almost at the same level of modernization, the 
effects may have smallest difference between the two countries.   
 
Apathy 
Generally, apathy is also reflected in people with certain demographic characteristics.  For 
example, females may focus more on life issues but have less interest in politics-related 
questions.  Compared with young adults, the older generation may care more about social 
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policies and thus tend to express concrete opinions on politics-related questions.  In China, 
respondents’ apathetic attitude may be resulted from political alienation in the course of history.  
Tong (1995) argues that mass alienation was originally a reaction to the defects of the state 
socialist system.  It increased during the period of ideological liberalization and marketization 
reform and was a result of the decline in public morality and widespread political corruption.  
Three questions are included in the survey to measure the degree of mass political interest. 25  
They are combined into a one-dimension index based on separate factor analyses of the data 
from each country26.  I expect those with higher degree of political interest tend to give more 
substantive answers to survey questions rather than ignoring them by saying “don’t know.”  
Moreover, the effect would be more notable on politics-related questions. 
At the end of the survey interview, the interviewers were asked to record whether the 
respondent was very interested, somewhat interested, or not very interested during the 
interview.27  Two dummy variables are generated to test whether those who are very interested 
or somewhat interested tend to give fewer “don’t know” answers than those who are not very 
interested.   
 
Social desirability/Fear of political retribution 
Social desirability and fear of political retribution usually have similar effect on item 
nonresponse depending on perception of sensitivity.  For the former, respondents believe that 
                                                 
25 The questions are: 
1.   How interested would you say that you are in politics? 
2.   How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? 
3.   When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or 
never? 
26 The loadings of the factor are over .50 in all countries, and the reliability coefficients are 0.65 for China, 0.72 for 
the US, 0.68 for India, 0.60 for South Korea, and 0.68 for Vietnam.  The index of political interest is generated by a 
linear combination of the values weighted by the loadings for each country. 
27 This question was not asked in the Korean survey. 
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there is a “right” answer to the question which is shared by the majority or valued by the society.  
It is widely discovered and discussed by survey researchers in democratic societies.  For the 
latter, respondents believe that there is a “safe” answer to the question which does not violate 
official doctrine.  It is the most suspicious reason for the high rate of item nonresponse in surveys 
from non-democratic settings (Welsh 1981; Shi 1997; Tang 2005).   
Though China is at the transitional state of post-totalitarianism as the state has been 
gradually loosening its control over the society since the reforms, it is reasonable to assume that 
fear of political retribution from past experiences still works on people’s mind, and the 
respondents are likely to conceal their true opinions by giving “don’t know” answers.  Two 
Chinese social surveys in 1992 and 1999 asked respondents directly whether they are afraid of 
being reported on by others if they criticize the government.  It turns out that about half of the 
respondents still have the concern of being reported by others, indicating people may not give 
true answers in some circumstances.  The WVS did not include such questions in the 
questionnaire.  So I use several indirect measures to explore if people attempt to hide their 
opinions by giving “don’t know” responses.   
The first measure is interpersonal trust, which is measured in the well-known dichotomy: 
“most people can be trusted” and “need to be very careful.”  I expect that it is easier for the 
respondents who chose the former answer to establish a good rapport with the interviewers, thus 
feeling more comfortable to give substantive responses than those who chose the latter.  This 
pattern is also expected to be most salient for the politics-related questions.   
Another measure is the presence of third parties in the interview process.  This 
information was recorded in the Chinese version of the World Values Survey.  It is expected that 
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the respondents with other adults around would be more likely to conceal true opinion than those 
who are interviewed alone. 
The effect of political fear can also be indirectly measured from individual’s personal 
experience or education level.  The three age groups correspond to life experiences in three 
different periods in China.  The respondents aged 50 or above were socialized during the radical 
Socialist transformation and experienced the crucial political purges. They learned how to avoid 
political troubles by keeping silence or telling lies.  Those in the second age group grew up in a 
society full of political attacks, betrayals, persecutions, and fears.  They also experienced the 
early stages of the reforms after the Cultural Revolution and the most liberal period before the 
Tiananmen event.  Such experiences may not only deviate them from official ideology but also 
prevent them from expressing their true opinions. As a result, they may be more concerned with 
revealing true opinions than younger generations would be.  The respondents in the third age 
group live in a period with stable political environment and rapid economic development.  
Marketization weakened the communist control over the society, and as a result political fear 
gradually faded away.  This group of people is expected to be more willing to express true 
opinions, though they are also more likely to give “don’t know” answers to questions on political 
issues due to apathy.  Therefore, I expect that respondents in the second group have the highest 
probabilities to give “don’t know” responses, followed by the first group and the third group.  It 
is also reasonable for well-educated people to be more sensitive to political contexts and contents 
of survey questions.  The number of item nonresponse may in this sense be positively associated 
with education level (a statistical description of the explanatory variables for each country is 
presented in Appendix B).   
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3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The distribution of DKs in each category is very similar to the distribution of total DKs—highly 
skewed to the right with excessive zeros.  In this situation, means are not good measures of 
center since they are not resistant to outliers.  So I computed medians for the DK rates in each 
category28 and compare them across topics and countries (Figure 2). 
As is expected, Figure 2 shows that politics-related category has the highest median of 
the DK rates while life-related category has the lowest in all countries but Vietnam.  For China, a 
half of the questions in life-related category are with 5% or lower DK rates, and the medians for 
questions in value-related and politics-related categories are 12.7% and 24.3% respectively.  
Among them, the median for politics-related category has the largest variance.  Based on Mood 
median test, the medians are significantly different from one another at .95 confidence level.  
Therefore, strong evidence supports the expectation that the item nonresponse rates in Chinese 
survey have a positive relationship with the difficulties of questions.   
Median tests across countries on each category reveal that the difference of medians in 
China and India is mostly caused by chance—they are not statistically different.  In contrast, 
item nonresponse rates in Vietnam, South Korea and the US have different patterns which are 
statistically significant from China and India.  The results are consistent on all categories.  It 
seems that, rather than political context or cultural difference, economic development seems to 
play an effective role on item nonresponse rates in public opinion surveys in China and India 
since the two countries are almost at the same level of economic development in spite of being 
different in other aspects.  But this argument is far from conclusive based on the single evidence. 
                                                 
28 For each country, DK rates are computed as the number of DKs divided by the number of respondents in a 
question-by-question basis.  Medians of DK rates are found separately for each category.  
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Figure 2 Median of DK rate by topics and countries 
 
To control the effect of topical difficulty, I perform further analyses on each category 
separately.  Before choosing an appropriate method to model the data, some descriptions of the 
dependent variables are desirable.  First, the number of DKs is an event counting variable.  It is 
found that the distribution of DKs in each category is highly skewed to the right.  Normality 
assumption of ordinary least square regression analysis hence is violated.  In this situation, 
Poisson regression analysis should be considered as an alternative approach.  Second, it may not 
be appropriate to assume that the events of a respondent’s “don’t know” answers are independent 
from each other. Some questions are correlated, therefore DK answers to these questions are very 
likely to be correlated as well.  Such a situation results in overdispersion, that is, the unique 
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property of Poisson distribution with equal mean and variance is not valid.  Descriptive statistics 
of the data confirm that the variances of the variables are far greater than their means. Negative 
binomial (NB) regression is then suggested to deal with overdispersion in counting event data by 
adding an overdispersion parameter (alpha) to the model (Long 1997; King 1998; Pickery and 
Loosveldt 1998).  By allowing the alpha term to vary systematically, NB regression can model 
the data with various dispersions. When alpha is zero, NB model reduces to Poisson regression.  
Third, it is also observed that the dependent variables contain a considerable proportion of zeros.  
It indicates that some respondents may be inclined to give “don’t know” answers, while some 
others may be resistant to item nonresponse for some reason.  Zero-inflated negative binomial 
(ZINB) regression analysis can be of help for explaining situations like this (Long and Freese 
2006).   
The ZINB regression in this case involves two processes: one determines whether a 
respondent is likely to give DK answers, and the other determines the number of times that the 
respondent gives DK answers in a survey.  The ZINB regression estimates the two processes 
separately.  In other words, this method assumes that there are two latent groups: Always Zero 
group and Not Always Zero group. The dependent variable in the first process is a binary 
variable assigning 1 to Always Zero group (no DK at all) and 0 to Not Always Zero group (some 
DKs).  A logistic model is specified to explore how likely a respondent gives substantive 
answers to all questions based on certain personal characteristics. For those who give “don’t 
know” answer, in the second process a NB regression is utilized to determine the probability of 
the DK counts on condition whether the respondents are designated to Always Zero group or Not 
Always Zero group.  
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3.5.1 The ZINB regression results of “don’t know” responses 
The results of three ZINB regression analyses on life-related, value-related, and politics-related 
questions in China survey are shown in Table 3.  Goodness of fit tests for all three models are 
highly significant.  Vuong tests are significant for the models on value-related and politics-
related questions, suggesting that the ZINB models are better than the corresponding standard 
NB models.   
 The logit model predicts the probability in which a respondent is likely to be put in the 
Always Zero group.  The results show whether a respondent will give substantive answers to all 
questions is affected by his cognitive ability, indicated by gender and education, and his political 
interest.  For the life-related questions, education plays a significant role to distinguish these two 
groups of respondents. Being educated with one additional level increase the odds of no DK 
answers by a factor of 3.50, holding other variables constant29.  For the value-related questions, 
political interest can reduce the probability of giving DK answers.  A standard deviation increase 
in the index of political interest increases the odds of never giving DK answers by a factor of 
1.85, holding all other variables constant.  For the politics-related questions, gender, education 
and political interest all have significant effects. Being a female respondent decreases the odds of 
never giving DK answers by a factor of 0.39 (or 61 percent), and an additional unit increase in 
education and political interest increases the odds by 80 percent and 36 percent respectively, 
holding all other variables constant.  
 
 
                                                 
29 The interpretations of the ZINB results in this chapter are based on the STATA output with command “listcoef.” 
In this case, the factor 3.50 = exp (1.253), where 1.253 is the coefficient of education in Table 3.  The numbers in 
the following interpretations of Table 3 are calculated in the same way. 
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Table 3  ZINB results for “don’t know” responses in China, WVS 2000 
 
 Life-related Value-related Politics-related 
 Logit NB Logit NB Logit NB 
Gender(female) -0.356  0.100 -0.039  0.251 -0.935*  0.183** 
Age 
             > 50 -15.418  0.142  0.339  0.194 -0.101 -0.042 
             <= 35  1.214 -0.205*  0.519 -0.316*  0.726 -0.128* 
36-50 (c.f.)       
Education(level)  1.253* -0.357***  0.019 -0.562***  0.590** -0.305*** 
Interpersonal trust  0.105 -0.130  0.198 -0.147  0.688  0.008 
Presence of third 
parties -3.189  0.056 -0.801  0.095  0.402  0.172** 
Political interest  0.444 -0.134***  0.614* -0.091*  0.306* -0.141*** 
Interest in interview 
- very interested -16.366 -1.387***  14.337 -0.937***  0.228 -0.712*** 
- somewhat interested -1.529 -0.830***  13.538 -0.560** -0.126 -0.346** 
- not very interested 
(cf)       
Constant -7.637***  3.245*** -17. 740  3.032*** -6.060***  3.469*** 
Ln Alpha -0.087  0.280 -0.580*** 
N  935  935  935 
Log Likelihood -1778.332 -1402.433 -2494.552 
LR chi-square  267.07***  167.68***  281.26*** 
Vuong test  1.58  2.77**  2.76** 
* Denotes significance at .05, two-tailed. 
** Demote significance at .01, two-tailed. 
*** Denotes significance at .001, two- tailed. 
 
 
The hypotheses of cognitive ability and apathy are also supported by all the three 
counting models.  Significant constants of the models suggest that if a respondent is likely to 
give DK responses, holding all other factors at zero, he/she would give about 11 (19%) DK 
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answers30 to the 58 life-related questions, about 8 (38%) DK answers to the 21 value-related 
questions, and 24 (80%) DK answers to the 30 politics-related questions.  Respondents with 
higher cognitive ability and more political interest can effectively reduce the number of DK 
answers. For example, for those who are likely to give DK responses, an additional level in 
education reduces the expected number of DK answers by 30.0 percent to life-related questions, 
by 43.0 percent to value-related questions, and by 26.3 percent to politics-related questions, 
holding all other variables constant.  For the same group of respondents, a standard deviation 
increase in the index of political interest decreases the expected number of DK answers by 12.6 
percent to life-related questions, by 8.7 percent for value-related questions, and by 13.1 percent 
to politics-related questions.  Moreover, though respondents who are interested in the survey 
interview are not likely to give substantive responses to all questions, they do give less number 
of DK answers than those with no interest.  Being a respondent who is very interested in the 
interview decreases the expected number of DK answers by 75.0 percent to life-related 
questions, by 60.8 percent to value-related questions, and by 50.9 to politics-related questions, 
holding all other variables constant.  It is also found that the younger respondents gave less DK 
answers than the older respondents.  Compared with the respondents in middle age, those who 
are less than 35 years old give about 18.5, 27.1, and 12.0 percent less DK answers to the three 
types of questions separately. Gender only has significant effect in the model for politics-related 
questions.  Female respondents give about 20.1 percent more DK answers to politics-related 
questions on average than male respondents controlling effects of other variables.   
The hypothesis of social desirability/fear of political retribution is only partially 
supported by the results. Interpersonal trust, which is expected to reduce fear and DKs, plays no 
                                                 
30 I use the derivative interpretation suggested by King (1998).  The baseline is computed as the coefficient times the 
mean number of counts in the sample.  For the case of China, it is equal to 3.245*3.435 = 11.147. 
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role in all three models.  Education is negatively related to the number of DK answers, showing 
no sign of political sensitivity for the educated.  Though respondents in the age group of 35 or 
younger give significantly less number of DK answers to politics-related questions, it is 
reasonable to interpret it as part of cognitive ability effect, rather than because of personal 
experience, since similar age effects are also present in responses to life- or value- related 
questions.  However, it is found that the presence of other adult people in the process of 
interview can influence respondents’ answers to politics-related questions.  The respondents tend 
to give 18.8% more DK answers in front of other adults when being interviewed.  In contrast, the 
respondents have no such concerns when answering life- or value- related questions.  It suggests 
that political control and social desirability still have lingering effects on the mentality of the 
Chinese respondents and they seem to be very cautious about answering politics-related 
questions.  Some may give DK answers to hide their true opinions, while some others do so 
because they are afraid of giving “wrong” answers when they do not have clear opinions.  The 
effect of third party presence is, nevertheless, weaker than that of education (supporting 
cognitive ability hypothesis) and political interest (supporting apathy hypothesis).  The predicted 
number of DKs increases 0.77 when other adults presented in the interview, whereas the number 
decreases 3.33 and 1.33 for an additional unit increase in education level and political interest 
score (Appendix B). 
Therefore, though we may not eliminate the possibility that Chinese respondents hide 
their true opinions by giving DK answers due to political fear, we have stronger evidence to 
demonstrate that the higher rates of DK answers to politics-related questions among the Chinese 
respondents are mainly due to task difficulty, low cognitive ability, and political apathy.   
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3.5.2 A comparison of “don’t know” responses to politics-related questions 
With a particular intention to explore whether political fear affects survey responses in China, I 
perform the ZINB regression analyses of “don’t know” responses to politics-related questions for 
all five countries since this group of questions are assumed most difficult and politically 
sensitive.31  The results are presented in Table 4. 
 In general, the ZINB model for the survey of China shares many similarities with the 
models for the surveys of other countries.  The most influential factors are education and 
political interest.  They not only determine the probability that a respondent would give DK 
answers to politics-related questions but also predict how many DK answers they would be likely 
to give.  The effects of these two factors are in the same direction for all surveys, but with 
different magnitude. 
 
                                                 
31 There is no information about the presence of third parties during the interview from the surveys of other four 
counties.  So this variable is not included into the comparative analysis. 
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Table 4 A comparison of “don’t know” responses to politics-related questions 
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I further computed the predicted number of DK answers based on various education 
levels (Figure 3).  The results reveal three patterns.  First, the predicted number of DK answers 
has different baselines for the five countries.  At the lowest education level, it is predicted that on 
average Chinese respondents fail to answer 9.2 questions, Indian respondents give about 7.4 DK 
answers, respondents of South Korea and Vietnam give about 4.0 and 2.5 respectively, and the 
US respondents give the fewest DK answers (0.9).  It seems that China is more similar to India 
than to Vietnam and South Korea.  Then economic development may have some explanatory 
power.  Second, significant education effects, though present in all models except that for the 
U.S., are different in magnitude.  The connecting line representing China has the steepest slope 
among all lines.  The Chinese respondents with medium level of education are expected to give 
about 4.5 less DK answers than those with lowest level of education.  The expected number of 
DK answers decreases to 2.2 for those with the highest level.  The lines indicating India, South 
Korea, and Vietnam have similar slopes, suggesting equally strong effect of education.  Third, 
the five lines converge as education level increases.  It helps to explain the big differences of DK 
answers to politics-related questions for the five countries.  The mean level of education in China 
and India is much lower than that in South Korea and the US.  Therefore, modernization that 
promotes education will play an important role in improving quality of survey data from China 
by reducing item nonresponse. 
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Figure 3 A comparison of education effect on number of DK answers 
 
Political interest also shows significant effects on DK answers to politics-related 
questions.  Because political interest is measured using three indicators and the respondents from 
different countries have different factor structures to construct the index, it is not appropriate to 
use units for comparison.  Figure 4 presents a comparison of predicted number of DK answers 
based on the five-number summary statistics which consists of minimum, first quartile, median, 
third quartile, and maximum.  Again, China is more similar to Indian than to other countries.  
While the lines of Vietnam, South Korea, and the US group together at the bottom, the lines of 
China and India stay at the top with an intersection at the median.  For half of the respondents in 
the middle part of political interest distribution, the average predicted numbers of DK answers 
are almost equal for the two countries.  However, with the steepest slope of the line, Indian 
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respondents are more influenced by political interest than Chinese respondents in giving DK 
answers to politics-related questions.  At the point of the third quartile of political interest 
distribution, the predicted number of DK answers is 2.9 for India compared with 4.4 for China.  
It is also observed that the lines for China and South Korea, though have different starting points, 
have very similar pattern of slope changes.  Both lines drop quickly from the minimum to the 
first quartile, and then gradually decrease to the lowest point at the maximum value of the index 
of political interest.  There is almost equal distance between the two lines.  It suggests that the 
derivative effects of political interest on item nonresponse are almost the same for the surveys of 
China and South Korea.  Some common cultural features of the two countries may help to 
explain the similarity.  Moreover, the lines also converge as the quantile increases but the 
process is slower than that of education effects.   
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Figure 4 A comparison of political interest effect on number of DK answers 
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 If fear of political retribution has impacts on survey responses through “don’t know” 
answers, we would expect that some variables have common effects in the models for China and 
Vietnam but work in different way for other countries since both China and Vietnam were under 
communist rule before reform and now are in a transition featuring political liberalization and 
marketization.  However, the results are quite contradictory to our expectation.  First, the number 
of “don’t know” answers to politics-related questions is unbelievably low among Vietnam 
respondents.  About 50 percent of them give less than 2 DK answers to the 30 questions, but for 
Chinese respondents, this number is about 7.   The baselines computed from the counting models 
are 7.4 DK answers for Vietnam and 24.3 DK answers for China.  Second, while the age group 
effect in China survey is more likely to be associated with cognitive ability, this effect in 
Vietnam survey may be better explained by political apathy.  Chinese respondents under 35 
years old are expected to give about 13.7 percent less DK answers than those in the mid-age 
group, but the Vietnamese respondents in similar age group are expected to give about 34.6 
percent more DK answers.  Third, the number of DK answers in the surveys of both countries 
can be effectively reduced by higher education level and more political interest.  Interpersonal 
trust fails to show significant effects to predict the number of DK answers in this analysis.   
In a nutshell, from a comparative perspective, my analysis strongly supports the 
hypotheses of cognitive ability and political apathy.  Lacking information on third party presence  
in surveys of other countries, we found moderate effect of third party presence on DKs, which 
seems to support the hypothesis of political fear and social desirability.   
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
Based on extensive studies on item nonresponses in survey research, I summarize three meanings 
of “don’t know” answers: don’t know, don’t care, and don’t want to tell.  I present four 
hypotheses—topical effect, cognitive ability, political apathy, and political fear—to explore the 
difference of the three meanings for item nonresponse in the survey of China.   
First, I find strong support for the hypotheses on topical effect and cognitive ability, 
which are mostly associated with the first meaning of “don’t know” answers.  For the 
respondents who are female, less educated, and at an older age, when they fail to answer some 
questions, it is likely because they truly do not know the answers or have difficulty to formulate 
concrete opinions.  The phenomenon is especially evident in responses to questions with higher 
task difficulty since such questions usually require more cognitive ability to answer.  The effect 
of cognitive ability on item nonresponse is common to surveys of all countries in this study. It 
results in more “don’t know” answers among respondents from developing countries (e.g., China 
and India) than those from modernized countries (e.g., South Korea and the U.S.) because 
education is not as developed in China and India as in South Korea and the U.S.  In addition, 
education has a converging effect.  As education level increases the gaps of the predicted number 
of “don’t know” response among the selected countries decrease rapidly.   
Second, I also find evidence for the second meaning of “don’t know” answers—don’t 
care.  For the respondents who lack interest in politics or the survey interview, they are more 
likely to say “don’t know.”  The effect of political interest is the strongest for politics-related 
questions among the three categories.   Like the effect of education, this political interest effect is 
not particular to China.  It also causes a convergence, though not that drastically.  It is 
worthwhile to note the similarity between China and South Korea in the derivative effect of 
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political interest.  The gaps of the predicted number of “don’t know” answers are almost equal 
between the two countries at each of the 5 points of political interest distribution.  It suggests that 
culture may play a role in influencing the magnitude of the effect. 
Finally, item nonresponse due to “don’t want to tell” seems to play a modest role, though 
we cannot claim that fear of political retribution or social desirability has no effect in Chinese 
surveys based on the evidence.  It is found that the Chinese respondents give more “don’t know” 
answers to politics-related questions if other adults are present during the interview. However, 
this effect of third party presence is weak, compared to other factors such as cognitive ability and 
political interest.  Further, third party presence may produce similar effect in increasing 
nonresponse in any society, since social desirability exists in all countries, free or not free. 
Unless we can prove that third party presence does not increase nonresponse in other countries, 
we cannot conclude that nonresponse caused by social desirability or fear of political 
incorrectness is unique to China. Unfortunately, the World Values Surveys in other countries do 
not contain information on third party presence.  Future improvements of the World Values 
Survey in including information on third party presence will enable researchers to address this 
question. Finally, the fact that Vietnam showed fewer nonresponses cast further doubt on the 
effect of fear, since both are under similar political control by communist regimes and both share 
low freedom ratings.  The more damaging threats to the validity of survey response in China in 
terms of “don’t know” answers seem to be political apathy and the lack of education, rather than 
fear of political retribution.       
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4． EXAMINING THE VOICED OPINIONS: THE MEANINGFULNESS OF 
POLITICAL SUPPORT 
The previous chapter explored whether there are true opinions hidden behind people’s non-
responses to survey questions.  This chapter continues with a follow-up question: even if Chinese 
respondents give answers to survey questions, do they really mean it?  Is it possible that they 
give false responses to hide their true opinions, or give easy answers derived from official 
propaganda?  And what are the considerations when the respondents handle politically sensitive 
questions? Scholars in China studies are haunted by these questions when they incorporate 
Chinese survey data in their research.  They usually devote several paragraphs or even an entire 
section to justify the validity of the data (e.g., Shi 1997; Chen 2004).  Nonetheless, these 
justifications are unlikely to be convincing without support from systematic studies.   It is the 
task of this chapter to shed light on these questions and to clarify readers’ suspicions. 
4.1 THE ISSUE: POLITICAL SUPPORT 
In lieu of investigating all survey questions concerning this problem, which is impractical, we 
select questions on political support to illustrate this issue.  Political support in China is of great 
interest to Chinese specialists because of both theoretical inquiry and political implications. A 
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large number of studies on political support are based on democratic contexts.  In contrast, 
relevant studies are scarce in non-democratic polities including China32. People outside China 
often assume that the Chinese government lacks popular support since its legitimacy is not based 
on the people’s consent.  Once the ongoing reforms encounter serious problems, it will be 
difficult for the government to maintain sociopolitical stability in China.   
However, evidence from survey research has demonstrated that the Chinese government 
in fact enjoys a rather high level of political support (Chen 2004).  Rudimentary analyses of the 
WVS data reveal the same fact (Figure 5).  A total of eight questions are included in this 
analysis.   
 
‘I am going to name a number of organizations.  For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all?’  
(1) The government (in your capital)  
(2) Parliament 
(3) Political parties 
(4) The police 
(5)  Democratic development - ‘On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing (in your country)?’ 
(6)  Human rights - ‘How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in your country)?  
Do you feel there is a lot of respect, some respect, not much respect or no respect at all?’ 
                                                 
32 A few examples includes Lujan (1974), Geddes and Zaller (1989), Miller et al. (1994), Rose and Mishler (2002), 
and Chen (2004). 
 97 
(7)  People in national office - ‘How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are 
handing the country’s affairs?  Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied?’ 
(8)  Political system - ‘People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is 
the scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good.  Where on this 
scale would you put the political system as it was (under communist regime/under the xxx regime/ten 
years ago)?’ 
 
These questions are chosen with the Eastonian conceptualization on support for the 
regime and political authorities, and six of them are in the dimension of regime performance in 
Klingemann’s empirical studies (1999).  I compute the percentages of the respondents who held 
positive opinions to these questions and summarize the results for China in comparison with the 
world average and the democracies33 average in Figure 5. It shows that a majority of Chinese 
people gave positive answers to each question, thus drawing a striking picture of the high level 
of political support in China.  Among all indicators, the government in Beijing, the Parliament, 
and political parties34 invite a great proportion of the people to declare confidence in them (an 
average of 90%).  In contrast, the average percentages of people with the same opinions in the 
democracies and in the world are far lower.  The gaps of percentages between China and the 
democracies are from 15% in the question on the rating of political systems to 75% in the 
question on political parties.   
 
                                                 
33 Democracies refer to those who scored lower than 4 on the Freedom House Index (1999) of 1(free) – 7 (not free) 
scale. 
34 In the Chinese questionnaire the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was used in place of political parties.   
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Figure 5 A comparison of political support 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
What does the high level of political support mean in China?  To what extent does it 
reflect supportive sentiments among the Chinese?  Specifically, does it indicate the people’s 
satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government, the people’s affective feelings 
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toward political objects, or is it just an illusion from artificial answers?  With these concerns in 
mind, this chapter will examine the voiced political support in China. It will start to explicate the 
meaning of political support.  After laying out possible explanations to the “unbelievably” high 
level of political support in China, this study will proceed to empirical analyses at both the 
country and the individual levels in order to examine the problem from a comparative 
perspective and provide an in-depth case study of China as well.  Finally it will conclude that the 
higher level of political support revealed in the surveys is to a great degree a result of political 
contexts in China.  Though people do not necessarily give false answers to hide true opinions, 
their responses are significantly influenced by the government’s propaganda and information 
control.   
4.2 THE MEANING OF POLITICAL SUPPORT 
Political support is a key concept in political science.  The commonly assumed relationship 
between political support and political stability has continually aroused attention from a great 
number of political researchers.  Although there are some disagreements or complements to the 
definition of political support, Easton’s conceptualization (1965; 1975) has such far-reaching 
influence that scholars of today frequently refer to it as their major analytical framework in 
studying political support (e.g., Dalton 1999, 2004; Mishler and Rose 2000; Chen 2004).  In his 
earlier work, Easton identifies three major objects toward which political support is directed: the 
political community, the regime and the authorities.  The political community, in Easton’s 
words, is “a group of people who come together to draw up some kind of constitution to regulate 
their political relationship” (Easton 1965: 178). Their attachments to this group usually transcend 
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particular political settings and form strong sentiments of belonging.  The regime commonly 
refers to the fundamental values, norms, and institutional arrangements.  It provides a platform 
for political governing.  The authorities include political figures that are currently in the position 
of political authority or denote political leadership in general.  Among these three objects, the 
regime and the authorities are believed to be more critical to political stability and have 
prompted numerous empirical studies. 
Having observed some unpredictable outcomes of the relationship between political 
dissatisfaction and acceptance of political arrangements, Easton argues that political support is 
not uni-dimensional.  He distinguishes between two types of political support: specific support 
and diffuse support.  Specific support is “object-specific” and a direct response to the political 
authorities.   It varies with the people’s evaluation of the perceived outputs and performance of 
the political authorities.  When people perceive themselves as beneficiaries of concrete policies 
or the actions of government, their specific support can be significantly boosted.  However, if 
they feel disappointed with government performance, such as big corruption being exposed, they 
may also be likely to cease their support.  In contrast, diffuse support “refers to evaluation of 
what an object is or represents … not of what it does” (Easton 1965: 444).   Thus it is more 
“durable” and “basic” compared with specific support.  Diffuse support can underlie all three 
objects mentioned above and varies in different ways depending on the objects to which it is 
directed.  When directed to the political authorities and regime, diffuse support typically 
expresses itself in the forms of trust and legitimacy.  Trust reflects the people’s confidence that 
the authorities can take care of the people’s interests even with little or no supervision.  
Legitimacy is a normative belief that the authorities or the regime will act in a right and proper 
fashion.   
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The meaning of political support is not only determined by the objects and the particular 
forms, it also involves reflections of supportive sentiments.  For this reason Easton singles out 
compliance from the dimensions of diffuse support in that compliance is ambiguous in its 
connection with political support and requires context-based interpretation (Easton 1975: 453-
455).  The people’s behaviors of conformity with authority rules may indicate their support but 
may also be caused by fear of persecution.  Dalton (1999) also discusses two sentiments that 
orient political support: evaluative and affective feelings.  He argues that while specific support 
is more rationally oriented based on evaluative calculations, diffuse support reflects more 
generalized and affective orientations.   
In short, the meaning of political support is multi-faceted.  It involves support directed to 
different objects, support in different forms, as well as support with different orientations.  
Diffuse support seems to be mostly directed to the political community and the regime, and 
specific support is usually directed to the political authorities; however, they may also be 
targeted on the same objects.  In the same vein, affective feeling is not exclusively for diffuse 
support, and neither is evaluative calculation for specific support.  Thus, which meaning can we 
derive from survey responses on political support?  That is, when respondents answer questions 
related to political support, what are the major considerations that influence their responses?  I 
will first use factor analyses to explore this question.   
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4.3 THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE VOICED POLITICAL 
SUPPORT 
The eight questions listed in the first section are in the dimension of regime performance 
according to Klingemann’s study (1999)35.  Theoretically, they may also be grouped under the 
categories of the regime and the political authorities, or alternatively under diffuse support or 
specific support.  Two dimensions have emerged from the exploratory factor analyses of the 
World Values Survey data at three different levels: the individual level in China, the aggregate 
national level, and the pooled cross-national individual level (Table 5).  The results are not 
completely identical with one another.   
 The findings from the pooled cross-national individual data are mostly consistent with 
our theoretical expectations. The first dimension indicates institutional trust, which consists of 
confidence in the government, the parliament, political parties, and the police.  Thus it 
successfully captures elements of diffuse support among the respondents.  The second dimension 
is from the perspective of regime performance, which includes ratings of the political system, 
satisfaction with democratic development, respect for individual human rights, and satisfaction 
with the people in national office. It is more relevant to specific support.  The results provide a 
general view of political support among all the respondents.  They cannot, however, be 
generalized to all the people of the countries surveyed in that the samples, when being pooled 
together, were not representative for the whole population.  The findings thus run the risk of 
selection bias since the sample size varies from country to country especially when country 
context influences the people’s responses. 
                                                 
35 Klingemann (1999) used six of these questions due to data availability.  Two questions excluded from his analysis 
are confidence in the police and respect for individual human rights. 
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 Table 5 Dimensions of political support 
 Pooled cross-
national 
individual level 
Aggregate 
national level 
Individual level in 
China 
 I II I II I II 
 
Confidence in the 
government 0.832 0.242 0.962 0.165 0.868 0.137 
 
Confidence in the 
parliament 0.871 0.209 0.864 0.387 0.856 0.170 
 
Confidence in political 
parties 0.828 0.142 0.944 0.257 0.867 0.087 
 
Confidence in the police 0.531 0.317 0.248 0.719 0.258 0.546 
 
Rating of the political 
system 0.077 0.389 0.283 0.550 0.112 0.645 
 
Satisfaction with democratic 
development 0.238 0.798 0.359 0.857 0.265 0.635 
 
Respect for individual 
human rights 0.228 0.678 0.292 0.874 0.115 0.724 
 
Satisfaction with the people 
in national office 0.244 0.804 0.690 0.510 0.182 0.683 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
3.617 
 
1.093 
 
3.392 
 
2.820 
 
3.237 
 
1.360 
 
% Total variance 
 
32.40 
 
26.47 
 
42.40 
 
35.25 
 
30.42 
 
27.04 
 
Method: Factor analysis with principal components factoring.  Factor matrices are rotated and 
factors with eignenvalues larger than 1 are extracted. 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
The second factor analysis (aggregate national level) is based on the percentages of 
respondents in each country who give positive answers to the questions.  This analysis is 
expected to uncover countries’ differences in the pattern of political support.  An interesting 
finding is that the item of confidence in the police does not stand together with the same 
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questions about other political institutions, but has higher loadings in the second dimension.  
Moreover, the item of satisfaction with the people in national office has almost equal loadings in 
both dimensions.  It implies that respondents from different countries may have different 
considerations to orient their responses.  The first dimension appears to be oriented by affective 
feelings, and the second by evaluative calculations.  As the core institutions of a political system, 
the government, the parliament, and political parties have more particular significance in the 
people’s lives than the police do.  For example, these institutions are not allowed to be 
challenged in some non-democratic countries ruled by a single party.  In contrast, the police are 
not as politically sensitive as others, and thus people are more likely to view it from an 
evaluative perspective.  In the same vein, the people in national office, representing the political 
authorities, may involve intertwined feelings from the respondents of different countries in that 
their legitimate role relies not only on their positions but also on their performances.  While 
people may view their positions with affective feelings, they may also evaluate their performance 
in a rational way.   
The factor analysis of the Chinese survey data shows a similar pattern of political support 
with that of the aggregate national level.  The only difference is that the Chinese respondents’ 
attitudes towards the people in national office are mainly based on their evaluation of those 
people’s performances.  Therefore, the Chinese respondents implicitly distinguish between items 
on core political institutions and regime performance when they voice their opinions towards 
political support. 
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Figure 6  National scores on political support 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
Based on the factor scores from the factor analysis of the aggregate national level data in 
Table 5, I use a scatterplot to compare the level of the voiced political support in China with that 
in other countries (Figure 6).  It shows that political support in China is at a high level in both 
dimensions.  It is striking that the Chinese support of the core political institutions is almost the 
highest among all countries.  Their support in the dimension of regime performance is also far 
above that of the average value (0) among countries.  The scatterplot also shows that China 
appears to fall in the category of other non-democratic or developing countries, such as Vietnam, 
Tanzania, and Uganda with high levels of political support in both dimensions. In contrast, some 
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old democratic and developed countries, such as the United States, Canada, Sweden, Spain, 
Finland, Germany, and Japan, shows very similar patterns of political support with a high level 
in the dimension of regime performance and a relatively low level in the dimension of political 
institutions.   
The findings from the factor analyses raise two questions pertaining to the voiced 
political support in China.  First, what are the factors that make the level of political support in 
China different from other countries? Second, what are the factors that account for the variation 
within the Chinese respondents in voicing political support in survey research?  Several possible 
explanations will be laid out below followed by empirical tests at both the country level and the 
individual level within China. 
4.4 EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Past research suggests three approaches to explain the level of voiced political support in China.  
Briefly, they are regime, cultural, and rational arguments.   
4.4.1 Regime arguments 
Regime arguments cast doubt on the validity of the responses in non-democratic countries 
including China (Welsh 1981; Warren 2001).  They claim that the responses are either false or 
manipulated.  To their knowledge, the communist state penetrates every aspect of the people’s 
lives using ideology or coercion to unify the people’s thoughts.  In doing so, it has to falsify 
reality and try to educate the people into believing in the falsification.  In the post-totalitarian 
 107 
system as depicted by Havel (1990), “individuals need not believe all these mystification, but 
they must behave as though they did, or they must at least tolerate them in silence, or get along 
well with those who work with them”.  Havel illustrates a greengrocer who places in his window 
a slogan: “Workers of the World, United!” This behavior, however, is properly interpreted as: “I 
am afraid and therefore unquestionably obedient.”  The greengrocer did not care about the 
content of the slogan, but he clearly knew he would be in trouble if he did not do it.  Hence, 
people have to tell lies or keep silent in order to show harmony with the system. This mentality is 
named by Goldfarb as “post-totalitarian mind,” which is shaped by the experience of totalitarian 
system and by the cultural and political liberalization from this experience (Goldfarb 1989).  
This mentality was also captured by survey research in the Soviet Union.  Vladimir Shlapentokh 
(1985) argues that when the repression level is low, the government loses its capability of 
enforcing the official values among the masses.  While the legacy of the past could not die away 
immediately, there were two levels of public opinion in the mentalities of the masses: pragmatic 
and mythological levels.  These two levels influence individuals’ decisions to different issues.  
“Whereas the pragmatic level reflects values and images which directly govern human ‘material 
behavior,’ the mythological level serves mostly verbal behavior and enables people to 
demonstrate collaboration with their social milieu and to maintain self-respect.” The discrepancy 
between the two levels is minimal both in both strong repressive regimes and in democratic 
societies, but reaches its peak in a society with relatively mild repression (Shlapentokh 1985).   
China is under the transition of post-totalitarianism.  Like most totalitarian states, the 
Chinese government used to proactively mobilize popular support through powerful propaganda 
on one hand, and ruthlessly punish dissenters with the aid of coercion on the other.  However, in 
the past three decades, the power of both propaganda and coercion has been significantly 
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weakened as a consequence of marketization and liberalization. Chinese people have gradually 
started to enjoy more freedom in assimilating ideas and expressing opinions.  Some of them may 
have formed private opinions on political support that deviate from official inculcation.  Yet the 
post-totalitarianism mind is pervasively observed among the people.  It is reasonable to assume 
that fear of political retribution from past experiences are still on the people’s minds, and the 
respondents are likely to conceal their true opinions by giving norm-seeking or political-favored 
answers in surveys.  
To identify if some responses are driven by a fear of political retribution, Tang (2005) 
suggests three strategies: (1) avoid asking politically sensitive questions; (2) deliberately asking 
politically sensitive questions; (3) asking people directly in the survey whether they are afraid of 
being reported on by others if they criticize the government.  The third strategy was used in two 
Chinese social surveys in 1992 and 1999. It turns out that about a half of the respondents still 
have the concern of being reported by others, indicating people may not give true answers in 
some circumstances.  Political fear is also found to exist in post-Communist countries although 
the reasons of such lingering fear are not clear (Rose 2007).  However, no significant empirical 
evidence indicates that the fearful people answer differently from the others about political 
questions either in the post-Communist countries or in China (Shi 1996, 1997: Chen 2004; Rose 
2007).   
Manipulation by politicization is another concern in the regime arguments.  The 
authoritarian governments try to publicize propaganda and discourage criticism through media 
control or political education. The state limits the public access to alternative sources of 
information and news, and holds political meetings regularly where people get together and 
study the latest central documents. Exposure to political communications promotes the popular 
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acceptance for the “mainstream political norms embedded in those communications” (Miller, 
Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979; Chan 1997; Patterson 1999).  However, resistance factors are 
also found in Geddes and Zaller’s exposure-acceptance model (1989).  They prove that in 
authoritarian states people who pay enough attention to government-dominated communications 
media but not sophisticated enough to resist the propaganda are typically most susceptible to 
government influence.  The exposure-acceptance effect, in a different form, is also found in 
Stockmann’s studies (2007) on the effects of media commercialization on Chinese public 
opinion.  By examining the attitudes of Chongqing residents toward the labor law and of Beijing 
residents toward the United States, she demonstrates that people are more resistant to positive 
news when they consume more official papers, but more susceptible to media messages when 
reading more reformed papers.   
It is noteworthy that the effect of politicization is not the same as that of political fear. 
Political fear prevents respondents from expressing true opinions when their opinions are 
contradictory to what the authority promotes.  Politicization persuades people to conform to the 
official viewpoints by the means of propaganda, social education, and control of information.  
Survey responses, in the latter situation, are manipulated; yet they may reflect respondents’ true 
opinion. 
In light of the regime arguments, I propose the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The level of the voiced political support in survey research is likely to be higher in 
non-democratic states than in democratic states. 
H1b: The Chinese respondents with fear of political retribution tend to express higher 
level of political support than others. 
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H1c: The Chinese respondents who are influenced by official media tend to express 
higher level of political support than others. 
4.4.2 Cultural arguments 
Almond and Verba (1963) argue that cultures play an independent role on the formation of  the 
people’s attitudes, and thus people may react to the same stimuli differently because of different 
values they assign to events (Inglehart 1999; Shi 2001). Confucianism still has a deep impact in 
China.  It emphasizes deference to authority and hierarchy, which is likely to promote political 
support among the Chinese people and also distinguishes China from other cultural entities.  
Moreover, empirical research reveals that respondents have different strategies in handling 
survey questions that they do not understand or cannot answer, such as acquiescence, satisficing, 
or randomly picking.  Some strategies are common for all, but some are culture-based (Ross and 
Mirowsky 1984; Javeline 1999; Smith 2004).  Therefore, we would expect that countries 
embracing the similar cultures will show a similar pattern in the level of political support. 
 Moreover, the distinction between support for the political community and for the regime 
and political authorities is blurred in both the Chinese traditional culture and the Communist 
social education.  The idea that “loving China is equivalent to loving the government/the party” 
is very common among the Chinese people.   Thus the spill-over effect from support for the 
political community to support for the regime and the political authorities is expected to be 
present in the voiced political support in China. 
 Two hypotheses derive from the above arguments: 
H2a: The level of the voiced political support is likely to be higher in Confucian 
countries than others. 
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H2b: The Chinese respondents who are more nationalistic tend to express higher level of 
political support than others. 
4.4.3 Rationality arguments 
Rationality arguments stress the evaluative side of political support.  Easton (1975) defines 
support in a general sense as “the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some 
object through either his attitudes or his behavior” (p.436). Specific support is relatively intuitive 
in this sense. As specific support is directed toward the political authorities and institutions, it 
hinges on perceived benefits or satisfaction and thus can fluctuate significantly.  Diffuse support 
is also an evaluative sort; though different from specific support, “it refers to evaluation of what 
an object is or represents … not of what it does” (p.444).   Besides socialization, diffuse support 
can drive from the evaluation of past experiences in the long term.  Some scholars employ the 
rational choice theory to interpret trust and consider trust as an evaluative reaction when one 
speculates how others’ interests relate to his/her own and to what extent they would behave as 
expected (Hardin 1998, 2002).   
However, current studies on China haven’t provided strong evidence for the role of 
performance in shaping the people’s political support. A research based on survey data from 
1995 and 1999 fails to find the effect of the individual satisfaction of one’s material and social 
life on the assessment of local policies (Chen 2004). Also, an important comparative study on the 
PRC and Taiwan finds that the bases of political trust in both places are still less legal-rational 
than traditional, especially in the PRC (Shi 2001).  
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Elements that may serve for evaluation of political performance include economic 
development and the corruption of countries, and the perceived benefits or satisfactions by 
individuals.  The following hypotheses will be tested based on these arguments. 
H3a. The level of the voiced political support is likely to be higher in the more 
economically developed countries than others. 
H3b. The level of the voiced political support is likely to be higher in the countries with 
less perceived corruption than others. 
H3c: The Chinese respondents who perceive more benefits or satisfactions tend to 
express higher level of political support than others. 
 
 I also expect that the factors discussed above will have different effects in the two 
dimensions of political support revealed by the factor analyses.  Hence the hypotheses will be 
tested separately in these two dimensions in order to explore the motives or sentiments that 
underlie voiced opinions to political support.  
4.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AT THE MACRO LEVEL 
Analysis at the macro level aims to discover the factors that distinguish China from other 
countries in the survey responses on political support.  Four hypotheses (H1a, H2a, H3a, and 
H3b) will be tested in this section using multivariate regression analyses. 
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4.5.1 Measurement 
Two variables are generated from the factor analysis of the aggregate national level data in the 
World Values Survey (see Table 5), and they will be used as the dependent variables which 
represent the two dimensions of voiced political support.  The first dependent variable, named 
institution-based support, mainly consists of the items on the people’s confidence in three core 
political institutions: the government, the parliament, and political parties.  The second 
dependent variable, performance-based support, stresses the people’s evaluation of the political 
system, democratic development, respect for human rights, and the people in national office in 
their respective countries.  Both of these scores have means of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
 Regime type is measured by the Freedom House Indices in 1999.36  Freedom House rates 
the degree of freedom in each state in two aspects: political rights and civil liberties.  They are 
originally measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom 
and seven the lowest.  I reversed both indices, and the final score has a range of 0 (no freedom) 
to 14 (maximum freedom). 
 The cultural variable is categorical and consists of the four country groups in the World 
Values Survey: (1) the predominantly Confucian societies; (2) the predominantly Christian 
societies; (3) the predominantly Islamic societies; and (4) other countries.  The predominantly 
Confucian societies, which include China, are used as the comparison group. 
 Economic development and corruption are used to test the rationality arguments.  
Economic development is measured by GDP per capita of each country in 1999, and corruption 
                                                 
36 The indices are accessible at www.freedomhouse.org. 
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is measured by the corruption perception indices developed by Transparency International.37  
The indices are reversed with 10 indicating “the least corrupted” and 0 indicating “the most 
corrupted.” 
4.5.2 Findings 
Political support and regime type 
Exploratory studies of the relationship between political support and regime type reveal two 
different patterns in the two dimensions.  First, in the dimension of political institutions, there 
appears a negative linear relationship between the degree of freedom and the confidence in 
political institutions (Figure 7).   As the degree of political freedom increases, the confidence in 
political institutions tends to decrease.  Vietnam and China are on one end with the highest 
scores in confidence of political institutions yet the lowest scores in the degree of political 
freedom, whereas several old democratic countries, such as the United States, Canada, Finland, 
and Germany, scatter at the other end with the lowest scores in the confidence in political 
institutions.  Generally confidence in political institutions is regarded as elements of diffuse 
support.  Thus it might be surprising to find that the levels of diffuse support are lower in those 
countries with more political freedom.  Studies have shown that citizens in some democratic 
countries have been becoming more and more critical towards their political systems (Norris 
1999).  In contrast, authoritarian governments try to maintain popular support through powerful 
propaganda and strict information control.  Moreover, in countries ruled by a single party, the 
power of the government, the parliament, political parties, and the incumbents are 
                                                 
37 The corruption perception indices are accessible at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
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unchallengeable by common people, and thus respondents may have concerns to express their 
true opinions.  Therefore, the results suggest that respondents may have different orientations to 
answer the questions.  While those in democratic countries may respond to the questions from an 
evaluative perspective, those in non-democratic countries may do it out of affective/fearful 
feelings. 
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Figure 7 Regime type and national scores on institution-based support 
 
Notes: Lowess smoothing with bandwidth (0.5) 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
 Second, Figure 8 shows a quadratic relationship between the degree of political freedom 
and performance-based support.  Vietnam and China are almost at the same score level with the  
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old democratic countries in the dimension of evaluation of regime performance, whereas most 
new or incomplete democracies lie on the bottom of a quadratic curve based on the lowess 
smoothing technique.  The results regarding the old and new democracies are consistent with 
some scholarly works, whereas the case of China (as well as Vietnam) again stands out to pose 
questions on the validity of the survey responses.   
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Figure 8 Regime type and national scores on performance-based support 
 
Notes: Lowess smoothing with bandwidth (0.5) 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
 Hence, H1a is partially confirmed in this primary study.  It appears that regime type does 
have a significant effect on the levels of political support, yet the effects have different patterns 
 117 
in the two dimensions.  Consistent with our expectation, the level of institution-based support is 
higher in non-democratic countries than in democratic ones.   However, the relationship between 
the degree of political freedom and the level of performance-based support is curvilinear.  These 
relationships will be explored further by controlling the effects of culture, economic 
development and corruption in the multivariate analyses below. 
 
Findings from OLS models 
Regime type, culture and rationality explanations are tested at the macro level using multivariate 
OLS regression analyses, and the results of the models in the two dimensions of political support 
are presented in Table 6.   
First, the findings from the exploratory analysis of political support and regime type in 
Figures 7 and 8 are confirmed by the multivariate analyses.  Regime type still has significant 
effects on the voiced opinions of political support after introducing the variables of economic 
development, corruption, and cultures into the models.  Consistent with Hypothesis H1a, the 
level of institution-based support is negatively related to the degree of political freedom.  People 
in the countries with more political freedom actually express less confidence in political 
institutions.  However, the relationship is quadratic in the dimension of regime performance.  
People in both the least free and the most free countries give better evaluations than people in 
between.   
Second, Confucian culture is not an important factor in influencing people’s voiced 
opinions of political support.  In the dimension of political institutions, people from the 
Confucian societies tend to express more confidence than those from Christian societies, whereas 
they have no significant difference from the people of other societies.  For the performance-
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based support, the cultural effects are negligible – there are no significant differences among the 
people from Confucian, Christian, or Islamic societies at all.  Hence, Hypothesis H2a is not 
supported by the evidence. 
  
 
Table 6 Regression analyses of political support 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Institution-based 
support 
 
Performance-based 
support 
Freedom House indices, 99 
 
-0.122  (0.055)* -0.704  (0.108)***  
Freedom House indices, 99 (squared)   0.042  (0.008)*** 
Corruption perception indices, 99  
 
-0.123  (0.110) -0.101  (0.066)    
GDP per capita, 99 (in thousand)  
 
-0.044  (0.036)  0.064 (0.017)**    
 
Culture:   
 
Confucian (c.f.)   
Christian 
 
-0.953  (0.457)*  0.365  (0.216)  
Islamic 
 
-0.721  (0.523)   1.062  (0.826) 
Others 
 
-0.111  (0.548)  0.682  (0.239)**   
Constant  
 
 2.611  (1.318)   2.069 (0.712)**  
Adjusted R2        0..665        0.655 
Observations          37          37 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  (cf.) Comparison group 
Source: The World Values Survey (China) 
 
 
 
Lastly, the results show that people from affluent countries may not necessarily have 
more confidence in the political institutions of their countries, yet they do give significantly 
higher evaluations to the regime performance of their corresponding countries than others.  In 
comparison, the effects of perceived corruption, with more variation than that of economic 
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development, are not significant in both dimensions of political support.  Therefore, the 
hypotheses based on the rationality argument (H3a and H3b) are only partially confirmed by the 
analysis at the macro level.   
4.5.3 Summary of macro analysis 
In summary, the two dimensions of political support at the macro level have different sources.  
First, regime type significantly affects the level of institution-based support.   People from 
countries with more political freedom show a lower level of confidence in political institutions 
compared with those from less free countries.  However, cultural or rational factors do not 
significantly account for the variation of the level of institution-based support across the 
countries.   
In another dimension, both regime type and economic development play significant roles 
in predicting the level of performance-based support.  The effect of regime type is an interesting 
quadratic relationship between the degree of political freedom and the score of the evaluation of 
regime performance.  People from incomplete or new democracies are least likely to give high 
evaluations of regime performance.  Meanwhile, the level of economic development has a 
positive linear relationship with the level of performance-based support, indicating that the 
country’s economic condition is a major factor that can promote general political support.  In 
contrast, a country’s cultural contexts and the people’s perception of corruption have no 
significant influence on the level of performance-based support. 
 Based on these findings, we will conclude that China’s high level of voiced political 
support is to a great degree related to China’s political system.  Under a non-democratic regime, 
Chinese respondents not only expressed a high level of confidence in the core political 
 120 
institutions, they also gave high evaluations to regime performance.  The regime effect on the 
people’s minds is so strong that it even cancels out the negative influence of China’s economic 
development when they evaluate the regime performance.  The macro analysis provides a grand 
explanation of China’s high level of political support from a comparative perspective.  However, 
it cannot explain what the mechanisms of China’s regime to promote political support are.  
Neither can it account for the variation of political support among the Chinese people under such 
a regime.  We will turn to a micro analysis to accomplish these tasks. 
4.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AT THE MICRO LEVEL 
The analyses at the macro level demonstrate that regime type is an important factor that 
contributes to the high level of political support in China.  This section will further explore the 
variation of the voiced political support among the Chinese respondents and the factors that 
account for such variation. 
4.6.1 Measurement 
The factor analysis of the Chinese survey data on political support extracts two factors that are 
similar with those from the aggregate world data (Table 5).  This makes it possible to further 
explore the sources of political support at the micro level in the same dimensions.  Again, the 
factor scores of institution-based support and performance-based support are predicted using the 
principle component factoring method.  They are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. 
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 Several independent variables are selected to test the hypotheses derived from the regime, 
culture, and rationality arguments.  The first variable is age cohort, which indicates the effect of 
regime change.  This study divides respondents in five age groups on the basis of critical 
political events: The first age group includes those who were 18 years old by 1966 (55 or older at 
the time point).  Respondents in this group had been socialized during the radical Socialist 
transformation.  They, on one hand, had the strongest ideological orientation and could be the 
firmest supporters of the communist government.  On the other hand, they also experienced the 
crucial political purges and thus had the strongest political sensitivity. For both reasons, this 
group of respondents is expected to express the highest level of political support.  The second 
age group includes those who were under 18 during the Cultural Revolution.  They were around 
their forties at the survey time point.  They grew up in a society full of political attacks, 
betrayals, persecutions, and fears.  Such experiences might make them question the legitimacy of 
the communist ideology, but might also deter them from expressing their true opinions.  They are 
expected to give moderate support to the political system.  The third age group of respondents 
experienced the early stages of the reforms after the Cultural Revolution and also the most liberal 
period before the Tiananmen demonstration.  They were open to western thoughts and became 
critical to the government performance.  However, they were also under the influence of 
Tiananmen Square demonstration.  As a result, they are expected to be more reluctant to express 
political support than the previous group.  The respondents in the fourth group were between 25 
and 32.  They finished their socialization before Deng’s death, which was a period with a stable 
political environment and rapid economic development.  Marketization weakened the state 
control over the society and the legacy of the past gradually faded away.  The youngest group of 
respondents grew up in post-Deng era.  Communist political purges became historical stories to 
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them.  They were under the least effects of political fear and enjoyed more freedom to express 
their true opinions.  Moreover, they were most exposed to western democratic thoughts.  
Therefore I expect that the youngest group of people (the generation of the post-Deng era) to 
give the least political support and serves as the comparison group in the analysis. 
The second variable that can reflect the legacy of the Communist rule in China is how 
much freedom of choice and control people feel they have over their lives (life independence).  
Those who are still living in the shadow of the past Communist rule would feel less freedom than 
those who are under less of an influence of the past.  Thus their answers to questions on political 
support are expected to be more subject to regime effect.  A scale of one to ten is used to 
measure respondent’s feelings on this question, with 1 being “none at all” and 10 being “a great 
deal.” 
Two variables are used to test response effects on survey responses.  One is the presence 
of adult parties during the interviews, and the other is interpersonal trust.  Chinese respondents 
may have concerns over expressing opinions towards politically sensitive questions in front of 
other adult people due to fear of being reported.  However, those who think most people can be 
trusted may have less such concerns in the interviews.  Both variables are recoded to dummies.   
The people’s sophistication and their exposure to information are critical to politicization.  
Unfortunately the World Values Surveys did not ask questions about the use of media or other 
information sources.  But there are questions on the people’s confidence in the press and 
television.  In China most the press and television are mouthpieces of the government.  It is 
reasonable to assume that those who are confident in the press or television are more likely to be 
influenced by the official media, and thus more likely to express support for the government.  
The people’s sophistication can be measured by their gender, education level and political 
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interest.  Males are expected to be more sophisticated than females in handling political 
information.  Those who are better educated are expected to be more critical of the government 
and regime, thus expressing less political support in the survey interviews.  People who are 
interested in politics are not necessarily regime supporters.  However, we expect those who are 
both interested in politics and confident in the press or television to be more likely to accept the 
official opinions and show support to the government or the regime.  Thus interaction terms of 
political interest and confidence in the press or television will be considered in building the 
model.  Gender, confidence in the press and television are recoded as dummy variables.  
Education and political interest are measured in the same manner as the previous chapter. 
As discussed earlier, Chinese people usually do not differentiate between nation and 
government.  We expect that those who are proud of being Chinese are more likely to express 
political support in the survey interviews.  Nationalism is coded as a dummy variable. 
Finally, two variables related to personal life are used to test the hypothesis derived from 
the rationality arguments.  One variable is the people’s satisfaction with their life as a whole or, 
in Inglehart’s term, subjective well-being.  Though it is regarded as a cultural variable in 
Inglehart’s works, the linkage of subjective well-being and political support are reasonably 
believed to be based on rational consideration.  That is, people who are more satisfied with their 
lives as a whole are more likely to show support for the government or the regime.  Another 
variable is people’s satisfaction with their household financial situation, which reflects their 
perception of economic benefits under the current political contexts.  When people perceived 
more economic benefits, they are more likely to express political support in the survey interview.  
Both variables are measured on a 1 to 10 scale, with the larger number indicating more 
satisfaction. 
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4.6.2 Findings 
Table 7 presents the results from the multivariate multiple OLS regression models to test the 
explanations derived from the regime, cultural, and rationality arguments.  Several findings 
deserve emphasis when the effects of the independent variables are compared within and across 
the models of institution-based support and performance-based support. 
Let’s examine the regime effects first.  In the model of institution-based support, 
significant regime effects involve socialization, response effects, and media influence.  First, the 
oldest group of people, who completed their socialization during the Socialist transformation, 
tends to show higher level of support than those who grew up after the Deng era, whereas this 
difference is not significant among other groups of people.  Second, respondents appear to be 
more supportive of the political institutions when there are other adults present during the survey 
interview.  Third, traditional paper media has a significant influence on public support for 
political institutions.  Holding all other variables constant, the score of the institution-based 
support for those who are confident in the press are in average 0.208 higher than those who lack 
the confidence.  These findings suggest that the supporters of political institutions are relatively 
conservative people, who are old in age, and prefer an old media form (the press).   These people 
were strongly under the influence of official propaganda in their early years and via the 
traditional propaganda tools.  Though there are no systematic differences between the 
respondents who trust people in general and those who do not, and though people who feel less 
freedom of choice in their lives did not seem to give false responses by expressing higher 
political support than others, the respondents do appear to be vigilant when answering politically 
sensitive questions, especially in front of other adults. 
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Table 7 Multivariate multiple OLS regression analysis of political support in China 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Institution-based 
support 
 
Performance-based 
support 
Age cohort: 
56 – 66  
(generation of Socialism transformation) 
 
 
 0.393  (0.181) * 
 
   
-0.115 (0.168)    
44 – 55 
(generation of the Cultural Revolution) -0.013  (0.146) -0.038 (0.136)    
33 – 43 
(generation of political liberalization)  0.161 (0.142) -0.134 (0.132) 
   25 – 32 
(generation of post-Tiananmen event)  0.015  (0.150)  0.053  (0.139)    
18 – 24 (cf.) 
(generation of post-Deng era)   
Life independence 
 
-0.003  (0.018)  0.0412  (0.017) * 
Presence of third parties  0.194 (0.082) * -0.097 (0.076) 
Trust in general people  
 
-0.092  (0.078)  0.087  (0.073)    
Gender - Female  
 
-0.077  (0.082)  0.135  (0.076)    
Education (level) 
 
-0.069  (0.043) -0.071  (0.039)    
Political interest (PI) 
 
 0.054  (0.082)  0.192  (0.076) *   
Confidence in television (TV) 
 
 0.189  (0.105)  0.265  (0.098) **    
Confidence in the press (PRE) 
 
 0.208  (0.098) *  0.434  (0.091) ***   
Interaction of PI and TV 
 
-0.105  (0.108) -0.047  (0.101)    
Interaction of PI and PRE 
 
 0.084  (0.103) -0.101  (0.097)    
Nationalism 
 
 0.334  (0.105) **   0.070  (0.098)    
Satisfaction with life as a whole 
 
 0.052  (0.024) *   0.038  (0.022)    
Satisfaction with financial situation 
 
-0.049  (0.021) *   0.056  (0.019) **    
Constant  
 
-0.474  (0.260)   -1.280 (0.242) ***   
Adjusted R2        0..094        0.210 
Observations          641          641 
 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  (cf.) Comparison group 
Source: The World Values Survey (China)  
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Things look very different in the model of performance-based support.  People’s 
socialization experiences have nothing to do with their evaluation of regime performance.  There 
is also no evidence that the respondents’ answers were influenced by the presence of other 
adults.  In contrast, media influences play a significant role on the responses.  When people are 
more interested in politics, or they have confidence in the press or television, they are more 
likely to express a higher level of performance-based support while holding other effects 
constant. We expected that an interaction between political interest and confidence in the press 
or television can help explain people’s orientations to voice political support.  However, it does 
not show that people who are more interested in politics and are also confident in the press or 
television appear more supportive than others. Gender and education also make no difference on 
the level of political support.  It is noteworthy that life independence, a variable used to measure 
the legacy of Communist rule, plays a significant role as a cultural variable in influencing 
people’s performance-based support.  Those who feel more freedom of choice and control over 
their lives tend to give a higher evaluation on the regime performance. 
Hence, the official media can significantly influence people’s evaluations of regime 
performance unlike in their confidence of political institutions where there is no such effect, and 
thus H1c is partially confirmed. However, we cannot with confidence reject the hypothesis that 
political fear may prevent people from giving true responses (H1b).   
 Next, nationalism, as a cultural variable, is expected to have a spill-over effect from 
support for the political community.  However, it does not work equally in the two dimensions of 
political support.  Whereas patriotic people tend to express more confidence in political 
institutions, they are no different from others in evaluating regime performance 
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 Lastly, based on the rationality arguments, satisfaction with life as a whole and 
satisfaction with financial situations are considered in the analysis.  A striking finding is that the 
second variable, satisfaction with financial situation, has contradictory effects in the two 
dimensions of political support.  On the one hand, people who are more satisfied with their 
financial situation appear to be supportive by giving a higher evaluation on the regime 
performance; on the other hand, they refrain themselves from expressing more confidence in 
political institutions.  Meanwhile, respondents’ satisfaction with their lives as a whole effectively 
promotes their institution-based support, yet it has no effect on their performance-based support.  
This indicates that people have learned to form opinions on a basis of certain rational 
considerations.  Their satisfaction and perceived benefit play a significant role in predicting their 
level of political support. 
4.6.3 Summary of micro analysis 
In summary, institution-based support and performance-based support are not only two 
dimensions of political support in meaning, they are also different in terms of sources.  As shown 
above, regime effect on institution-based support is mostly present in political socialization, 
influence of the traditional media, and, to some degree, response effect (third party presence); the 
official media plays a significant role in boosting the level of performance-based support.  
Moreover, nationalism and subjective well-being are important sources of institution-based 
support, while feelings of life independence and satisfaction with financial situations have 
significantly positive effects on performance-based support.  It is also interesting to find that 
people who are more satisfied with their financial situation are more critical of the core political 
institutions. 
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 These findings reveal that, to a great extent, both types of political support in the Chinese 
survey are government-led.  The Chinese government has been devoting itself to propagandize 
nationalism to fill the ideological vacuum caused by economic reforms.  It also tries to maintain 
its positive image to the public in the media, as both nationalism and confidence in the official 
media significantly promote political support among the Chinese people.   Meanwhile, the 
economic achievements of the government during the market-oriented reforms have also 
successfully gained performance-based political support from some citizens, but at the risk of 
reducing institution-based support.   
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Political support is an ideal topic to study the meaningfulness of the voiced opinions in Chinese 
surveys, not only because it has an “unbelievably” high level in China compared with other 
countries, but also because it has a “suspicious” relationship with the regime (or the degree of 
political freedom) at the country level.   
I use factor analyses to explore the meanings of the voiced political support among all the 
people in the countries where data is available, among all the countries in question, and among 
the Chinese respondents in particular.   Similar to the results from the analysis at the country 
level, the voiced political support in China has two dimensions: confidence in political 
institutions and evaluation of regime performance.  China shows high levels of both institution-
based and performance-based support in the group of countries studied.   
The high level of political support in China comes from different sources: regime type, 
culture, and rational consideration.  At the macro (country) level, the undemocratic nature of the 
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Chinese political system appears to be a major contributor to both institution-based and 
performance-based support.  At the micro (individual) level, the respondents expressed more 
support for political institutions, perhaps due to the fear of political retribution or political 
desirability, but they do not have such concerns for regime performance related questions.  
Moreover, those who are conservative, who have strong nationalistic sentiments, or who have 
positive feelings of subjective well-being are more likely to be institution-based supporters, 
whereas the greater performance-based supporters are more likely to be recipients of official 
information and beneficiaries of economic reforms.    
These findings have at least three implications for studying survey responses on 
politically sensitive topics in China.  First, the truthfulness of the survey responses should be 
justified at the researchers’ discretion.  It is possible that the Chinese respondents give norm-
seeking answers to some questions on political institutions, but they do not always have the same 
concerns with other politically sensitive questions related to government performance.  Second, 
individual opinions of the Chinese respondents may not be completely independent, but under 
the influence of political propaganda and the government’s information control.  This will pose a 
problem when testing theories using Chinese survey data.  Some theories may not be validated 
since Chinese public opinion to a certain extent is manipulated.  Third, Chinese survey data 
provides good opportunities to study the government’s influence on public opinion in a 
transitional society.  Political propaganda has been gradually weakened by media 
commercialization.  Government control of information is also expected to erode with more 
convenient and flexible modern communication and transportation.  Studies of longitudinal 
survey data from China would be capable of capturing this dynamic process and enrich the study 
of Chinese politics.  
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5． ENHANCING THE COMPARABILITY: INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND 
DEMOCRACY 
As availability of survey data from China makes it possible to compare China with other 
countries in a quantitative way, the problem of comparability also arises as a result.  In some 
studies, extra comments have to be made on China because of “unbelievable” descriptive 
findings or “unusual” relationships between political variables.  However, few in-depth 
explorations have been done to clarify why China is different from other countries.  This chapter 
addresses these problems by examining the linkage between interpersonal trust and democracy.  
China has stood out with high levels of interpersonal trust and democratic support in comparative 
data.  It has been treated as an outlier in the macro analysis of the relationship between 
interpersonal trust and democracy.  Is that because China is incomparable?  This chapter will 
show that though cultural difference may make China somewhat unique, the choice of research 
techniques is even more critical to tackle these problems of comparability. Therefore, 
measurement equivalence and level of inference, two important issues in comparative research, 
should receive more attention from comparative researchers.   
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5.1 THE ISSUE: INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRACY 
Political scientists have dedicated their research efforts to finding out the social conditions for 
both democratization and stable democracy.  Interpersonal trust, in this milieu, stands out as an 
important element of social capital for democracy.  The relationship between interpersonal trust 
and democracy has been tested between/within some democratic countries (Almond and Verba 
1963; Putnam 1993).   Inglehart’s research is the first global study of the theory based on survey 
data (Inglehart 1999).  He demonstrates that a strong linear relationship exists between 
interpersonal trust and democracy (Inglehart 1999: 102).  This finding leads to his conclusion 
that interpersonal trust is conducive to stable democracy.  The scatterplot of interpersonal trust 
and levels of democracy also shows a striking outlier—China.  As expected, being a Communist 
country undertaking a transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism, China has a very low 
rating in civil liberties and political rights.  However, surprisingly, over 50 percent of the 
Chinese respondents agree that most people can be trusted.  China’s status in the relationship of 
interpersonal trust and democracy again was confirmed by Seligson’s study (Seligson 2002).38  
A ready response to this is whether the data are reliable, but this high level of interpersonal trust 
has been found repeatedly by the various waves of the World Values Surveys (Figure 9).  The 
percentage from Chinese value surveys was 59.4 in 1990, 50.4 in 1995, and 52.5 in 2000.  In 
contrast, the average interpersonal trust level calculated from the three waves is 20.6 for partly 
free countries and 31.5 for free countries.   
 
 
                                                 
38 A figure from Seligson’ study is attached in Appendix D.   
 132 
All countries
All countries
All countries
Free polities
Free polities
Free polities
Partly Free polities
Partly Free polities
Partly Free polities
China
China
China
0 20 40 60 8
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 4
% trusting people in general
0
 
Figure 9 Most people can be trusted: a comparison 
 
Notes:  The World Values Surveys were conducted in 1989-1993 for wave 2, 1994-1999 for wave 3, 
and 1999-2004 for wave 4.  The distinction between free and partly free countries is based on the 
Freedom Housing ratings in 1990, 1995, and 2000 respectively.   
Sources: The World Values Survey  
 
 In another study by Inglehart (2003), he found that democracy has been widely accepted 
among the people in the world.  When asked “would you say that having a democratic political 
system is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country (V167)”, 
most respondents in the surveys give positive answers to this question.  The percentages of 
respondents saying that a democratic system is a good way of governing their countries range 
from 62% in Russia to 99% in Albania.  Surprisingly even some non-democratic countries, 
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including those Islamic and Communist states, show higher percentages than many democratic 
countries.  China, with 96% of respondents giving positive accounts, ranks 13th among the 77 
countries in the list, whereas, for example, the percentage is 89% in the US, 85% in South Korea, 
93% in India, and 95% in Vietnam. 
 Confronting these unexpected findings from Chinese survey data, Inglehart first attributes 
them to China’s Confucian heritage and further generalizes that “Protestant and Confucian-
influenced societies consistently show higher levels of interpersonal trust than do historically 
Roman Catholic or Islamic societies” (Inglehart 1999: 92).  For the support for democracy, he 
claims that “almost everyone gives lip service to democracy” (Inglehart 2003: 52).  It is also 
found that China is not an influential case and its removal does not alter the overall relationship 
between interpersonal trust and democracy at the country level.  However, Peters (1998) reminds 
us that “… although comparative politics is primarily concerned with developing generalizations, 
it is also about identifying the exceptional cases.  Careful understanding of the exceptional cases 
can themselves bear substantial theoretical fruit” (p.157-159).   
This chapter aims to give a further account of these problems.  After a brief review of 
current studies on interpersonal trust and democracy, it will call attention to the importance of 
measurement equivalence and level of inference in comparative research.  Based on the survey 
data from the World Values Surveys and Chinese Value and Ethics Survey, it first points out a 
problem in the measurement of interpersonal trust in China.  Next, it will propose a 
nonparametric measure of democratic support to enhance the comparability of concepts across 
countries.  Lastly, multilevel modeling techniques will be used to explore the relationship 
between interpersonal trust and democracy at both country and individual levels. 
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5.2 STUDIES ON INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRACY 
Since Almond and Verba (1963) in their pioneering studies claim that interpersonal trust is 
essential to effective participation via engagement of secondary associations, the linkages 
between interpersonal trust and democracy have become the subject of heated debate among 
political culturists.  Putnam (1993) argues that interpersonal trust is an element of social capital, 
which helps to explain the difference in the performance of democratic institutions in southern 
and northern Italy.  In Inglehart’s (1988, 1990) analyses, interpersonal trust is part of an enduring 
cultural syndrome39 that is conducive to stable democracy.  
While Inglehart announced “the renaissance of political culture” in comparative research, 
his work confronts challenges from various perspectives.  Muller and Seligson (1994) are 
concerned over the direction of the causal relationship.  To be specific, is interpersonal trust a 
cause of stable democracy, or “a rational, learned response to the experience of living in a 
country that has a stable democratic regime” (p. 635)?  Inglehart’s dependent variable is the 
number of years of a country’s continuous democracy since 1900, which is prior to the time of 
the measurement of the civic culture attitudes during 1981-86.  It is easy to alert people that the 
reverse causal relationship might make more sense.  By including six Central American states to 
extend Inglehart’s data set, Muller and Seligson confirmed this possibility.  They found that the 
variation in the percentages of trusting people in countries is unrelated to the change in the 
countries’ levels of democracy.  Instead, interpersonal trust appears to be an effect rather than a 
cause of democracy.   
                                                 
39 The other two components of this syndrome are life satisfaction and support for revolutionary change.  
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Scholars also cast doubts on the measurement of civic culture.  Jackman and Miller 
(1996) find a modest size of bivariate correlations between the components of political culture, 
which indicates that a single enduring and distinctive cluster of cultural traits might not exist.  
The cultural syndrome is also not found at the micro level (Seligson 2002).  Among the forty-
three countries included in the 1990 World Values Survey, Significant associations among all 
three variables were found in only three countries: Spain, Norway, and Czechoslovakia. 
.  As a result, Inglehart’s finding at the macro level would face a serious problem of 
“ecological fallacy.”40  
Even though a cohesive syndrome of civic culture does not exist, we might also expect 
that there is a strong relationship between interpersonal trust, in particular, and democracy.  
Using the Freedom House scores of political rights and civil liberties as an indicator of 
democracy, Inglehart (1999) once again demonstrates this is still the case.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient of the two variables is .50 and highly statistically significant. However, 
Seligson (2002) points out that there is a selection bias inherent in Inglehart’s analysis.  Some 
highly advanced industrial societies of northern Europe and North America included in the study 
also have other characteristics in common, e.g. high GNPs.  These cases contribute to the 
positive relationship between interpersonal trust and stable democracy to a significant degree.  
Eliminating these cases from the study, the positive relationship disappears or even shows a 
slightly negative trend.  In another way, when a single control variable, namely national per 
capita income measured in Purchasing Power Parity terms in 1995, is introduced to the OLS 
                                                 
40 Seligson’s argument is based on the axiom of Przeworski and Teune (1970), which states that ecological fallacy 
occurs when “within-system regressions do not differ from zero in all systems, but the total regression does differ 
from zero” (p. 73). 
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regression on levels of democracy, interpersonal trust loses its role as a significant predictor of 
democracy.   
At the micro level, Seligson (2002) fails to find a consistent and significant relationship 
between interpersonal trust and support for the repression of civil liberties among the six Central 
American countries.  His analyses even reveal a positive effect of interpersonal trust on support 
for repressive action in Honduras. Interpersonal trust also has little to do with attitudes toward 
democratic institutions and processes in Russia (Gibson 2001).   
Inglehart and Welzel (2003) quickly responded to Seligson’s query.  They not only point 
out a misunderstanding of ecological fallacy in Seligson’s argument, but also claim that 
democratic support based on survey questions is a poor indicator of democracy.  They propose 
an improved measure of democracy—effective democracy, which is the score of freedom 
rights41 weighted by elite integrity42.  Again they show that self-expression values are strongly 
related to effective democracy.    
The existing literature dipicts a complex picture of the relationship between political 
culture and democracy.  The role of interpersonal trust in promoting democracy is also 
controversial.  The debate reveals that there are at least three problems that may undermine the 
findings.  First, validity of conclusions is threatened by selection bias.  Seligson (2002) points 
out that advanced industrial countries are overrepresented in the dataset.  Meanwhile non-
democratic countries or “fake” democracies are underrepresented.  The findings on the basis of 
these cases may not be able to be generalized to a sound theory.  The second is the problem of 
measurement.  In the studies above, measurements of interpersonal trust are quite consistent.  
                                                 
41 The scores of freedom rights are calculated as the sum of political rights and civil liberties scores from the 
Freedom House indices. 
42 Elite integrity is measured by the corruption perception indices developed by Transparency International. 
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However, the dependent variable, democracy, is measured from various perspectives.  At the 
country level, it emphasizes on overall performance of democracy or democratic institutions, 
e.g., years of continuous democracy since 1900 (Inglehar 1990), the Freedom House rating of 
civil liberties and political rights (Inglehart 1999), and effective democracy (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2003).  At the individual level, measures of democracy are often some kind of social 
reaction, such as support for the repression of civil liberties (Seligson 2002), and attitudes toward 
democratic institutions and processes (Gibson 2001).  These differences in the measurement of 
democracy may cause inconsistencies in conclusions.  The third problem is the confusion over 
the level of analysis.  Inglehart’s studies focus on covariations of political culture variables and 
democracy at the country level, whereas Seligson’s results are from area studies at the individual 
level.  As discussed later, their findings in fact cannot validate or invalidate each other.   
The problem of selection bias is mainly caused by availability of survey data.  It will 
become less serious as more countries are included in the studies.  However, the problems of 
measurement and inference are two pitfalls of comparative studies.   
The issue of measurement emerged as early as the rise of comparative research.  It was 
first discussed as the “traveling problem” (Sartori 1970; Peters 1998).  This problem usually 
happens at two levels.  One is at the conceptual level, that is, whether concepts developed in one 
context are meaningful in others.  Concept traveling problem is very common in doing 
comparative research since almost all concepts are originally developed in some particular 
context and may not apply in other contexts.  A consequence of this problem is that the same 
words may have different meanings across cultures.  For example, “Do you believe in God?” is a 
question with ambiguity. Affirmative answers to this question can be interpreted in many ways 
when responses are recorded cross-culturally (Przeworski and Teune 1966-67: 551).  The second 
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level of the traveling problem is that of operationalization.  Comparative researchers need to be 
very cautious in choosing instruments to measure concepts across different settings.  Some 
instruments are culture/context-based.  It is not unusual that certain questions which are asked in 
a straightforward manner in one setting have to be asked in an indirect way in other settings.    It 
is also likely that a concept can be measured using one question in one setting but has to be 
clarified by several questions in other settings. 
The traveling problem has given rise to tremendous studies on the equivalence of 
measurements in cross-cultural research and numerous techniques have been proposed to address 
this problem at each phase of survey research (for a thorough review, see Johnson 1998).  Most 
comparative students, however, have to conduct their research based on available survey data.  It 
is important for them to remain conscientious about the concepts in comparison and select 
measurements with caution.   
Another pitfall of comparative research is cross-level inference.  Generally, comparative 
studies can be conducted at three levels: macro-, meso- and micro- levels.  A common 
malpractice of comparative researchers is to assume that relationships discovered at one 
particular level would occur in the same fashion at some other (higher or lower) level.  The 
downward cross-level inference may lead to the “ecological fallacy,” that is, “the properties of a 
collectivity are assumed to characterize individuals within them” (Peters 1998: 44).   As 
illustrated in Robinson’s classic studies on ecological fallacy, though the percentages of black 
people in political units have strong association with the percentages of illiterate people in those 
same units, it does not mean that black people are more illiterate on average (Robinson 1950).   
The problem of cross-level inference can also work the other way. For example, in 
Almond and Verba’s pioneering studies on civil culture, they conclude that democracy would not 
 139 
survive in West Germany, Mexico and Italy because in these countries people have vague 
attitudes towards democracy (Peters 1998).  This type of mistake is called an “individualistic 
fallacy,” which comes about when “the collectivity is assumed to have the properties of the 
individuals that comprise it” (Peters 1998: 44).   
The problems of measurement and inference have affected the research on interpersonal 
trust and democracy.  They not only provoked controversies among scholars but also disguised 
the true relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy.   
5.3 UNPACKING INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN CHINA 
Interpersonal trust refers to horizontal trust relations among persons.  It is the belief of the trustee 
that a particular person, others around, or others in general, will act in such ways as expected or, 
at least, that will not be harmful for the well-being of the trustees or a relevant collectivity 
(Gambetta 1988; Offe 1999; Sztompka 1996; Uslaner 1999).  Trust (as opposed to “naïve” or 
“blind trust”) is commonly believed to be a virtue of a person as well as of a community.  
“Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ 
on matters of substance” (Putnam 1993: 89). And the community consisting of such citizens is 
also “vibrant” and “virtuous” (Uslaner 1999: 122).   
Survey research has discovered that interpersonal trust is pervasive among Chinese 
people.  This finding is somehow counterintuitive to many comparative scholars since Chinese 
society is deeply penetrated by the Communist rule.  Tang (2005) is the first to tackle this 
problem.  He finds that formal group membership does not play a role in promoting interpersonal 
trust in China as it does in most other countries.  While further exploring the sources of 
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interpersonal trust based on a domestic urban survey, he argues that trust is high in China 
because it is extended to a smaller and more informal circle around the individual.  Therefore, 
such “parochial trust” is less likely to have any effects on the freedom ratings.  Tang’s findings 
uncover a problem in the measurement of interpersonal trust.  We normally use a simple question 
in the surveys to measure interpersonal trust—“Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”—and trust is 
believed to be a simple concept to most people. However, interpersonal trust may not be that 
simple as it seems.   
There are two kinds of trust in theory. One is particularized trust, which could be inimical 
to social capital.  When persons only trust their relatives, friends, or some people they know, they 
may withdraw themselves from civic life and think of the world in terms of “insiders” and 
“outsiders”.  Particularized trust could result in many vicious mind states or behaviors, e.g., zero-
sum mentality, selfishness, corruption, short-term interests, low credibility, and disregarding law 
(Banfield 1958).  The other is generalized trust, that is, to trust widely including strangers, which 
is an essential part of social capital.  It could make people more willing to take part in their 
communities and to endorse moral commitments.  Therefore, interpersonal trust has meanings in 
two dimensions.  Though the purpose of researchers is to measure the generalized trust, people 
may give responses based on their own understandings of trust. 
The past World Values Surveys measure interpersonal trust based on one single question, 
which makes it hard to determine what kind of trust is captured by the question.  Fortunately the 
newly released fifth wave of World Values Survey includes questions about trusting family, 
neighborhood, people known personally (or acquaintances), or people met for the first time (or 
strangers).  Figure 10 presents the relationships between trusting people in general and trusting a 
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particular group of people at the country level.  Good news is that interpersonal trust, as 
measured by the single question, is the least related to trusting family and the strongest related to 
trusting strangers.  Therefore, this survey question successfully captures the generalized trust as 
the wish of the researchers.  However, China appears to have different patterns of the 
relationships from other countries. In the figures of (a), (b) and (c), the data point of China 
clusters together with other data points, suggesting the similarity of China with other countries in 
the relationships.  However, in Figure (d), China is clearly distinguished from other countries 
with high percentage of trusting people in general associated with low percentage of trusting 
strangers.  Furthermore, when China is eliminated from the analysis, the correlation coefficients 
of these relationships change to various degrees and in different directions.  Particularly, the 
relationship between trusting people in general and trusting strangers become much stronger as 
the correlation coefficient increases from .574 to .651.  It is also interesting to find that trusting 
people in general becomes less associated with trusting family members or neighborhood, yet 
more associated with trusting acquaintances or strangers.  The findings suggest that the survey 
question on interpersonal trust is likely to measure particularized trust instead of generalized 
trust in China.   
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(a) r = .334, sig. = .029 (without China: r = .329, sig. = .034) 
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(b) r = .499, sig. = .001 (without China: r = .482, sig. = .001) 
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(c) r = .522, sig. = .000 (without China: r = .538, sig. = .000) 
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(d) r = .574, sig. = .000 (without China: r = .651, sig. = .000) 
 
Figure 10 The correlations of trusting in general and trusting different kinds of people 
Source: The World Values Survey, 2005-2007 
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To further confirm this possibility, I shift my research focus to the micro level.  The 
Chinese Value and Ethics Survey (CVES) asks the question on interpersonal trust with the same 
wording as the World Values Surveys.  Moreover, the survey contains a battery of questions 
about trusting some particular people.  An exploratory factor analysis of the responses extracts 
three factors (Appendix E).  Trust in neighbor, colleague, schoolmate, villager, and friend load 
higher on factor 1, forming an “acquaintances (shuren)” dimension.  The second factor appears 
to be a “stranger (moshenren)” dimension, on which trust in businessman, out-of-towner, and 
stranger have higher loadings.  Trust in family and relatives are closely related to each other, 
forming the “relatives (qinren)” dimension.  These three dimensions comprise the whole 
meaning of trust relationship among people.    
 
Table 8 Logistic regression analysis of interpersonal trust 
 
Variable Odds Ratio (S.E.) Marginal effect 
 
Trust in acquaintances 
 
1.299 (0.040)*** 
 
 0.065 
Trust in strangers 1.256 (0.039)***  0.057 
Trust in relatives 1.088 (0.033)**  0.021 
Gender (female) 0.869 (0.052)* -0.035 
Age (year) 1.005 (0.003)  0.001 
Education (year) 0.999 (0.003) -0.000 
Family Income (level) 0.952 (0.020)* -0.012 
Urban Residents 0.960 (0.074) -0.010 
 
Notes: N = 4683; Wald Chi-square = 150.63 (p = .000).  
Source: The Chinese Value and Ethics Survey, 2004 
 
 
 145 
Then which meaning of interpersonal trust is captured by the single survey question on 
trust in general for the Chinese respondents?  In this survey, about half of the respondents say 
that most people can be trusted.  Controlling the effects of gender, age, education, family income 
and residence location, a logistic regression shows that all the factors have significant effects on 
interpersonal trust (Table 8) 43 .  Among the three types of trust relationship, trust in 
acquaintances is most related to trust in general.  For a standard deviation increase in the score of 
trust in acquaintances, the probability of trust in general increase by 6.5%, holding other 
variables constant, whereas the marginal effects of trust in strangers and relatives are 5.7% and 
2.1% respectively.  It suggests that when the Chinese respondents answer the question on trust in 
general, they are more likely to use their acquaintances as reference group.  This finding 
confirms the observation at the macro-level analysis. Therefore, this survey question measures 
particularized trust rather than generalized trust among Chinese respondents.  On the one hand, it 
explains why China has such a great percentage of people saying that most people can be trusted; 
on the other hand, it is also expected that such interpersonal trust may not have the expected 
effect on democracy.   
5.4 MEASURING DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT: A NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH 
Democracy can be measured from various perspectives.  For example, the Freedom House scores 
come from expert ratings of democratic institutions, and an effective democracy emphasizes 
democratic practice.  Both measures are at the country level.  In contrast, democratic support 
                                                 
43 Factor scores obtained from factor analysis are used in the logistic regression analysis. 
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indicates pro-democratic attitudes among the public.  It is a measurement at the individual level 
and the information can be aggregate to the country level.  However, inappropriate measurement 
of democratic support would lead to false conclusions.  As mentioned before, Inglehart (2003) 
found a majority of people in almost all countries agree that a democratic system is a good way 
of governing their countries.  However, the percentages of people supportive of democracy 
across the countries are poorly related to the Freedom House indices.  It may be because 
democracy has obtained moral support worldwide and such responses are socially desirable.  It 
may be also a case that people have different understandings of democracy influenced by their 
background (Miller et al. 1997; Bratton and Mattes 2001).  For either reason, it is necessary to 
find a measurement of democratic support with equivalent meanings to enhance comparability of 
concepts across countries. 
The best way to learn about public support for democracy is through comparing it with 
plausible alternatives (Rose et al. 1998).  In the WVS, respondents are also asked about their 
opinions on three other political systems: having a strong leader who does not have to bother 
with parliament and elections (V164); having experts, not government, make decisions according 
to what they think is best for the country (V165); and having the army rule (V166).44  Inspired 
by the method of anchoring vignettes45 (King et al. 2004), I develop a simple nonparametric 
measurement of support for democracy using the three questions as anchoring references.  To be 
specific, I first order these three questions from army rule to experts to a strong leader at a ladder 
                                                 
44 The text of the question is 
“I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing 
this country.  For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this 
country?” 
45 King et al. (2004) proposes an innovative method to measure complex concepts and enhance their comparability 
among respondents.  In brief, they estimate a respondent’s unique attitudinal position on the levels of a concept (e.g., 
political efficacy) by using vignettes on an ordered scale. 
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according to the degree of dictatorship.  Then, as illustrated in Figure 11, I assign “1” to a 
respondent if he/she said that having the army rule is better than having a democratic political 
system, “2” if he/she said that having the army rule and a democratic political system are equally 
good/bad, “3” if he/she said that having a democratic political system is better than having the 
army rule, but worse than having a strong leader, “4” if he/she said that having a strong leader 
and a democratic political system are equally good/bad, “5” if he/she said that having a 
democratic political system is better than having a strong leader, but worse than having experts, 
“6” if he/she said that having experts and a democratic political system are equally good/bad, and 
“7” if he/she said that having a democratic political system is the best among the four 
possibilities.  46 
 
 
 7     (Democratic political system) 
Experts 6     (Democratic political system) 
 5     (Democratic political system) 
A strong leader 4     (Democratic political system) 
 3     (Democratic political system) 
Army rule 2     (Democratic political system) 
 1     (Democratic political system) 
 
  
Figure 11 Measuring democratic support: a ladder of preference 
 
                                                 
46 Missing values in these variables are treated as neutral attitudes and thus put in the middle position of the scale for 
each question.   
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Table 9 Comparison of measures for democratic support 
 
Country  Ia IIb IIIc Country  I II III 
Greece 87.2 96.6 97.9 Peru 42.0 88.9 93.1 
Denmark 78.0 94.0 98.0 Morocco 41.9 67.7 95.9 
Iceland 77.8 96.5 97.9 Venezuela 41.7 92.2 93.5 
Sweden 73.6 95.4 97.4 Estonia 41.4 70.7 86.8 
Tanzania 73.4 90.7 92.9 Chile 39.9 78.9 84.9 
Malta 70.0 90.1 93.6 Croatia 38.7 94.0 98.0 
Netherlands 67.0 95.8 96.7 Zimbabwe 38.6 78.6 88.5 
N. Ireland 64.8 80.5 92.7 China 38.5 73.3 
Pakistan 64.1 79.3 88.1 Algeria 37.5 82.5 92.7 
Italy 63.9 92.3 96.6 Serbia and Montenegro 36.5 84.0 94.3 
Ireland 63.6 86.3 91.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 36.1 83.3 92.0 
Spain 63.1 84.1 94.8 Iraq 34.9 76.7 91.1 
Puerto Rico 62.6 89.0 91.7 Slovenia 33.0 82.8 89.5 
Austria 62.2 93.0 96.3 Bulgaria 31.5 70.9 87.0 
United States 57.9 85.3 88.8 Lithuania 30.9 67.0 85.8 
Canada 57.1 80.0 87.0 Turkey 28.2 84.6 91.8 
Portugal 56.7 83.8 91.9 India 27.6 68.0 93.0 
Singapore 56.6 86.2 88.9 Slovakia 27.0 75.2 84.1 
Bangladesh 55.8 94.6 98.3 Latvia 27.0 75.6 88.3 
Egypt 54.2 93.2 98.6 Mexico 26.6 73.0 86.6 
Germany 54.0 88.5 93.8 Moldova 26.3 59.2 74.8 
France 53.9 81.9 89.2 Kyrgyzstan 26.2 78.1 81.5 
Czech  53.6 88.9 92.9 Hungary 24.8 79.2 87.4 
Belgium 53.4 84.7 90.6 Ukraine 24.5 63.6 84.7 
Uganda 52.5 89.4 93.8 Belarus 24.5 67.3 88.4 
Great Britain  51.1 72.2 86.8 Philippines 24.0 81.4 82.2 
Finland 50.1 83.3 88.3 Macedonia 22.2 82.3 91.3 
Albania 49.7 91.7 97.6 Indonesia 20.6 89.1 95.9 
Argentina 49.1 84.5 90.5 Russia 19.9 46.1 61.7 
Japan 48.8 80.0 91.9 Poland 19.5 71.9 83.6 
South Africa 46.4 81.4 89.3 Jordan 19.5 83.1 94.7 
Luxembourg 44.8 77.8 92.1 Iran 16.3 55.2 85.6 
South Korea 43.1 75.1 84.7 Romania 15.4 74.7 88.7 
Nigeria 42.3 93.8 95.3 Vietnam 0.5 86.8 95.5 
96.3 
Notes:  
a. Measure I is the percentage saying that a democratic system is the best among the listed 
political systems in governing this country. 
b. Measure II is the percentage saying that a democratic system is a “very good” or “fairly good” 
way of governing this country. 
c. Measure III is the percentage saying that a democratic system is a “very good” or “fairly good” 
way of governing this country after eliminating all “don’t know” answers. 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave)  
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 It makes more sense when we examine the percentage of people who rate democratic 
system above all other alternatives (Table 9).  As the birthplace of classic democratic theories, 
Greece ranks first with 87.2% of the people supporting democracy. It is followed by a block of 
old established democratic countries.  Those on the bottom of this list are mainly either the post-
Communist countries in which people were disappointed with the new political changes 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000), or Islamic countries in which people are not open to democratic 
thoughts.  We will be misled if we only look at the percentage of people saying that a democratic 
system is a “very good” or “fairly good” way of governing a country, especially when significant 
number of people did not give responses.  Take China as an example. Whereas there are over 
70% of the respondents saying that a democratic system is a “very good” or “fairly good” way of 
governing a country, in fact only 38.5% of the respondents think a democratic system is the best 
way.  If we simply treat “don’t know” answers as missing data and eliminate them from analysis, 
the percentage is as high as 96.3%.  Inglehart (2003), unfortunately, used the last measure 
(Measure III), and thus got a different picture about democratic support all over the world. 
 Following Inglehart’s method, I also cross-validated the new measure by three separate 
criteria: the society’s level of democracy in 1999, the society’s level of democracy during the 
period from 1981 to 2000, and the score of the country’s effective democracy in 1999.  It turns 
out that the correlations between the new measure and the three criteria are all statistically 
significant (Table 10).  Also as expected, the correlations are higher when we use the indices of 
democracy in the longer period since support for democracy is more likely to be the fruit of a 
long term stable democracy rather than of a society’s level of democracy at any given point in 
time.  In contrast, the two measures based on a single question on democratic support have poor 
validity.  The measurement that ignores the “don’t know” answers in its analysis has no relations 
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with democracy at all.  Therefore, the nonparametric approach produces a more accurate 
measurement of democratic support since it is based on multiple items.  . 
 
Table 10 A comparison of measurement validity 
 
 Correlations with:  
 Society’s score on 
1999 Freedom 
House Indices 
Society’s average score 
on 1981-2000 Freedom 
House Indices 
Effective 
Democracy 
1999 
Mean score of democratic 
support in country 
.442 
(.000) 
.519 
(.000) 
.459 
(.000) 
Percentage saying that 
having a democratic 
system is the best way 
 
.404 
(.000) 
.524 
(.000) 
.557 
(.000) 
Percentage saying that 
having a democratic 
system is good 
 
.184 
(.142) 
.235 
(.054) 
.270 
(.039) 
Percentage saying that 
having a democratic 
system is good 
(eliminating missing data) 
.003 
(.981) 
.065 
(.600) 
.156 
(.238) 
 
Notes: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients with p-value in parenthesis. 
   
5.5 INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRACY: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
Inglehart’s studies focus on the relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy at the 
country level (Inglehart 1988, 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2003).  In his studies trust is used as a 
contextual variable, that is, the percentage of people with generalized trust in a country.  He finds 
that such a cultural context is closely related to the level of country democracy from a global 
view.  Though ecological fallacy occurs if we assume that the individuals with generalized trust 
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are pro-democracy based on the findings at the macro level, it is of great interest to find out 
whether interpersonal trust has effect at the micro level (Seligson 2002; Gibson 2001; Tang 
2005).  Unfortunately, findings from these studies are far from consistent.47  This study will 
employ the multilevel technique to explore the effect of interpersonal trust on democracy. 48   
The WVS data are multilevel in nature. They were collected from a number of samples 
that were drawn independently from each surveyed country.  Respondents within each sample 
(country) are reasonably more similar to one another than to respondents from other samples 
since they were exposed to the same political, cultural, and economic settings.  When the data 
collected from different countries are pooled together, the data structure violates a basic 
assumption of the ordinary least square (OLS) regression that the individual errors should be 
independent (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Moreover, it is problematic to assume, 
by ignoring country contexts, that the relationship between interpersonal trust and democratic 
support is the same for the respondents in all surveyed countries.  Therefore, it is appropriate and 
necessary to employ multilevel modeling to improve the study of interpersonal trust and 
democracy.   
 
                                                 
47 As mentioned before, both Seligson (2002) and Gibson (2001) find minimal effects of interpersonal trust on 
people’s democratic support or attitudes to democracy in some Central American countries and Russia.  Tang (2005), 
however, provides evidence from China that interpersonal trust can significantly promote political participation and 
support for civil society.   
48 While Seligson (2002) suggested that research on the relationship between political culture and democracy could 
profit from multilevel analyses, the proposed study has not been seen yet.   
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Figure 12 Scatterplot of country means of democratic support and trust slopes 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave) 
 
To justify the need for a multilevel model, I run regression analyses of interpersonal trust 
on democratic support for each country in the dataset while controlling the effects of gender, age 
and education.49  Figure 12 provides a scatterplot of the relationship between country means of 
                                                 
49 The equation of the regression analysis for the j countries is: 
Y TRUST GENDER AGE EDUCATION rij j j j j j ij= + + + + +β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 ,  
in which β0 j is country means on democratic support, and β1 j is the slope of trust. 
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democratic support (intercepts) and trust effects (slopes) across countries.  First, it shows that 
there is considerable variability from country to country on the mean levels of public support for 
democracy.  Mean support ranges from the lowest level of 1.84 in Vietnam to the highest level of 
6.55 in Iceland (country names not shown in the figure). Moreover, the spread of dots along the 
X-axis suggests a strong country-to-country variability on the effect of interpersonal trust on 
democratic support.  Especially the slopes are around zero for a large proportion of countries, 
indicating that interpersonal trust has no significant effect in these cases.  The plot also shows 
little association between country means and trust slopes, thus a country’s mean level of 
democratic support is not associated with the strength of trust effect.  The evidence suggests that 
a two-level random-coefficient Hierarchical Liner Model (HLM), in which both intercepts and 
slopes are allowed to vary across countries, is appropriate for this analysis.  . 
Public support for democracy is the dependent variable in this analysis.  It indicates to 
what extent a democratic system or democratic values are accepted by the public, thus crucial to 
the transition or consolidation of a democratic system (Linz and Stepan 1996).   Measured in the 
way proposed in the previous section, support for democracy is a variable at the individual level.  
However, it can be easily aggregated by taking means to represent the level of democracy (in a 
populist view) at the country level.   
The relationship of interpersonal trust and democratic support is examined at both levels.  
At the country level, interpersonal trust is measured as the percentage of trusting people and it is 
expected to be an element of pro-democratic culture by promoting the overall democratic support 
of countries.  At the individual level interpersonal trust, measured by a binary variable, is a 
personal virtue that influences individual’s support for democracy.  Age, gender, and education 
are introduced to the model as control variables.  For easy interpretation of the HLM model, the 
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trust dummy is centered around its group mean, and the control variables are centered around 
their population means. 
In addition to the cultural context represented by the percentage of trusting people in each 
country, two other contextual variables are also considered in this analysis.  One is the 
institutional context.  People can “learn” to support democracy because they have become 
accustomed to using democratic institutions.  Thus high levels of democratic support are 
expected to exist with stable democratic systems.  The other is economic context.  Economic 
development is considered to be a causal factor in democratization although some dispute its 
causality (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994).  In emerging democracies, levels of democratic 
support increase significantly when people perceive that new democratic systems can deliver 
positive economic output and improve their economic conditions (Bratton and Mattes 1999; 
Rose et al 1998).  Since these contexts are enduring in nature, I used the average GDP per capita 
for the period of 1990-1999 as the indicator for the country’s economic context, and for 
institutional context I used average score on 1981-2000 Freedom House Indices.  As alternative 
explanations to interpersonal trust, I expect that the countries which are more affluent and liberal 
are expected to have higher levels of democratic support.   
Cultural, economic and institutional contexts can also have influence on the strength of 
association between interpersonal trust and democratic support at the individual level.  They may 
work like a catalyst to boost or like an inhibitor to suppress the effect of interpersonal trust.  
Generally, I expect that interpersonal trust will have a stronger effect in trusting cultures, 
prosperous economies and stable democratic systems. The country level predictors are centered 
around their grand means. 
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 Table 11 HLM model on democratic support 
 
 Model I Model II 
 
Fixed Effects: 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
Model for country means   
     Intercept 4.044*** 3.087*** 
     Percentage of trusting people  -.858 
     Average score on 1981-2000 Freedom House Indices  .142** 
     Average GDP per capita 1990-1999 (in thousand)  .004 
Model for trust slopes   
     Intercept .102** -.321*** 
     Percentage of trusting people  .654** 
     Average score on 1981-2000 Freedom House Indices  .024* 
     Average GDP per capita 1990-1999 (in thousand)  .005 
Gender -.132*** 
Age (year) .003*** .003*** 
Education (level) .268*** .273*** 
  
Random Effects:
-.132*** 
 
 Variance Variance 
Country level 1.128*** 
Trust slope .053*** .029*** 
Individual level 3.523*** 3.500*** 
.938*** 
 
Source: The World Values Survey, 1999-2004 (4th wave)  
 
The two-level random-coefficient model (Model I in Table 11) is specified in the 
following equations. 
Individual-level equation: ijjjjjjjjjjij rXXXXY +++++= 443322110 βββββ  
 156 
Country-level equations: jj u0000 += γβ  
 jj u1101 += γβ  
where  represents trust, gender, age, and education. 1X 2X 3X 4X
The results from Model I confirm our findings from primary analyses.  First, countries 
have significant differences in the mean level of democratic support.   The mean level of 
democratic support across countries is 4.044 on average and the estimated variability is 1.128, 
thus we would expect that 95% of the country means to fall within the range of 1.96 to 6.1350.  
Second, the effect of interpersonal trust on democratic support is significantly different across 
countries.  The strength of association is .102 on average, with the estimated variability of .053.   
The significant variability suggests that county-level predictors should be included in the 
analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  A two-level intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes HLM 
model (Model II in Table 11) is further specified as below: 
Individual-level equation: ijjjjjjjjjjij rXXXXY +++++= 443322110 βββββ  
Country-level equations: jjjjj uWWW 0303202101000 ++++= γγγγβ  
 jjjjj uWWW 1313212111101 ++++= γγγγβ  
where  denotes trust,  gender,  age,  education,  percentage of trusting people, 
 average score on 1981-2000 Freedom House Indices, and  average GDP per capita 1990-
1999. 
1X 2X 3X 4X 1W
3W2W
In the model for country means of democratic support (specified as the first country-level 
equation), the analysis shows that institutional context is the only factor that has an impact on 
democratic support at the country level.  The countries with higher scores on the 1981-2000 
                                                 
50 The 95% confidence interval of the country means is (4.044-1.128*1.96, 4.044+1.128*1.96), or (1.96, 6.13). 
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Freedom House ratings demonstrate higher levels of democratic support on average.  This 
finding supports my hypothesis and suggests that it is possible for democratic support to be an 
outcome of “institutional learning” from the use of democratic institutions.  The average GDP 
per capita (1990-1999) is significantly related to country means of democratic support in the 
bivariate analysis (the Pearson correlation coefficient is .48), but the effect disappears when 
controlling the Freedom House scores.  It indicates that a prosperous economic environment is 
not a necessary condition on which people can become more pro-democratic.  The spurious 
relationship in fact results from the covariation of economic development and democratic 
ratings51.   
It is disappointing but not surprising to find that the percentage of trusting people (or 
average level of interpersonal trust) plays no role in shaping the level of democratic support of 
countries.  However, as shown in the model for trust slopes (specified as the second country-
level equation), the strength of association between interpersonal trust and democratic support at 
the individual level can be influenced by a country’s cultural context—the effect is stronger in 
countries with more percentage of trusting people.  This finding is interesting but under-
theorized.  A possible explanation is that a “vibrant” and “virtuous” (Uslaner 1999: 122) 
community is likely to form in countries with pervasive trusting atmosphere.  In such a 
community, mutual trust is valued and it is more easily perceived by those who trust others than 
those who do not.  Mutual trust is necessary for democracy to work.  Therefore, trust at the 
individual level is more likely to promote pro-democratic attitude only when it is embedded in a 
society where the average level of interpersonal trust is high. 
                                                 
51 The Pearson correlation coefficient for the indicators of economic development and democracy is .6766 and 
highly significant. 
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The model for trust slopes also shows that the relationship between interpersonal trust 
and democratic support is stronger in the institutional settings that are relatively more democratic 
than others, whereas economic context measured by GDP per capita has almost nothing to do 
with it.  By controlling country context in the analysis, we see a substantial reduction in the 
variance of trust slopes.  Specifically, whereas the unconditional variance of the trust slope had 
been .053, the residual variance is now .029.  This means that about 45% of the parameter 
variation in the trust slope has been explained by the three country contexts.52   
To sum up, the relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy is examined at 
both country and individual levels.  Results from the HLMs show that more percentages of 
trusting people do not necessarily lead to higher level of democratic support across countries.  
However, people with general trust in countries of more trusting cultural settings or more 
democratic institutional settings are more likely to embrace democratic system than others.     
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Past research on the relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy has provoked 
controversies.  Whereas a strong relationship has been claimed at the country level, the 
relationship is questionable at the individual level.   This study suggests that the controversies are 
caused by two problems in comparative research: measurement and inference. 
First, the measurement of interpersonal trust is subject to the problem of concept 
traveling.  Though the purpose of researchers is to measure interpersonal trust in general, it turns 
                                                 
52 It is calculated as (0.053-0.029)/0.053 = 0.453. 
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out that responses to the question emphasize different dimensions of this concept.  The results 
from a case study of China reveal that Chinese people think of trust mostly in terms of 
relationships with their acquaintances.  Such particularized trust, in contrast to generalized trust, 
is in fact not a component of a pro-democratic culture because it may cause people to withdraw 
people from civic life. 
Second, poor measurement of democracy can lead to false conclusions.  People may have 
different understandings of democracy across countries, thus it is better to measure democratic 
support in the form of a comparison with plausible alternatives in order to correct the problem of 
incomparability.  Following this line, I propose a nonparametric approach to measuring 
democratic support based on people’s attitudes to democratic systems in comparison with the 
political systems ruled by experts, a strong leader and the army.  It is a measurement at the 
individual level, but the information can be aggregated to the country level.  Cross-validation 
proves that this aggregate measurement has a stronger association with the Freedom House 
scores on civil and political rights than other measurements of democratic support based on a 
single question.   
Finally, comparative researchers easily run into fallacies at cross-level inferences when 
they inappropriately assume that relationships discovered at a particular level occur in the same 
fashion at other levels.  Multilevel statistical techniques can avoid the fallacies and thus are used 
to investigate the relationship of interpersonal trust and democratic support at both country and 
individual levels.  The results show that interpersonal trust, when measured as a cultural context, 
has no significant effect on the level of democratic support of countries.  It can, however, 
significantly promote individual’s pro-democratic attitude in countries which have higher 
percentages of trusting people and more democratic institutional settings. 
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Therefore, as a case study in comparative politics, China is distinctive but not a 
contradictory in testing the theories.  The comparability of China with other countries can be 
significantly enhanced by conscientious selection of measurements and statistical methods.   
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6． CONCLUSION: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The suspicion of public opinion survey data as unreliable sources for scientific studies of 
Chinese politics and society is widely spread.  The suspicion seems to origniate mostly from the 
critic’s belief that public opinion can hardly exist in non-democratic states.  Even with the same 
survey techniques that prevail in democratic systems, it is still impossible to capture true, 
meaningful, and comparable survey responses in China.  This study is inspired by these 
criticisms.  It began by exploring the contextual factors that give rise to a proliferation of public 
opinion survey research in China.  Following this contextual discussion, the subsequent chapters 
examined three issues that seemed to be the threats to the validity of survey responses in China.  
The first issue was item-nonresponse.  Do respondents give “don’t know” answers to survey 
questions because they truly do not know, do not care, or do not want to tell?  The second issue 
was norm-seeking response.  When respondents voice high level of political support in public 
opinion surveys, do they truly mean it or do they simply echo what they are told by government 
propaganda?  The third issue was cross-national comparability.  Do some surprising findings 
about China from cross-national studies suggest that China is an exceptional case in testing 
theories?  In the remainder of the conclusion, I recapitulate my early findings concerning these 
questions and highlight the contextual effects on Chinese public opinion surveys.  I also discuss 
the developmental trends of Chinese public opinion survey and its implications for Chinese 
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political studies.  Lastly I suggest future research on the impact of public opinion survey on 
policy making. 
6.1 CONTEXT MATTERS 
This study stressed that the transitional context in contemporary China has significant impact on 
public opinion surveys.  This context provides conditions for the emergence and development of 
public opinion surveys.  It also affects the capability of survey research in collecting valid survey 
responses.  Three contextual factors are presented in the analyses of the previous chapters. 
 
Political context 
It is undeniable that the totalitarian nature of the Communist China  in the Mao era has changed 
and people today enjoy more freedom than before.  This political context is crucial to the practice 
of public opinion survey in China.  On the one hand, the authorities take a new stance on the role 
of public opinion.  Though they never give up the effort at manipulating public opinion by 
political education and propaganda, they have gradually recognized the needs of discovering true 
opinion among the public in order to ensure adequate public support for maintaining political 
stability.  Public opinion survey, in a good timing, was introduced into China, and has thrived 
quickly in both quantity and quality (Chapter 2).  On the other hand, the political context also has 
an impact on the formation and expression of individual opinions.  A general concern is that 
people may not tell the truth in survey interview because of the lingering fear of political 
retribution from the past.  The suspicious high rate of item nonresponse and the incredibly high 
level of political support in the Chinese surveys seem to confirm this concern.  However, this 
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study fails to find strong evidence that respondents tell lies by giving politically desirable 
answers.  Though people may be cautious about answering politically sensitive questions related 
to institutional support in front of other adults, they would give don’t know answers instead of 
desirable positive answers and they did not seem to hesitate to give true answers to performance-
based evaluation, even with the presence of other adults at the interview (Chapter 3 and 4). The 
impact of political context on shaping public opinion is not so much reflected in political fear, 
but it is more visible in the findings that political interest and exposure to government-controlled 
information can more effectively promote performance-based political support.  The propaganda 
state plays a powerful role in shaping public opinion (Chapter 4).   
 
Developmental context 
In the past 30 years, China has experienced the most significant economic growth since the 
Opium War.  Every facet of Chinese society is pushing toward modernization.  Public opinion 
survey, in this context, becomes a desirable tool of collecting public opinion as a result of the 
government’s pursuit of effectiveness and the diffusion of advanced telecommunication 
technologies (Chapter 2).    Meanwhile, the improvement of education is expected to further 
improve survey responses.  Findings from Chapter 3 show that education can effectively reduce 
the number of item nonresponses.  Respondents with higher level of education give less “don’t 
know” answers than the less educated.  And the rates of “don’t know” answers among 
respondents from developing countries (e.g., China and India) are significantly higher than those 
from developed countries (e.g., South Korea and the U.S.), since in the former countries people 
are usually less educated.  Moreover, education has a converging effect.  As education level 
increases the gaps of the predicted number of “don’t know” response among the selected 
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countries decrease rapidly.  Norm-seeking responses are also lower among educated respondents 
than others (Chapter 4).  Moreover, the developmental context is likely to give rise to political 
apathy by shifting people’s attention from political issues to individual lives.  Political apathy is 
a potential cause of the increasing item nonresponses in the Chinese surveys (Chapter 3).   
 
Cultural context 
Cultural context cannot be ignored especially for cross-national studies.  In the case of China, 
cultural context involves Confucian tradition and Communist legacy.  This poses particular 
challenge to concept measurements and data analysis.  Chapter 5 raises the issue of cross-
national comparability and presents three important findings.  The first is that Chinese people 
perceive interpersonal trust differently from those in some other countries.  They think of trust 
mostly in terms of relationships with their acquaintances rather than the general trust as expected 
by researchers on this topic.   Second, Chinese people may confuse liberal democracy with 
socialist democracy promoted by the communist party itself by granting high support of a 
democratic system.  When a new measure taking into consideration of people’s attitudes to other 
political systems is used, democratic support among Chinese people is significantly reduced.  
Third, cultural context can influence the strength of the association of interpersonal trust and 
democracy at the individual level. Specifically, people who trust in general are more likely to 
have pro-democratic attitudes in countries where trusting culture is pervasive.    
 
Limitations of this study 
It should be noted that the findings from my study may not be conclusive.  They are subject to 
measurement errors as well as omitted variable bias.  For example, political fear is not measured 
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directly and the information collected is far from adequate.  Moreover, certain key independent 
or control variables have to be omitted from my analyses due to the problem of availability or 
comparability, such as third party presence in my comparative research (chapter 3) and income 
as an objective measure of better-off (chapter 4).  These limitations to a great extent are due to 
the utilization of secondary data as my data sources.  This study is expected to be improved by 
incorporate new survey design, such as experiments in surveys, which will be described more in 
the next section.  
6.2 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY AND CHINESE POLITICAL RESEARCH 
Survey research makes great contributions to political science (Brady 2000).  Unfortunately, 
political science data are often not easily available in the collections of the Census Bureau, 
Bureau of Statistics, or other sources. Political scientists studying individual attitudes and 
behavior have to collect data by themselves.  Survey research, in this sense, like telescopes in 
astronomy and microscopes in biology, becomes an indispensable tool in political science and 
exerts critical influence in the quantitative trend of political research.  Studies of Chinese politics 
can greatly benefit from this trend (Chapter 1).  Public opinion survey research in China has 
flourished at a surprising speed. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, for China to catch up 
with the over 70 years of development in western countries within a short span of 30 years since 
public opinion survey emerged with the market reform in 1979.  My findings from this study 
may ease some concerns of Chinese political researchers regarding the credibility of public 
opinion survey in China.  Much work needs to be done in order to improve survey quality and 
provide more reliable data sources for Chinese political research.  
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 First, though Chinese political studies are based on a single case, they are often 
constructed in a comparative perspective by fitting China into more general analytic frameworks 
and theoretic concerns.  Such studies can be used to “expand the analytic knowledge of political 
science and to illuminate, and even test directly, theories commonly used in the discipline” 
(Peters 1998: 138).  To make a single case study comparable, researchers in Chinese politics 
need to consider common theoretical framework and conceptual equivalence since historical and 
cultural milieu of the case may impede comparability.  Though researchers normally rely on their 
personal knowledge and experience to justify the validity of measurements in a particular culture, 
now survey research with new design can provide more reliable information about the 
performance of measurements.  One example of new designs is the method of “experiments 
embedded in surveys” (Fienberg and Tanur 1988, 1989).  This design is applicable to comparing 
alternative aspects of survey methodology, such as questionnaires, training methods, collection 
methods, either in pilot surveys, in methods test panels, or in ongoing surveys.  For the instance 
of testing conceptual equivalence in across-cultural studies, researchers may vary question 
wordings and designate the questions randomly to respondents.  Statistical methods are 
employed to determine which wording/translation is the most suitable for measuring a concept in 
a cultural entity.   
Second, an exciting feature of Chinese political studies is that the object of research—
China—is experiencing great changes.  Scholars expect to describe these changes accurately and 
capture the meaning of these changes over time.  However, most Chinese opinion surveys are 
snapshot studies.  These studies allow scholars to explore how public opinions vary among 
individuals with various characteristics, yet they are less helpful in systematically detecting the 
changes over time and their mechanisms.  Some surveys provide trend data, such as the World 
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Values Surveys and the Beijing Area Studies. These surveys are repeated over time and collect 
information on the same variables from different samples of subjects in a general population.  
Comparison of the results of several different surveys can be useful for analyzing trends.  In such 
studies, however, changes in patterns of response from one survey to the next in part from real 
shifts in opinions and in part from sampling variation.  Panel study is another type of 
longitudinal designs. It is specially devised to minimize the effect of sampling error.  It 
distinguishes itself from others in that it collects information on the same variables from the 
same group of respondents at selected intervals (Finkel 1995).  The later responses of an 
individual, a group of people, or the sample as whole, can be directly compared to responses 
given at an earlier time.  Thus panel study can produce highly reliable measures of change and 
allow dynamic inquiries of underlying mechanisms (Gray et al 2007).  Panel studies are few in 
Chinese public opinion survey research.  A main reason is the high mobility of people because of 
the unprecedented pace of housing development in urban area and the huge labor migration from 
the rural area.  Very high data attrition could have occurred had panel studies been implemented.  
Nonetheless, a pioneer project of Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) was launched in 2007 by 
the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University (ISSS).  CFPS is designed to collect 
data from 16,000 sample households in nation wide and at the levels of individuals, family, and 
community.  The panel survey covers a wide range of social, economic, education, and health 
themes.  Currently CFPS is at its pretest stage.  The first wave of the project is expected to be 
conducted in 2009 and the data will be accessible at the official website of ISSS53.  Promisingly, 
CFPS will make great contribution to the understanding of the social, political, and economic 
changes in contemporary China.   
                                                 
53 The official website of ISSS is http://www.isss.edu.cn.  It is still under construction at this point of time. 
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 Finally, the quality of Chinese public opinion surveys is also expected to improve through 
integrating new design ideas in survey research.  For example, response effect, which often 
concern comparative researchers on the validity of survey responses in China, can be 
systematically studied by analyzing paradata of surveys.  Paradata, in contrast to data about the 
data (i.e., metadata), is data about the process (Couper 2005). It is an informative research tool 
for understanding the behavior of survey respondents.  In paper-based surveys, such as the World 
Values Surveys, interviewers are asked to answer several questions about their observations of 
the respondents immediately after completing their interviews.  These paradata are valuable for 
assessing survey quality, but often ignored by researchers.  Now as new technologies are applied 
to survey research, such as CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) in the 1970, CAPI 
(computer assisted person interviewing) in the late 1980s and Internet surveys in the 1990s, 
paradata are collected with more convenience and are widely used in quality control.  The new 
technologies can significantly reduce the cost of opinion survey research and thus have been 
quickly employed in Chinese opinion surveys.  The software that is developed in association 
with these new methods can generate paradata with ease.  It is foreseeable that the quality of 
Chinese public opinion surveys can be assessed in a more scientific way, which is good news for 
Chinese political studies based on survey data.   
6.3 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY AND POLICY MAKING 
The impact of public opinion survey on policy making is a challenging yet promising topic for 
studies of Chinese politics.  There are usually two ways to study the relationship between 
opinion surveys and policy making in democratic systems.  One is through the electoral process 
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to construct the link between election outcome and the policy position of the elected officials.  
The other approach is to examine the voting behavior of elected legislators in the legislative 
process and the public opinion in their constituencies.  In China, such links are absent in the 
current institutional context, which makes it very difficult to study to what extent public opinion 
can influence policy-making.  However, we cannot ignore or simply deny the existence of such 
influence.  One possibility for future studies is to examine how opinion surveys have been used 
by Chinese government at three stages of policy making: agenda setting, decision making and 
policy implementation.  Some of the main functions of public opinion survey during these stages 
are summarized in Table 12, followed by detailed explanations. 
 
Table 12 Use of opinion surveys in the policy-making process 
 
Opinion Surveys Stage of  
Policy-making Function Example 
Agenda setting Observation: finding problems Surveys on public mood and 
mentality 
Decision making Consultation: seeking solutions Policy research surveys, 
Deliberative polls 
Policy implementation Evaluation: assessing effectiveness Surveys on policy satisfactory 
and promises fulfillment  
  
Agenda setting 
Policy issues are identified at the stage of agenda setting.  There are several policy actors who 
can propose policy issues in China’s political system.  The first is high level government 
officials.  The Chinese government was under a hierarchical power system.  The central 
government used to have the paramount power, and all lower level governments must obey the 
orders from higher level governments.  Accompanying the trend of decentralization during the 
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reform, higher level governments usually offer sketchy principles regarding a particular policy 
and leave much room to lower level governments to develop specific ideas.  Moreover, speeches 
made by higher level governmental officials can often directly influence what are on the agenda 
of local governments.  The second kind of policy actors are local government officials.  In the 
official system of information collection, local governments are required to report certain 
information to higher level authorities regularly, such as social and economic statistics, a 
quarterly report on social situation and public opinion, and detailed work reports.  Local 
government officials often offer suggestions to solve the reported problems.  These suggestions 
may become the initiative of a policy.  The third group of policy actors is the representatives in 
the People’s Congresses and People's Political Consultative Conferences.  They can raise policy 
questions directly to relevant government agencies and request quick responses.  In the past 30 
years, People’s Congresses at various levels have gained more power, and become an effective 
chanel to raise policy questions.   
Opinion surveys used at the stage of agenda setting are usually observational.  That is, 
they are conducted in order to provide information about certain problems.  At this stage, policy 
actors can draw information from all kinds of opinion surveys, such as those commissioned or 
sponsored by the government for governance purposes, those conducted by academic 
organizations for research purposes, and those carried out by the media or commercial company 
for news effect.  Survey results are accessible through internal publications, academic or 
specialized journals, and the media.  Some polls provided valuable information for policy 
makers.  For example, the All-China Federation of Trade Union has conducted a series of 
national surveys to find out the problems among workers under marketization.  The surveys 
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provided very useful information for the government to formulate reform policies in State-owned 
Enterprises.54  
Opinion surveys are also used for instrumental purpose to influence other actors’ 
attitudes.  For example, as mentioned above, the reformists often cited poll results in their 
struggle with hard liners in the late 1980’s.  In the debate of village self-government, the 
proponents also used poll results published in specialized journals to show the seriousness of 
rural lawlessness and strongly pushed the implementation of the Organic Law of Villagers’ 
Committees (Kelliher 1997).   
 
Decision making 
Using opinion surveys at the stage of decision making is a highlight in recent administrative 
reform in China.  The government attempted to change the old style of “quick decision making 
and slow policy implementation” to “slow decision making and quick policy implementation” 
and invited more public participation in the process.  With the wide use of CATI system, opinion 
survey is regarded as a quick, accurate and scientific technique of collecting public opinion.  
Opinion surveys used at this stage are mainly commissioned or sponsored by the government for 
consultation purpose.  Consultation is a process in which “governments define the issues for 
consultation, set the questions and manage the process, while citizens are invited to contribute 
their views and opinion” (OECD 2001: 23).  It is a two-way relationship that people obtain 
necessary information from the government regarding particular policy issues and give their 
feedback in return.  Therefore, publicized information with low transitional cost is a prerequisite 
for meaningful public consultation.  There are two ways of information provision.  One is that 
                                                 
54 Interview with Feng Tongqing, a professor in China Labor Institute, All-China Federation of Trade Union.  He 
was one of the key members who designed the surveys.  05/13/2005.   
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the governments actively distribute relevant information through the powerful propaganda 
machine, such as TV, radio, print media, exhibitions, and brochures.  The other way is that the 
public actively obtained relevant information through government websites and personal 
inquiries.  The Chinese governments have been engaged in constructing government websites in 
recent years as a part of administrative reform in transparent public management.  People can 
easily search government documents, track the development of a policy issue online, and post 
their opinions online.55   
Using opinion surveys in public consultation is a trend in democratic governance (OECD 
2001).  Its adoption in China represents a significant change in governance even under 
authoritarian regime.  The governments are taking concrete steps in engaging the public in 
policy-making through public opinion surveys.  However, large scale opinion surveys often 
encounter two problems in public consultation: high cost and uninformed respondents.  
Deliberative polling was developed by Professor James Fishkin from Stanford University to 
overcome these problems while achieving representative opinions and political equality.  The 
first deliberative poll in China was undertaken in Zeguo township of Wenling City by the 
government on April 9, 2005.56  The working committee consists of party officials in Wenling 
City and Zeguo Township.  Fishkin and Baogang He, a professor of international studies at 
Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia, provided technical advice.   The aim of Zeguo 
experiment was to help townspeople to deliberate about which infrastructure projects should be 
funded in the coming year.  The township government listed thirty projects based on proposals 
                                                 
55 A good example of government website is the website of the State Environmental Protection Administration at 
www.sepa.gov.cn.  The documents are well classified and the news is quickly updated.   
56 Jakes, Susan, “Dabbling in Democracy: No one knew what to expect when a Chinese town tried listening to its 
people.” TIME Asia Magazine, vol. 165, No. 16. (April 25, 2005).  French, Howard W. “China's New Frontiers: 
Tests of Democracy and Dissent.” New York Times, June 19, 2005.  McCormick, Joel. “It’s Their Call: Using a 
Stanford professor’s polling technique, Chinese Communist Party officials are giving citizens a voice in decision 
making.” Stanford Magazine, January/Feburary 2006.   
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from the local people’s congress and the local people’s consultative conference.  The projects in 
total would cost about RMB 137 million ($17 million) according to the experts’ estimation.  
However, the government only had a budget of RMB 40 million ($5 million) for infrastructure 
construction.  In light of budget constraint, the Zeguo town leadership decided to adopt 
deliberative polling technique to make the choices.  Officials first selected 275 residents using 
random sampling to ensure accurate representation of the 120,000 townspeople.  They sent to the 
representatives an introduction of the 30 projects prepared by twelve experts ten days before the 
meeting.  For evaluation purpose, the representatives were asked to rank the priorities of the 
projects in a questionnaire after reading the introduction.  On the meeting day, 257 participants 
who showed up were split into small groups.  They discussed the pros and cons of the projects 
with the presence of twelve experts and all township government officials.  At the end of the day, 
235 participants completed the questionnaire regarding the 30 projects.  A majority of the 
representatives gave top priority to environmental works, including sewage treatment plants and 
public parks.  They rejected plans for another town square and several road-building projects.  
The final project list was submitted to the local people’s congress and approved by 84 of its 92 
deputies.     
The Zeguo experiment attracted attention from above.  A detailed description and 
discussion of the deliberative poll in Zeguo was published on Study Time(Xuexi Shibao), a 
weekly newspaper of the Cental Party School.57  The experiment was described as “a fruitful 
exploration of developing local democracy.”58  Zeguo Party Secretary Jiang made the following 
                                                 
57 Jiang, Zhaoguo and He Baogang, "Democratic Earnest Deliberation: where people participated to discuss 
important city planning issues - the people of Wenling City, Zegou Township participated in a 2005 city planning, 
money allotment and project decisions."  Study Time (Xuexi Shibao), No. 308 (October 2005).   
58 “A Fruitful Exploration of Developing Local Democracy.”  Study Time (Xuexi Shibao), No. 315 (December 
2005).    
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comment in his email, “the idea of Zeguo’s democratic deliberalization was to conduct a 
democratic and scientific experiment for important public decisions … This was an exploration 
within the existing political framework of China – it marked a transformation of the decision-
making process.”59    
 
Policy implementation 
There are two questions regarding the implementation process: (1) how effective is the 
governments in implementing the policy, and (2) what new problems emerge during the 
implementation.   Therefore, policy implementation requires evaluation.  Policy evaluation in the 
traditional policy-making process before the reform was mainly based on reports from local 
governments.  However, driven by individual’s career interests, local government officials often 
cover problems and exaggerate achievements.   The mechanism of policy evaluation was 
paralyzed.   
In recent years, opinion surveys have been used at this stage of evaluation.  Some surveys 
focus on governments’ effectiveness.  For example, one opinion survey conducted by Hunan 
Public Opinion Research Center was about the eight promises made by the provincial 
government in 2004.   It interviewed 843 respondents about their awareness and attitudes to the 
implementation of the eight promises.   Guangzhou Public Opinion Research Center also 
conducted a series of surveys on public evaluation of the government in 2002.  Some other 
surveys target particular policies.  For example, before Beijing government decided to ban 
fireworks in the metropolitan area in 1993, it conducted an opinion survey which reported that 
84.6% of the respondents supported for the ban.  Firework is a traditional activity to celebrate 
                                                 
59 McCormick, Joel. “It’s Their Call: Using a Stanford professor’s polling technique, Chinese Communist Party 
officials are giving citizens a voice in decision making.” Stanford Magazine, January/Feburary 2006.   
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New Year and Spring Festival in China.  People started to miss it after several years since the 
ban.  A couple of opinion surveys were conducted in 2005 about lifting the ban.  It turned out 
that over two thirds of the respondents supported the lifting of the ban, and a revision of the 
regulation took effective in 2006. 
 
Therefore, opinion surveys can be used by the Chinese governments at different stages in 
the policy-making process and for different purposes.  While opinion surveys used at the stage of 
agenda setting are for observation, those used at the stages of decision making and policy 
implementation are for consultation and evaluation respectively.  Opinion surveys have different 
impacts on the three stages of policy-making.  While opinion surveys may play a growing role in 
decision making and policy implementation, they are still less effective in influencing agenda 
setting.  Democracy, as represented by further improving the role of opinion surveys in decision 
making, is not an end but a means to promote China’s political reform.  
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APPENDIX A.  QUESTIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF “DON’T KNOW” ANSWERS 
Each question is indexed by two numbers.  The first is the question number in the questionnaire, 
and the second is the variable name in the dataset.  The total number of the questions is 119. 
 
Life-related questions (N = 58) 
 
- On life (N=17): 
 
V 4 A001.- Family important in life 
V 5 A002.- Friends important in life 
V 6 A003.- Leisure time important in life 
V 7 A004.- Politics important in life 
V 8 A005.- Work important in life 
V 9 A006.- Religion important in life 
V 10 A007.- Service to others important in life 
V 12 A009.- State of health (subjective) 
V 27 A057.- Spend time with parents or other relatives 
V 28 A058.- Spend time with friends 
V 29 A059.- Spend time with colleagues from work 
V 30 A060.- Spend time with people at your church, mosque or synagogue 
V 31 A061.- Spend time with people at sport, culture, communal organization 
V 38 A169.- Good human relationships 
V 80 C006.- Satisfaction with financial situation of household 
V 81 A170.- Satisfaction with your life 
V 82 A173.- How much freedom of choice and control 
 
- On jobs (N=14): 
 
V 78 C001.- Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women 
V79 C002.- Jobs scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than 
immigrants 
V 83 C008.- Work compared with Leisure 
V 84 C009.- First choice, if looking for a job 
V 85 C010.- Second choice if looking for a job 
V 97 C036.- To develop talents you need to have a job 
V 98 C037.- Humiliating to receive money without having to work for it 
V 99 C038.- People who don´t work turn lazy 
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V100 C039.- Work is a duty towards society 
V101 C040.- People should not have to work if they don´t want to 
V102 C041.- Work should come first even if it means less spare time 
V103 C059.- Fairness: One secretary is paid more 
V104 C060.- How business and industry should be managed 
V105 C061.- Following instructions at work 
 
- On marriage and gender (N=13): 
 
V109 D018.- Child needs a home with father and mother 
V110 D019.- A woman has to have children to be fulfilled 
V111 D022.- Marriage is an out-dated institution 
V112 D023.- Woman as a single parent 
V113 D054.- One of main goals in life has been to make my parents proud 
V114 D055.- Make effort to live up to what my friends expect 
V115 D056.- Relationship working mother 
V116 D057.- Being a housewife just as fulfilling 
V117 D058.- Husband and wife should both contribute to income 
V118 D059.- Men make better political leaders than women do 
V119 D060.- University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
V 13 A025.- Respect and love for parents 
V 14 A026.- Parents responsibilities to their children 
 
- On religion (N=5): 
 
V182 F001.- Thinking about meaning and purpose of life 
V183 F022.- Statement: good and evil 
V184 F024.- Religious denomination 
V185 F028.- How often do you attend religious services 
V186 F034.- Religious person 
 
- On morality (N=9): 
 
V205 F115.- Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
V206 F116.- Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
V207 F117.- Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
V208 F118.- Justifiable: homosexuality 
V209 F119.- Justifiable: prostitution 
V210 F120.- Justifiable: abortion 
V211 F121.- Justifiable: divorce 
V212 F122.- Justifiable: euthanasia 
V213 F123.- Justifiable: suicide 
 
Value-related questions (N=21) 
 
- On environment (N=5): 
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V 33 B001.- Would give part of my income for the environment 
V 34 B002.- Increase in taxes if used to prevent environmental pollution 
V 35 B003.- Government should reduce environmental pollution 
V 36 B008.- Protecting environment vs. Economic growth 
V 37 B009.- Human & nature 
 
- On country priority (N=6) 
 
V120 E001.- Aims of country: first choice 
V121 E002.- Aims of country: second choice 
V122 E003.- Aims of respondent: first choice 
V123 E004.- Aims of respondent: second choice 
V124 E005.- Most important: first choice 
V125 E006.- Most important: second choice 
 
- On future changes (N=6) 
 
V127 E014.- Future changes: Less emphasis on money and material possessions 
V128 E015.- Future changes: Less importance placed on work 
V129 E016.- Future changes: More emphasis on technology 
V130 E018.- Future changes: Greater respect for authority 
V131 E019.- Future changes: More emphasis on family life 
V132 E022.- Opinion about scientific advances 
 
- On governance (N=4) 
 
V141 E035.- Income equality 
V142 E036.- Private vs state ownership of business 
V143 E037.- Government responsibility 
V144 E039.- Competition good or harmful 
 
Politics-related questions (N=30)  
 
- On institutional trust (N=13) 
 
V148 E070.- Confidence: Armed Forces 
V149 E072.- Confidence: The Press 
V150 E078.- Confidence: Television 
V151 E073.- Confidence: Labour Unions 
V152 E074.- Confidence: The Police 
V153 E079.- Confidence: The Government 
V154 E080.- Confidence: The Political Parties 
V155 E075.- Confidence: Parliament 
V156 E076.- Confidence: The Civil Services 
V157 E081.- Confidence: Major Companies 
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V158 E082.- Confidence: The Environmental Protection Movement 
V159 E083.- Confidence: The Women´s Movement 
V162 E088.- Confidence: The United Nations 
 
- On political system (N=12) 
 
V164 E114.- Political system: Having a strong leader 
V165 E115.- Political system: Having experts make decisions 
V166 E116.- Political system: Having the army rule 
V167 E117.- Political system: Having a democratic political system 
V168 E110.- Satisfaction with the way democracy develops 
V169 E120.- In democracy, the economic system runs badly 
V170 E121.- Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling 
V171 E122.- Democracies aren´t good at maintaining order 
V172 E123.- Democracy may have problems but is better 
V173 E124.- Respect for individual human rights nowadays 
V174 E125.- Satisfaction with the people in national office 
V175 E128.- Country is run by big interest vs. for all people’s benefit 
 
- On international politics (N=5) 
 
V177 E135.- Who should decide: international peacekeeping 
V178 E136.- Who should decide: protection of the environment 
V179 E137.- Who should decide: aid to developing countries 
V180 E138.- Who should decide: refugees 
V181 E139.- Who should decide: human rights 
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APPENDIX B. A ZINB MODEL OF DK ANSWERS TO POLITICS-RELATED 
QUESTIONS 
 [STATA output] 
 
. zinb dkpol ageg1 ageg3 3rdpar female edulev intpol trust respint1 respint2, inflate(ageg1 
ageg3 preadu female edulev intpol trust respint1 respint2) vuong zip nolog 
 
. prchange 
 
zinb: Changes in Predicted Rate for dkpol 
 
          min->max      0->1     -+1/2    -+sd/2 
   ageg1   -0.1817   -0.1817   -0.1829   -0.0727 
   ageg3   -0.8623   -0.8623   -0.8621   -0.4190 
  3rdpar    0.7658    0.7658    0.7574    0.3670 
  female    1.2096    1.2096    1.2092    0.6034 
  edulev   -6.7927   -3.3254   -1.7288   -1.7450 
  intpol   -5.2092   -1.3292   -0.8061   -1.1929 
   trust   -0.1567   -0.1567   -0.1607   -0.0792 
respint1   -3.3204   -3.3204   -3.7666   -1.7360 
respint2   -1.7885   -1.7885   -1.7294   -0.8447 
 
exp(xb):   5.0862 
 
base x values for count equation:  
 
           ageg1     ageg3    preadu    female    edulev    intpol     trust  r 
> espint1  respint2 
    x=   .196791   .385027   .374332   .491979   2.74973   4.31926    .53262    
> .325134        .6 
sd(x)=   .397786   .486862   .484209   .500203   1.00929   1.47848   .499202    
> .468675    .49016 
 
base x values for binary equation:  
 
           ageg1     ageg3    preadu    female    edulev    intpol     trust  r 
> espint1  respint2 
    x=   .196791   .385027   .374332   .491979   2.74973   4.31926    .53262    
> .325134        .6 
sd(x)=   .397786   .486862   .484209   .500203   1.00929   1.47848   .499202    
> .468675    .49016 
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APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN TABLE 4 
Table 13 Description of variables in Table 4 
 
Variable 
 China 
Mean 
(s..d) 
India 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Vietnam 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
S. Korea 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
U.S. 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
 
Gender(female) 
 
dummy 
 
0.506 
(0.500) 
0.432 
(0.495) 
0.508 
(0.500) 
0.497 
(0.500) 
0.577 
(0.494) 
 
Age       > 50 
 
dummy 
 
0.214 
(0.410) 
0.222 
(0.416) 
0.288 
(0.453) 
0.194 
(0.396) 
0.296 
(0.457) 
36-50 dummy 0.409 
(0.492) 
0.315 
(0.465) 
0.365 
(0.482) 
0.379 
(0.485) 
0.331 
(0.471) 
             <= 35 dummy 0.377 
(0.485) 
0.464 
(0.499) 
0.347 
(0.476) 
0.427 
(0.495) 
0.373 
(0.484) 
 
Education (level)a 
 
scale 
 
2.685 
(1.034) 
2.791 
(1.690) 
2.868 
(1.129) 
4.184 
(0.825) 
4.003 
(1.178) 
 
Political interest 
 
scale 
 
4.319 
(1.478) 
3.819 
(1.861) 
5.217 
(1.373) 
3.888 
(1.096) 
4.685 
(1.697) 
 
Interpersonal trust 
 
dummy 
 
0.525 
(0.500) 
0.389 
(0.488) 
0.387 
(0.487) 
0.273 
(0.446) 
0.359 
(0.480) 
 
Interest in interview 
- very interested 
 
dummy 
 
0.311 
(0.463) 
0.474 
(0.499) 
0.692 
(0.462)  
0.761 
(0.427) 
- somewhat interested dummy 0.597 
(0.491) 
0.375 
(0.484) 
0.271 
(0.445)  
0.222 
(0.416) 
 
N 
  
935 
 
1808 
 
966 
 
1192 
 
1192 
 
Notes: a  Education is measured in five levels: 1 "inadequately completed elementary education"; 2 "completed 
(compulsory) elementary education"; 3 "complete secondary school: technical/vocational type";  4 "complete 
secondary: university-preparatory type"; 5 "university degree"  
 
Source: World Values Survey, 4th wave 
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APPENDIX D. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN TABLE 7 
Table 14 Description of variables in Table 7 
 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Institution-based support 0 1 -4.81 1.93
Performance-based support 0 1 -4.16 2.77
Age cohort: 
56 – 66  
(generation of Socialism transformation) 0.10 0.29 0 1
44 – 55 
(generation of the Cultural Revolution) 0.20 0.40 0 1
33 – 43  
(generation of political liberalization) 0.33 0.47 0 1
   25 – 32 
  (generation of post-Tiananmen event) 0.28 0.45 0 1
18 – 24 (c.f.) 
  (generation of post-Deng era) 0.10 0.29 0 1
Education (level) 2.90 0.99 1 5
Gender - Female  0.44 0.50 0 1
Trust in general people  0.55 0.50 0 1
Presence of third parties 0.36 0.48 0 1
Life independence 7.36 2.37 1 10
Political interest (PI) 0.17 0.96 -2.25 1.54
Confidence in television (TV) 0.74 0.44 0 1
Confidence in the press (PRE) 0.67 0.47 0 1
Interaction of PI and TV 0.15 0.82 -2.25 1.54
Interaction of PI and PRE 0.14 0.78 -2.25 1.54
Nationalism 0.83 0.38 0 1
Satisfaction with life as a whole 6.76 2.34 1 10
Satisfaction with financial situation 5.81 2.54 1 10
     
 
Source: World Values Survey, 4th wave 
SD = standard deviation 
N = 659 
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APPENDIX E. FREEDOM BY INTERPERSONAL TRUST 
 
Figure 13 Freedom by interpersonal trust 
Notes: Interpersonal trust is the average percentage who said “most people can be trusted” in 
each country in the 1990-1996 World Values Suveys. 
Source: Seligson 2002, p. 278. 
 184 
APPENDIX F. DIMENSIONS OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST 
Table 15 Dimensions of interpersonal trust 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Items loading loading loading 
 
Family 0.032 -0.038 0.885 
Relatives 0.420 0.078 0.677 
    
Neighbor 0.700 0.115 0.355 
Colleague  0.806 0.087 0.114 
Schoolmate 0.805 0.034 0.031 
Villager 0.824 0.095 0.077 
    
Businessman 0.140 0.753 -0.013 
Out-of-towner 0.072 0.846 0.015 
Stranger 0.038 0.793 0.008 
    
 
Eigenvalue 
 
3.190 
 
1.785 
 
1.031 
Proportion 0.355 0.198 0.115 
 
Notes:  Extraction Method: principal-component factors.  Figures in this table are factor loadings from 
the varimax rotation matrix.  N = 5475. 
Source: The Chinese Value and Ethics Survey, 2004 
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